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The welfare effects of trade shocks turn on the nature and magnitude of the costs workers face in moving between sectors. Using an Euler-type equilibrium condition derived from a rational expectations model of dynamic labor adjustment, we estimate the mean and variance of workers' switching costs from the US CPS. We estimate high values of both parameters, implying slow adjustment of the economy and sharp movements in wages in response to trade shocks. However, import-competing workers can still benefit from tariff removal; liberalization lowers their wages in the short and long run but raises their option value.

Purpose The purpose of this study is to explore the essential cause for the policy failure of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) in South Korea. Design/methodology/approach To substantiate the claims made for the failure of the policy, this paper focuses on the differences in policy preferences among the government ministries and agencies involved in TAA. Findings The failure in the TAA policy, according to this study, was attributed to the conflicts and miscoordination arising from the differences in policy preferences among government ministries and agencies. To rectify this failure, the South Korean government had to revise its laws and regulations several times over a short period. Originality/value Drawing on the analytical framework of the literature on policy failure, this paper examines the causal relationships between outcomes of TAA policy and the conflicts or miscoordination among government bodies at each stage: initiatives and planning, implementation and operation of the policy.

Do fast, competitive markets yield liquidity measurement problems when using the popular Monthly Trade and Quote (MTAQ) database? Yes. MTAQ yields distorted measures of spreads, trade location, and price impact compared with the expensive Daily Trade and Quote (DTAQ) database. These problems are driven by (1) withdrawn quotes, (2) second (versus millisecond) time stamps, and (3) other causes, including canceled quotes. The expensive solution, using DTAQ, is first-best. For financially constrained researchers, the cheap solution—using MTAQ with our new Interpolated Time technique, adjusting for withdrawn quotes, and deleting economically nonsensical states—is second-best. These solutions change research inferences.

We empirically characterize the mechanics of trade adjustment during the Argentine crisis. Though imports collapsed by 70 percent from 2000 to 2002, the entry and exit of firms or products at the country level played a small role. The within-firm churning of imported inputs, however, played a sizeable role. We build a model of trade in intermediate inputs with heterogeneous firms, fixed import costs, and roundabout production. Import demand is non-homothetic and the implications of an import price shock depend on the full distribution of firm-level adjustments. An import price shock generates a significant decline in productivity.

The conventional approach to trade liberalization has been to liberalize trade through international agreement and address subsequent domestic fallout and spillovers through domestic policies. In consequence, international obligations in trade liberalization are not legally connected with ‘flanking’ measures to address their negative effects. We discuss the shortcomings of this conventional approach with respect to labor adjustment and environmental protection: for political reasons, trade liberalization requires today the simultaneous regulation of labor and environmental spillovers. We suggest a novel approach to trade liberalization that includes the necessary flanking policies as part of, or linked to, the international agreement itself. This novel approach seeks to achieve the best of both worlds: reaping the benefits of international trade while making sure that negative spillovers are effectively addressed. To illustrate the intricacies of this approach, we introduce a new conceptual framework covering the negative effects of trade liberalization and flanking or mitigating policies, and a proposed novel approach in the form of trade liberalization packages and package treaties. Trade liberalization packages and package treaties are currently emerging around the world (e.g. sustainable palm oil in EFTA–Indonesia) and deserve our close attention.

The lack of real progress at the Durban climate change conference in 2011—postponing effective action until at least 2020—has many causes, one of which is the failure to address trade issues and, in particular, carbon leakage. This paper advances two arguments. First, it argues that the conventional view of Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs) as a 'dirty' trade barrier should be turned on its head. Rather, the absence of a carbon price comprises an implicit subsidy to dirtier production in non-regulated markets. Second, BCAs could act as a game-changer when climate policy negotiations move at a glacial pace, if at all. Materially stronger progress could be achieved indirectly from the threat of unilateral trade policies. The paper shows how this could come about, using a simple political game theory model. The appropriate game form is one in which parties move unilaterally and sequentially, given the failure to agree on a common course of action, and are fully aware of the impacts of their actions. The paper shows that properly crafted BCAs could help reduce trade distortions, limit the competiveness effects, and help build a broader coalition of interests for more global actions.

This feature contains short articles on topics that are currently on the agendas of policymakers, thus illustrating the role of economic analysis in illuminating current debates. Suggestions for future columns and comments on past ones should be sent to C. Eugene Steuerle, c/o Journal of Economic Perspectives, The Urban Institute, 2100 M Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037.

