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This is the first work to set one of the great bloodless revolutions of the twentieth century in its proper historical context. John Dunlop pays particular attention to Yeltsin's role in opposing the covert resurgence of Communist interests in post-coup Russia, and faces the possibility that new institutions may not survive long enough to sink roots in a traditionally undemocratic culture.

Joseph Stalin was the unchallenged dictator of the Soviet Union for so long that most historians have dismissed the officials surrounding him as mere yes-men.On Stalin's Team overturns this view, revealing that behind Stalin were a dozen or so loyal and competent men who formed a remarkably effective team from the late 1920s until his death in.

The purpose of the discussion, which served as keynote at a conference convened under the title “Music and Power,” is to complicate what is often a simplified and overly dichotomized view of that relationship. Two figures, Dmitry Kabalevsky and Tikhon Khrennikov, are singled out for commentary as musicians who wielded political power or conspicuously benefited from it under the Soviet regime. The titular serendipities were occasions through which the author was made unexpectedly aware of the ambiguities and nuances that attended the interactions of music and musicians with the Soviet state.

This article develops a comparative institutional framework for evaluating the new legislatures of the former Soviet Union, and demonstrates that the conventional wisdom about the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet is wrong. It was not a totalitarian, Soviet institution whose omnipotent and malevolent Chair singlehandedly dominated policy outputs and controlled the membership. Rather, the Supreme Soviet's non-partisan, committee-centered design enabled the committees to dominate the legislative process and to virtually exclude conflict, even on such objectively contentious legislative issues as the annual budget. However, the non-partisan design denied the legislature the mechanisms for controlling the Chair on non-legislative, political issues, particularly in relations with the executive branch. On legislative issues, the Supreme Soviet was a well-oiled machine, but on political issues it was out of control, thus leading to the legislature's demise. This article demonstrates the utility of an institutional framework for comparing post-communist legislatures, and the necessity of disaggregating legislative and political issues when evaluating legislative performance.

