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\"Recent revelations about America's National Security Agency offer a stark reminder of the challenges posed by the rise of the digital age for American law. These challenges refigure the meaning of autonomy and the meaning of the word \"social\" in an age of new modalities of surveillance and social interaction, as well as new reproductive technologies and the biotechnology revolution. Each of these developments seems to portend a world without privacy, or at least a world in which the meaning of privacy is radically transformed, both as a legal idea and a lived reality. Each requires us to rethink the role that law can and should play in responding to today's threats to privacy. Can the law keep up with emerging threats to privacy? Can it provide effective protection against new forms of surveillance? This book offers some answers to these questions. It considers several different understandings of privacy and provides examples of legal responses to the threats to privacy associated with new modalities of surveillance, the rise of digital technology, the excesses of the Bush and Obama administrations, and the continuing war on terror\"-- Provided by publisher.

All U.S. agencies with counterterrorism programs that collect or \"mine\" personal data-such as phone records or Web sites visited-should be required to evaluate the programs' effectiveness, lawfulness, and impacts on privacy. A framework is offered that agencies can use to evaluate such information-based programs, both classified and unclassified. The book urges Congress to re-examine existing privacy law to assess how privacy can be protected in current and future programs and recommends that any individuals harmed by violations of privacy be given a meaningful form of redress. Two specific technologies are examined: data mining and behavioral surveillance. Regarding data mining, the book concludes that although these methods have been useful in the private sector for spotting consumer fraud, they are less helpful for counterterrorism because so little is known about what patterns indicate terrorist activity. Regarding behavioral surveillance in a counterterrorist context, the book concludes that although research and development on certain aspects of this topic are warranted, there is no scientific consensus on whether these techniques are ready for operational use at all in counterterrorism.

\"This is the story of surveillance in Britain and the United States, from the detective agencies of the late nineteenth century to 'Wikileaks' and CIA whistleblower Edward Snowden in the twenty-first. Written by prize-winning historian and intelligence expert Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, it is the first full overview of its kind.\"--Publisher's description.

We live in an age of student surveillance. Once student surveillance just involved on-campus video cameras, school resource officers, and tip lines, but now, it extends beyond school hours and premises. Corporate monitoring software, installed on school-provided laptops, does two things. First, it blocks \"objectionable\" material, informing administrators about content that students tried to access. Second, it scans students' searches, browsing, files, emails, chats, and geolocation to detect \"problematic\" material. For many students, school-provided laptops are their only computing device. They use that device to complete homework, as they must; they use it to chat with friends, explore ideas, and play. For those students, the surveillance is twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. Totalizing surveillance makes student intimate privacy impossible and undermines the school's crucial role in educating democratic citizens. Student surveillance chills children's willingness to engage in expressive activities, including experimenting with nonmainstream ideas. Self-censorship is even more likely for disabled and LGBTQ+ students who fear judgment and reprisal. Student surveillance corrodes students' relationships with teachers. It raises the risk of suspension for Black and Hispanic students for minor infractions like profanity, a blow to equality. Companies promise that their surveillance systems can detect suicidal ideation, threats, and bullying, but little evidence shows that they work as intended. We need robust, substantive protections for student intimate privacy for the good of free expression, democracy, and equality. Schools should not use surveillance software unless companies can show that the continuous tracking makes students safer and is designed to minimize the harm to privacy, expression, and equality.

\"After losing her job to artificial intelligence, May, in a city populated by intelligent robots called \"hums,\" takes her family on a three-night respite to the Botanical Garden, a rare green refuge, where her children come under threat and she is forced to trust a hum to save them\"-- Provided by publisher.

A playful, informal approach to using the Raspberry Pi for mischief!Raspberry Pi for Secret Agents is for all mischievous Raspberry Pi owners who'd like to see their computer transform into a neat spy gadget to be used in a series of practical pranks and projects. No previous skills are required to follow along and if you're completely new to Linux, you'll pick up much of the basics for free.Apart from the Raspberry Pi board itself, a USB microphone and/or a webcam is required for most of the audio/video topics and a WiFi dongle is recommended for the networking examples. A Windows/Mac OS X/Linux computer (or second Raspberry Pi) is also recommended for remote network access.