Background In late 2018 the United States, Canada, and Mexico signed a new trade agreement (most commonly referred to by its US-centric acronym, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA) to replace the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The new agreement is the first major trade treaty negotiated under the shadow of the Trump Administration’s unilateral imposition of tariffs to pressure other countries to accept provisions more favourable to protectionist US economic interests. Although not yet ratified, the agreement is widely seen as indicative of how the US will engage in future international trade negotiations. Methods Drawing from methods used in earlier health impact assessments of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, we undertook a detailed analysis of USMCA chapters that have direct or indirect implications for health. We began with an initial reading of the entire agreement, followed by multiple line-by-line readings of key chapters. Secondary sources and inter-rater (comparative) analyses by the four authors were used to ensure rigour in our assessments. Results The USMCA expands intellectual property rights and regulatory constraints that will lead to increased drug costs, particularly in Canada and Mexico. It opens up markets in both Canada and Mexico for US food exports without reducing the subsidies the US provides to its own producers, and introduces a number of new regulatory reforms that weaken public health oversight of food safety. It reduces regulatory policy space through new provisions on ‘technical barriers to trade’ and requirements for greater regulatory coherence and harmonization across the three countries. It puts some limitations on contentious investor-state dispute provisions between the US and Mexico, provisions often used to challenge or chill health and environmental measures, and eliminates them completely in disputes between the US and Canada; but it allows for new ‘legacy claims’ for 3 years after the agreement enters into force. Its labour and environmental chapters contain a few improvements but overall do little to ensure either workers’ rights or environmental protection. Conclusion Rather than enhancing public health protection the USMCA places new, extended, and enforceable obligations on public regulators that increase the power (voice) of corporate (investor) interests during the development of new regulations. It is not a health-enhancing template for future trade agreements that governments should emulate.

At a time when trade and globalization are subject to extremely polarized political debates, we study the interplay between politics and the certification outcome of trade adjustment assistance (TAA), a US national policy meant to buffer the domestic labour market from adverse effects of increased international trade. To this end, we capitalize on the unique design, implementation and detailed data collection efforts of the US TAA program. We employ a rich multi-dimensional data set to quantify the effects of political influence on the TAA certification process, controlling for a variety of fixed effects, in particular at the industry level. We find that political factors such as party affiliation of the president, congressional voting outcomes at the state and district levels and whether a petition was filed in a presidential election year influence the TAA certification probability as well as the decision time. À l’heure où le commerce et la mondialisation font l’objet de débats politiques extrêmement polarisés, nous nous intéressons à l’interaction entre la politique et l’aboutissement d’une certification au plan d’aide aux rajustements commerciaux, une politique nationale américaine visant à protéger le marché national du travail des répercussions négatives liées à l’essor du commerce international. À cette fin, nous nous appuyons sur la conception singulière, la mise en œuvre et le recueil de données détaillées du Programme d’aide à l’ajustement commercial des États-Unis (PAAC). Pour mesurer les répercussions de l’influence de la politique sur le processus de certification du PAAC, nous utilisons un ensemble de données multidimensionnel important tenant compte d’un ensemble d’effets fixes, notamment au niveau sectoriel. Nous constatons qu’un certain nombre de facteurs politiques, notamment l’affiliation politique du président, l’issue des votes parlementaires au niveau national et local ou le dépôt d’une pétition au cours d’une année d’élection présidentielle peut avoir une incidence sur la probabilité d’une certification ainsi que sur le calendrier décisionnel.

How responsive is the US’ Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) to the labor dislocation that results from trade integration? Recent findings suggest that the world's most ambitious trade adjustment program barely responds to import shocks, and that the shortfall is made up by disability insurance and early retirement. This holds considerable implications: TAA offers a lens onto the central question of whether developed democracies can effectively redistribute the gains from international economic integration. We take a closer look at these results. Using petition-level data over a 20-year period, we find that TAA is between 1.7 and 3.3 times more responsive than current estimates suggest. Yet the news is not all good. As we show, the responsiveness of TAA has decreased considerably since the 1990s, just as developed democracies started facing increasing pushback against liberalization. This shortfall, in turn, has political consequences: areas where TAA has been least responsive were also more likely to shift toward voting for Trump in the 2016 Presidential election. Our findings speak to the considerable challenge governments face in aiding workers “left behind” by liberalization.