Rodion Y. Malinovsky informs Soviet Union. Armed Forces that the present state of International relations requires a heightened state of Combat readiness; Red Star (Soviet Union periodical) article of 5 October 1962 summarizes Combat readiness requirements for Armed forces confronted with the exigencies of modern Warfare; Warsaw Pact Order (21 November 1962) terminates Military alert status for Warsaw Pact Armed forces; Soviet Union Government Order of 23 October 1962 terminates Military alert status for Soviet Union. Armed Forces; Warsaw Pact Order (23 October 1962) calls for increased Warsaw Pact [Military personnel; Naval forces] Combat readiness; Soviet Union Government Order of 23 October 1962 cancels leaves for Soviet Union. Armed Forces [Rockets; Anti-aircraft weapons; Submarines] Military personnel; Mao Tse-Tung Intermediaries reportedly promised that China (People's Republic) would carry out a Military intervention in Taiwan in the event of a U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Anatoly F. Dobrynin reportedly states that Soviet Troop withdrawal from Cuba led to Opposition from \"certain quarters\" in the Soviet Union; Soviet Union. Armed Forces Military officers displeasure with the Cuban Crisis policies of Nikita S. Khrushchev reportedly leads them to Boycotts of a December 1962 meeting of the Soviet Union. Supreme Soviet; Soviet Union. Armed Forces attitudes regarding [Soviet missile deployment; Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba] are reviewed; Intelligence Report states that the Anastas I. Mikoyan Visit to Cuba (2-26 November 1962) was intended to restrain Fidel Castro from shooting down other U-2 Flights over Cuba which could have led to U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Foreign Minister of Cuba son reportedly states that Soviet motivations during the Cuban Crisis were to carry out a Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba in exchange for U.S. concessions; Emilio Aragones Navarro reportedly states that Cuba possessed Nuclear weapons for a few weeks only; John F. Kennedy is told during the Anastas I. Mikoyan Visit to Cuba (2-26 November 1962) that Soviet missile deployment in Cuba consisted of Defensive weapons installed in response to U.S. military intervention in Cuba Threats; Soviet Union reportedly falsely informs officials from Poland on 12 November 1962 that China (People's Republic) Technical personnel carried out the U-2 Downing over Cuba (27 October 1962) in an attempt to provoke Warfare; Nikita S. Khrushchev informs the United Kingdom. Ambassador to the Soviet Union that IL-28 Aircraft were sent to Cuba in response to John F. Kennedy Mobilization of the U.S. Armed Forces. Reserve Components; Evidence is inconclusive concerning a report that the [Bratsk (Soviet Union ship); Aleksandrovsk (Soviet Union ship)] removed radioactive materials associated with Nuclear warheads from Cuba; Cuban refugees claim on 6 November 1962 that Missiles are concealed in Caves in seven locations in Cuba; Aleksandrovsk (Soviet Union ship) reportedly removes six nose cone vans for Nuclear warheads from Cuba on 5 November 1962; Soviet Union. Armed Forces Military personnel state that proposal for a Cuba-Turkey missile exchange was dropped because of U.S. resistance; Soviet Union. Armed Forces Military officers state on 29 October 1962 that Fidel Castro will have to accept a Cuban Crisis Settlement and that U.S. military intervention in Cuba would have led to Soviet Military actions; Government officials in [Hungary; Bulgaria] interfere with [United States Embassy. Hungary; United States Embassy. Bulgaria] Communications; Polaris Missiles Submarines head from Holy Loch Naval Base (United Kingdom) on courses that are Classified information; Soviet Union. Committee for State Security Intelligence agents state that a U.S. military intervention in Cuba would elicit a \"strong response\" from the Soviets; Meeting of Nikita S. Khrushchev and William E. Knox (24 October 1962) discusses [Soviet missile deployment; Jupiter Missiles; Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962); U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba); Berlin Crisis]; TASS (Soviet Union news agency) president reportedly states on 23 October 1962 that the Soviet Union. Armed Forces will sink U.S. Naval vessels if Soviet Ships are subjected to Military actions; Submarines are sighted alongside the Terek (Soviet Union ship) in the north Atlantic Ocean on 22 October 1962; Cuba Embassy. Switzerland are informed by Soviet Government officials on 21 September 1962 that all Soviet Union. Armed Forces are in a state of Military alert in preparation for a U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Nikita S. Khrushchev informs official from Belgium on 18 September 1962 that the Soviets will introduce the Berlin Crisis issue in the U.N.; Nikita S. Khrushchev informs Bruno Pitterman on 17 September 1962 that U.S. military intervention in Cuba would affect Soviet Union policy toward the Berlin Crisis; Nikita S. Khrushchev informs Bruno Pitterman that the Soviets will use [Submarines; Rockets] to ensure their Transit rights to Cuba; U.S. National Indications Center summarizes a Red Star (Soviet Union periodical) article describing the Combat readiness of Soviet Union. Armed Forces during the Cuban Crisis; Anatoly F. Dobrynin informs Adlai E. Stevenson that Nikita S. Khrushchev will not visit the U.N. before mid-November 1962; Nikita S. Khrushchev informs Bruno Pitterman on 17 September 1962 that Soviet Union. Navy vessels were instructed to ignore any U.S. Blockades of Cuba; Pravda (Soviet Union newspaper) editorial on 13 September 1962 states that Soviet policy toward Cuba will not permit U.S. Imperialism to use [Blockades of Cuba; U.S. military intervention in Cuba] to destroy the Cuban Revolution (1959); [Raul Castro; Ernesto (\"Che\") Guevara] request that Cuba be admitted to the Warsaw Pact is rejected on 12 September 1962; Foreign Minister of Cuba informs Government officials from Canada on 11 September 1962 that Cuba has not been guaranteed Security assistance from the Soviet Union; Anatoly F. Dobrynin informs Adlai E. Stevenson on 7 September 1962 that Arms shipments to Cuba consist only of Defensive weapons; Radio broadcasts from Havana state that Soviet policy toward Cuba includes defending it in the event of U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Soviet Union announces the resumption of Nuclear weapon tests on 21 July 1962; Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseyev arrives in Havana on 13 August 1962; TASS (Soviet Union news agency) criticizes Western policies toward the Berlin Crisis but Nikita S. Khrushchev states that Negotiations on the issue will nevertheless continue; Nikita S. Khrushchev denies statement by Robert S. McNamara that U.S. Military capability is greater than that of the Soviet Union; Evacuation of Cuban citizens from [Mariel; Banes] and other locations in Cuba is carried out in July 1962; Soviet arms shipments of AS-1 Cruise Missiles arrive in Cuba in July 1962; Military build-up in Cuba carried out by the Soviets began with [Cargo ships; Passenger ships] sailing from the Black Sea in July 1962; Nikita S. Ryzhov requests that Turkey accept the Cuba-Turkey missile exchange proposed in Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (27 October 1962); Nikita S. Khrushchev states that IL-28 Aircraft were obsolete intended to be used as \"flying\" Artillery by Cubans for Coastal frontier defense systems; U.S. National Indications Center prepares chronology of the role of the Soviet Union. Armed Forces in the Cuban Crisis from the commencement of extensive Soviet arms shipments to Cuba until 23 November 1962; Nikita S. Khrushchev informs Konrad Adenauer that Soviet Rockets removed from Cuba are being sent to the Western border

John F. Kennedy receives reports on [Skybolt missiles; Soviet Union; China (People's Republic); India] and on speeches by [Nikita S. Khrushchev; Andrei A. Gromyko] to the Soviet Union. Supreme Soviet

U.S. Department of State. Bureau of European Affairs. Office of Soviet Union Affairs analysis of a speech by Nikita S. Khrushchev to the Soviet Union. Supreme Soviet indicates that the Soviets are willing to make some concessions in future Negotiations