We sequenced sarbecovirus from Rhinolophus spp. bats in Bandarban District, Bangladesh, in a genomic surveillance campaign during 2022-2023. Sequences shared identity with SARS-CoV-1 Tor2, which caused an outbreak of human illnesses in 2003. Describing the genetic diversity and zoonotic potential of reservoir pathogens can aid in identifying sources of future spillovers.

Apple's high-profile 2016 fight with the FBI, in which the company challenged a court order commanding it to help unlock the iPhone of one of the San Bernardino terrorists, exemplifies how central the question of regulating government surveillance has become in U.S. politics and law. But scholarly attempts to answer this question have suffered from a serious omission. Scholars have ignored how government surveillance is checked by surveillance intermediaries: companies like Apple, Google, and Facebook that dominate digital communications and data storage and on whose cooperation government surveillance relies. This Article fills this gap in the scholarly literature, providing the first comprehensive analysis of how surveillance intermediaries constrain the surveillance executive, the law enforcement and foreign-intelligence agencies that conduct surveillance. In so doing, it enhances our conceptual understanding of, and thus our ability to improve, the institutional design of government surveillance. Surveillance intermediaries have financial and ideological incentives to resist government requests for user data. Their techniques of resistance are proceduralism and litigiousness that reject voluntary cooperation in favor of minimal compliance and aggressive litigation; technological unilateralism, in which companies design products and services to make surveillance harder; and policy mobilization that rallies legislative and public opinion against government surveillance. Surveillance intermediaries also enhance the surveillance separation of powers: They make the surveillance executive more subject to interbranch constraints from Congress and the courts and to intrabranch constraints from economic and foreign relations agencies as well as from the surveillance executive s own surveillance-limiting components. The normative implications of this descriptive account are important and crosscutting. Surveillance intermediaries can both improve and worsen the surveillancefrontier, the set of tradeoffs between public safety, privacy, and economic growth from which we choose surveillance policy. They enhance surveillance self government—the democratic supervision over surveillance policy—when they mobilize public opinion and strengthen the surveillance separation of powers. But they undermine it when their unilateral technological changes prevent the government from exercising its lawful surveillance authorities.

Herein, we provide results from a prospective population-based longitudinal follow-up (FU) SARS-CoV-2 serosurveillance study in Tirschenreuth, the county which was hit hardest in Germany in spring 2020 and early 2021. Of 4203 individuals aged 14 years or older enrolled at baseline (BL, June 2020), 3546 participated at FU1 (November 2020) and 3391 at FU2 (April 2021). Key metrics comprising standardized seroprevalence, surveillance detection ratio (SDR), infection fatality ratio (IFR) and success of the vaccination campaign were derived using the Roche N- and S-Elecsys anti-SARS-CoV-2 test together with a self-administered questionnaire. N-seropositivity at BL was 9.2% (1st wave). While we observed a low new seropositivity between BL and FU1 (0.9%), the combined 2nd and 3rd wave accounted for 6.1% new N-seropositives between FU1 and FU2 (ever seropositives at FU2: 15.4%). The SDR decreased from 5.4 (BL) to 1.1 (FU2) highlighting the success of massively increased testing in the population. The IFR based on a combination of serology and registration data resulted in 3.3% between November 2020 and April 2021 compared to 2.3% until June 2020. Although IFRs were consistently higher at FU2 compared to BL across age-groups, highest among individuals aged 70+ (18.3% versus 10.7%, respectively), observed differences were within statistical uncertainty bounds. While municipalities with senior care homes showed a higher IFR at BL (3.0% with senior care home vs. 0.7% w/o), this effect diminished at FU2 (3.4% vs. 2.9%). In April 2021 (FU2), vaccination rate in the elderly was high (>77.4%, age-group 80+).

