Explore the vast range of titles available.

The paper investigates the effects of oil price shocks on stock market volatility in Europe by focusing on three measures of volatility, i.e. the conditional, the realized and the implied volatility. The findings suggest that supply-side shocks and oil specific demand shocks do not affect volatility, whereas, oil price changes due to aggregate demand shocks lead to a reduction in stock market volatility. More specifically, the aggregate demand oil price shocks have a significant explanatory power on both current- and forward-looking volatilities. The results are qualitatively similar for the aggregate stock market volatility and the industrial sectors' volatilities. Finally, a robustness exercise using short- and long-run volatility models supports the findings.

This paper develops and estimates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with sticky prices and wages for the euro area. The model incorporates various other features such as habit formation, costs of adjustment in capital accumulation and variable capacity utilization. It is estimated with Bayesian techniques using seven key macroeconomic variables: GDP, consumption, investment, prices, real wages, employment, and the nominal interest rate. The introduction of ten orthogonal structural shocks (including productivity, labor supply, investment, preference, cost-push, and monetary policy shocks) allows for an empirical investigation of the effects of such shocks and of their contribution to business cycle fluctuations in the euro area. Using the estimated model, we also analyze the output (real interest rate) gap, defined as the difference between the actual and model-based potential output (real interest rate).

I study whether and how US shocks are transmitted to eight Latin American countries. US shocks are identified using sign restrictions and treated as exogenous with respect to Latin American economies. Posterior estimates for individual and average effects are constructed. US monetary shocks produce significant fluctuations in Latin America, but real demand and supply shocks do not. Floaters and currency boarders display similar output but different inflation and interest rate responses. The financial channel plays a crucial role in the transmission. US disturbances explain important portions of the variability of Latin American macrovariables, producing continental cyclical fluctuations and, in two episodes, destabilizing nominal exchange rate effects. Policy implications are discussed.

Productivity risk is pervasive in underdeveloped countries. This paper highlights a way in which underdevelopment exacerbates productivity risk. Productivity shocks cause larger changes in the wage when workers are poorer, less able to migrate, and more credit‐constrained because of such workers’ inelastic labor supply. This equilibrium wage effect hurts workers. In contrast, it acts as insurance for landowners. Agricultural wage data for 257 districts in India for 1956–87 are used to test the predictions, with rainfall as an instrument for agricultural productivity. In districts with fewer banks or higher migration costs, the wage is much more responsive to fluctuations in productivity.

In this paper, we examine the nature of the shocks that hit the small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Japan during the global financial crisis that occurred in the wake of the massive number of non-performing subprime loans in the U.S. We examine how the SMEs responded to the shocks, using the unique surveys that were conducted by the Research Institute of the Economy, Trade and Industry in 2008 and 2009. The shocks were identified as demand, supply, and financial shocks. The demand shock was the most prevalent of the shocks, while the financial shock was least frequent. The SMEs took a spectrum of measures against the demand shock by seeking help from suppliers and financial institutions. We find that the measures taken by the SMEs crucially depended on the bank-firm relationship as well as the customer-supplier relationship. The bank-dependent SMEs asked their closely-affiliated financial institutions for help, while the SMEs less dependent on financial institutions sought help primarily from their suppliers. A long customer-supplier relationship plays an important role in mitigating the supply shock.

This paper uses a simple VAR for the USA and Euro area to analyse the underlying shocks of the early millennium slowdown, i.e. supply, demand, monetary policy and oil price shocks. The results of two identification strategies are compared. One is based on traditional zero restrictions and, as an alternative, an identification scheme based on more recent sign restrictions is proposed. The main conclusion is that the recent slowdown is caused by a combination of several shocks: negative aggregate supply and aggregate spending shocks, the increase of oil prices in 1999, and restrictive monetary policy in 2000. These shocks are more pronounced in the USA than the Euro area. The results are somewhat different depending on the identification strategy. It is illustrated that traditional zero restrictions can have an influence on the estimated impact of certain shocks.

This paper studies a popular statistical model of permanent and transitory shocks to output using a set of arguably more plausible structural assumptions. One way to structurally interpret the model is by assuming aggregate demand has no long-run output effect. However, many economic theories are inconsistent with that assumption. Instead, we reinterpret the statistical model assuming a positive shock to aggregate supply lowers the price level and in the long run raises output while a positive shock to aggregate demand raises the price level. Under these assumptions, a puzzling finding from the empirical literature implies that a positive aggregate demand shock had a long-run positive effect on output in pre-World War I economies.

Shocks to the real price of oil may reflect oil supply shocks, shocks to the global demand for all industrial commodities, or demand shocks that are specific to the crude oil market. Each shock has different effects on the real price of oil and on US macroeconomic aggregates. Changes in the composition of shocks help explain why regressions of macroeconomic aggregates on oil prices tend to be unstable. Evidence that the recent surge in oil prices was driven primarily by global demand shocks helps explain why this shock so far has failed to cause a major recession in the United States. (JEL E31, E32, Q41, Q43)

Sign restrictions on the responses generated by structural vector autoregressive models have been proposed as an alternative approach to the use of exclusion restrictions on the impact multiplier matrix. In recent years such models have been increasingly used to identify demand and supply shocks in the market for crude oil. We demonstrate that sign restrictions alone are insufficient to infer the responses of the real price of oil to such shocks. Moreover, the conventional assumption that all admissible models are equally likely is routinely violated in oil market models, calling into question the use of posterior median responses to characterize the responses to structural shocks. When combining sign restrictions with additional empirically plausible bounds on the magnitude of the short-run oil supply elasticity and on the impact response of real activity, however, it is possible to reduce the set of admissible model solutions to a small number of qualitatively similar estimates. The resulting model estimates are broadly consistent with earlier results regarding the relative importance of demand and supply shocks for the real price of oil based on structural vector autoregressive (VAR) models identified by exclusion restrictions, but imply very different dynamics from the posterior median responses in VAR models based on sign restrictions only.

SUMMARY There has been a systematic increase in the volatility of the real price of crude oil since 1986, followed by a decline in the volatility of oil production since the early 1990s. We explore reasons for this evolution. We show that a likely explanation of this empirical fact is that both the short‐run price elasticities of oil demand and of oil supply have declined considerably since the second half of the 1980s. This implies that small disturbances on either side of the oil market can generate large price responses without large quantity movements, which helps explain the latest run‐up and subsequent collapse in the price of oil. Our analysis suggests that the variability of oil demand and supply shocks actually has decreased in the more recent past, preventing even larger oil price fluctuations than observed in the data. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.