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How long have the United States and their Saudi allies been sponsoring and financing the radical Islamists, and why doesn't anyone stop them? Labévière uncovers the money-laundering, the organized crime and the interlocking world of business and politics.

China's efforts in conflict mediation are an important test of the durability of the principle of non-interference. By analysing the approaches and means of China's post-2014 mediation efforts in Afghanistan, this article finds that China's behaviour shows it engages in medium-level interference in domestic affairs, but mostly with the host government's concurrence. This is because of the two forms China's mediation takes. In a bilateral context, China's mediation takes the form of “incentivizing mediation,” in which its economic power, and its omnidirectional foreign policy, provide incentives or leverage for warring factions to come to the negotiation table, but which also lets the warring factions formulate their own roadmap to peace talks. In a multilateral context, China sometimes engages in “formulative mediation,” in which the mediators, not the disputing parties, formulate a roadmap to peace talks. 中国在冲突调解方面的努力是对不干涉原则持久性的重要考验。通过分析 2014 年后中国在阿富汗进行调解努力的途径和方法, 本文发现中国的行为表明, 虽然中国进行中等程度内政干涉, 但主要还是在与东道国政府达成共识的基础上进行干涉。这是由中国调解采取的两种形式导致的。在双边背景下, 中国的调解采取 “激励式调解” 的形式, 其中它的经济实力和全方位的外交政策为交战各方提供了动机或杠杆来到谈判桌上, 但也让交战各方制定他们自己的和平谈判路线图。在多边背景下, 中国有时参与 “主导式调解”, 和平谈判的路线图是由调解者而不是争议各方来制定的。

This article provides an overview of the impact of United Nations (UN) sanctions and counterterrorism (CT) measures on humanitarian action. The mandatory requirements of UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373 on member States to prohibit the provision of \"funds, financial assets or economic resources\" to terrorists complicates the work of humanitarian actors delivering assistance in areas where groups designated under the 1267 regime control territory. After explaining the impact of sanctions and CT measures on humanitarian actors, the article explores three primary sets of challenges encountered by such actors: (1) lack of clarity and adequate legal protection for carrying out humanitarian activities in countries subject to sanctions or areas in which designated entities operate; (2) financial access difficulties or de-risking by financial institutions limiting the ability of non-profit organizations (NPOs) to transfer funds to higher-risk jurisdictions due to banks' risk aversion or fear of regulatory scrutiny of such transactions; and (3) conditions placed in funding contracts by donors effectively offloading CT and sanctions risks onto beneficiaries. The article analyzes experience with UN humanitarian carve-outs (exceptions as employed in the Somalia sanctions regime and case-by-case exemptions utilized in the North Korea regime), explaining why exceptions are the optimal solution for humanitarian actors. New data are presented indicating that the scope and scale of financial access difficulties experienced by NPOs have grown. Financial institutions, concerned about regulatory requirements to counter terrorism financing, are increasingly reluctant to provide banking services to NPOs working in highly sanctioned jurisdictions, and the resulting de-risking by banks results in significant problems for humanitarian organizations needing to move funds abroad. Additionally, contractual conditions related to CT and sanctions compliance are routinely employed by donors, resulting in an offloading of risk onto recipients without appropriate clarity and guidance from donors. Numerous initiatives in recent years have called attention to the challenges that humanitarians face: stakeholder dialogues, high-level meetings and other discussion fora promote broader understanding among participants and acknowledgement of the impacts that these polices have on humanitarian action. UN action to renew the 1267 regime's mandate and the consideration of a humanitarian carve-out in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Taliban's takeover represent opportunities to reform sanctions in order to better protect humanitarian action. Recommendations are presented for each of the three sets of challenges, with an urgent call for the Security Council to embrace the opportunity for reform and more effectively balance the equally critical objectives of countering terrorism and safeguarding humanitarian action.

In recent years, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)1 as well as several Al-Qaida affiliates have used the systematic and large-scale looting of antiquities as one of their income streams. Due to the large-scale and organized looting activities of these groups, in particular, in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), following various reports and recommendations by the ISIL, Al-Qaida and Taliban Monitoring Team has adopted a range of measures, chiefly among them the landmark UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017) to counter this threat. These measures demand that both member states’ regulators as well as private sector stakeholders take specific action to ensure that the art and antiquity trading industry is capable of defending itself against the misuse of their services to finance terrorism. This article outlines the various challenges member states and private industry are facing in this regard and explains how the various new UNSC provisions, including the measures outlined in UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017), could be employed effectively to counter this threat.

On this edition of Meet the Press: Senator John McCain discusses the possibility of war with Iraq; Colorado Senator, Wayne Allard and former U.S. Attorney, Tom Strickland face off in the first of the Meet the Press Senate Debate Series.

This chapter discusses UN resolutions referred to in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations. The chapter contains thirteen articles and outlines the ability of the Security Council to determine threats to world peace and take appropriate action. Resolution 1267 (1999) provides for the formation of a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council to report on the effectiveness of the fight against the Taliban. The sanctions have since been modified and strengthened by subsequent resolutions including Resolutions 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), and Resolution 1989 (2011) so that the sanctions measures applies to designated individuals and entities associated with Al‐Qaida, wherever located. Resolution 1373 is more wide‐ranging than Resolution 1267, in that it covers all acts of terrorism and terrorist financing. It calls upon states to increase cooperation and communication to prevent the financing of terrorism.

Discusses reasons for Pakistan's increasing isolation from the international community, including its Central Asian neighbors; political unrest leading to eruptions of violence, increased tension following adoption of Islamic law in Aug. 1998, and other issues. Summary in English p. 906. Loss of support for President Nawaz Sharif's regime, government bankruptcy, and assistance given by Pakistan to the Taliban in Afghanistan and other fundamentalist elements in Kashmir.

In Afghanistan's Helmland region, the opium economy is thriving and much of it is financing the Taliban. A United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report argues that much of the rest of the country has seen a decline in opium production, but Helmland heroin is finding new routes to the consumer, and NATO says that Taliban commanders and drug smugglers are often one and the same. The opium trade is worth about the equivalent of a third of Afghanistan's total economy. Adapted from the source document.

Discusses NGOs operating in Afghanistan over the past thirty years, under the Taliban and the new Afghan Interim Administration (AIA).

U.S. president Barack Obama entered office with a bold plan to combat Afghanistan's escalating insurgency, empower its government, encourage a political resolution of the conflict, and secure the cooperation of neighboring Pakistan -- all in time for U.S. troops to withdraw by the end of 2014. This new Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) policy has yet to deliver on its promise. While the U.S. military surge swept insurgents out of their southeastern strongholds, the rebels have responded with terror attacks and assassinations reaching into the heart of Kabul. Washington has accelerated its training of Afghan security forces, but most U.S. aid still circumvents the central government, weakening its authority. With a political settlement nowhere in sight and Pakistani support for armed extremists unabated, Washington's options for preventing a Taliban takeover have narrowed. Adapted from the source document.