Societal Impact Statement Huánglóngbìng (HLB) is a bacterial disease of citrus that has significantly impacted Brazil and the United States, although citrus production in the Mediterranean Basin remains unaffected. By developing a mathematical model of spread in Spain, we tested surveillance and control strategies before any future HLB entry in the EU. We found while some citrus production might be maintained by roguing, this requires extensive surveillance and significant chemical control, perhaps also including testing of psyllids (which spread the pathogen) for bacterial DNA. Our work highlights the key importance of early detection (including asymptomatic infection) and vector control for HLB management. Summary Huánglóngbìng (HLB; citrus greening) is the most damaging disease of citrus worldwide. While citrus production in the United States and Brazil have been affected for decades, HLB has not been reported in the European Union (EU). However, a HLB vector, the African citrus psyllid, is already in Portugal and Spain. In 2023, the major vector, the Asian citrus psyllid, was first reported in Cyprus. We develop a landscape‐scale, epidemiological model, accounting for heterogeneous citrus cultivation and vector dispersal, as well as climate and disease management. We use our model to predict HLB dynamics for an epidemic vectored by the African citrus psyllid in high‐density citrus areas in Spain, assessing detection and control strategies. Without disease management, we predict large areas infected within 10–20 years. Even with significant visual surveillance, any epidemic will be widespread on first detection, making eradication unlikely. Nevertheless, increased inspection and roguing following first detection, particularly if coupled with intensive insecticide use, could sustain some citriculture for a decade or more, albeit with reduced production. However, effective control may require chemical application rates and/or active substances no longer authorised in the EU. Strategies targeting asymptomatic infection will be more successful. Detection of bacteriliferous vectors—sometimes possible long before plants show symptoms—could reduce lags before disease management commences. If detection of HLB‐positive vectors were followed by intensive insecticide sprays, this may greatly improve outcomes. Our work highlights modelling as a key component of developing epidemiological preparedness for a pathogen invasion that is, at least somewhat, predictable in advance. El huanglongbing (HLB) es una enfermedad bacteriana de los cítricos que ha tenido un impacto significativo en Brasil y Estados Unidos, pero la cuenca mediterránea permanece libre de la enfermedad. Para prepararnos ante una posible entrada de HLB en la Unión Europea, desarrollamos un modelo matemático que simula la propagación de la enfermedad en España y evaluamos diversas estrategias para su vigilancia y control. Concluimos que si bien es posible mantener cierta producción de cítricos erradicando los árboles infectados, esta estrategia requiere una vigilancia intensiva, un control altamente efectivo de los psílidos que transmiten la bacteria y posiblemente pruebas de ADN de estos insectos para detectar la bacteria. Nuestro estudio destaca la importancia de la detección temprana de la enfermedad, incluidas las infecciones asintomáticas, así como el control eficaz de vectores, para el manejo del HLB. O huánglóngbìng (HLB) é uma doença bacteriana dos citrinos que teve um impacto significativo no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos, mas a Bacia Mediterrânica permanece livre da doença. Para nos prepararmos para uma possível entrada do HLB na União Europeia, desenvolvemos um modelo matemático que simula a propagação da doença em Espanha e avaliamos várias estratégias para a sua vigilância e controlo. Concluímos que, embora seja possível manter alguma produção de citrinos através da erradicação das árvores infetadas, esta estratégia requer uma vigilância intensiva, um controlo altamente eficaz dos psilídeos vetores da bactéria e, possivelmente, testes de ADN nesses insetos para detetar a bactéria. O nosso estudo destaca a importância da deteção precoce da doença, incluindo as infeções assintomáticas, assim como o controlo eficaz dos vetores, para a gestão do HLB. Huánglóngbìng (HLB) is a bacterial disease of citrus that has significantly impacted Brazil and the United States, although citrus production in the Mediterranean Basin remains unaffected. By developing a mathematical model of spread in Spain, we tested surveillance and control strategies before any future HLB entry in the EU. We found while some citrus production might be maintained by roguing, this requires extensive surveillance and significant chemical control, perhaps also including testing of psyllids (which spread the pathogen) for bacterial DNA. Our work highlights the key importance of early detection (including asymptomatic infection) and vector control for HLB management.