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A key obstacle to fundamental tariff reform in many developing countries is the revenue loss that it ultimately implies. This paper establishes a simple and practicable strategy for realizing the efficiency gains from tariff reform without reducing public revenues, showing that for a small open economy, a cut in tariffs combined with a point-for-point increase in domestic consumption taxes increases both welfare and public revenues. Increasingly stringent conditions are required, however, to ensure unambiguously beneficial outcomes from this reform strategy when allowance is made for such important features as nontradeable goods, intermediate inputs, and imperfect competition.

Non-tariff measures, particularly sanitary and phytosanitary measures and tariff-rate quotas, are two critical policy barriers that impede agricultural trade. Unlike simple tariffs, both measures contain non-linear effects and binding conditions that make their treatment in modeling trade liberalization challenging. In addition, the coexistence of these measures carries important interactive effects that restrict trade. This study investigates these joint effects by developing a conceptual framework that considers different partial liberalization scenarios. Our framework points to three cases that may arise: (a) binding tariff-rate quota, nonprohibitive sanitary and phytosanitary measure; (b) non-binding tariff-rate quota, non-prohibitive sanitary and phytosanitary measure; and (c) non-binding tariff-rate quota, prohibitive sanitary and phytosanitary measure. We then use a Computable General Equilibrium model to examine partial trade liberalization scenarios for these cases, using the ongoing Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations as our motivation. Our simulations provide a more nuanced analysis of complex trade liberalization and demonstrate the importance of modeling the interplay between these different types of barriers.

This paper analyzes risk aversion in discriminatory share auctions. I generalize the k‐step share auction model of Kastl (2011, 2012) and establish that marginal profits are set‐identified for any given coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion. I also derive necessary conditions for best‐response behavior, which allows determining risk preferences from bidding data. Further, I show how the bidders' optimality conditions allow computing bounds on the marginal profits that are tighter than those currently available. I use my results to estimate import rents from Swiss tariff‐rate quotas on high‐quality beef. Rents are overestimated when ignoring risk aversion, and rent extraction is underestimated. Small bidders (small, privately owned butcheries) are more risk averse than large bidders (general retailers). Best response violations are few and uniform across bidder sizes.

New horizons are opening for Africa, with a growing number of Chinese andIndian businesses fostering its integration into advanced markets. However,significant imbalances will have to be addressed on both sides of the equation to support long-term growth.

Ukraine's Trade Policy identifies the key drivers of Ukraine's recent trade performance, assesses current trade policies, and proposes recommendations to strengthen the Ukraine’s trade integration strategy. It also identifies core bottlenecks in the ongoing integration processes, including global and regional integration. The study concludes that the main obstacles to furthering Ukraine’s trade integration are domestic, and relate to deficiencies in the business environment. Problems in customs administration, standardization, and administrative barriers for new entry require immediate attention. The report highlights specific policy issues that hamper WTO accession, such as trade legislation, protection of intellectual property rights, government support for specific industries, and export restrictions. It also recommends improvements in the structure of Ukraine’s import tariffs, reform of both the regime of free economic zones and mechanism of VAT refund, and investment in a major upgrade of government capacity for investment and export promotion. The report also draws attention to the importance of the post-WTO accession agenda for Ukraine. To take advantage of WTO membership, the Government will need to undertake significant institutional reforms to implement WTO regulatory rules in ways that facilitate integration into the world economy and provide benefits to private sector participants.

This paper examines the theory underpinning the design of optimal tariffs in a developing economy, and the experience of implementation of tariff reforms. A central issue is whether and when a case can be made for a uniform tariff structure. While theory advocates a differentiated tariff structure (except under a balance of payments objective), political economy considerations, inadequate information, and administrative convenience point to a minimally differentiated tariff structure. The experience of reform indicates that tariff structures are mainly influenced by income distribution and protection objectives. The ability to successfully reduce tariffs depends on measures taken to alleviate fiscal and balance of payments constraints.

The paper contributes to the discussion about the revenue implications of trade reform by assessing the approximate fiscal revenue impact of different liberalization formulae under consideration in multilateral trade negotiations for a group of low- and middle-income countries. The study applies a linear optimization framework to data for bound tariffs, applied tariffs, and imports at the HS-6 digit level for 58 developing countries, and simulates results for different sets of import demand elasticities and developing country \"flexibilities.\" While only a small number of countries face a significant impact, results point toward the need for complementary fiscal measures in the countries most affected by revenue loss.

This paper assesses the effects of reducing tariffs under the Doha Round on market access for developing countries. It shows that for many developing countries, actual preferential access is less generous than it appears because of low product coverage or complex rules of origin. Thus lowering tariffs under the multilateral system is likely to lead to a net increase in market access for many developing countries, with gains in market access offsetting losses from preference erosion. Furthermore, comparing various tariff-cutting proposals, the research shows that the largest gains in market access are generated by higher tariff cuts in agriculture.