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We report from a large-scale randomized field experiment conducted on a unique sample of more than 15,000 taxpayers in Norway who were likely to have misreported their foreign income. By randomly manipulating a letter from the tax authorities, we cleanly identify that moral suasion and the perceived detection probability play a crucial role in shaping taxpayer behavior. The moral letter mainly works on the intensive margin, while the detection letter has a strong effect on the extensive margin. We further show that only the detection letter has long-term effects on tax compliance. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics.

Few tasks are as crucial for the future of democracy in Latin America—and, indeed, in other underdeveloped areas of the world—as strengthening the rule of law and reforming the system of taxation. In this book, Marcelo Bergman shows how success in getting citizens to pay their taxes is related intimately to the social norms that undergird the rule of law. The threat of legal sanctions is itself insufficient to motivate compliance, he argues. That kind of deterrence works best when citizens already have other reasons to want to comply, based on their beliefs about what is fair and about how their fellow citizens are behaving. The problem of \"free riding,\" which arises when cheaters can count on enough suckers to pay their taxes so they can avoid doing so and still benefit from the government's supply of public goods, cannot be reversed just by stringent law, because the success of governmental enforcement ultimately depends on the social equilibrium that predominates in each country. Culture and state effectiveness are inherently linked. Using a wealth of new data drawn from his own multidimensional research involving game theory, statistical models, surveys, and simulations, Bergman compares Argentina and Chile to show how, in two societies that otherwise share much in common, the differing traditions of rule of law explain why so many citizens evade paying taxes in Argentina—and why, in Chile, most citizens comply with the law. In the concluding chapter, he draws implications for public policy from the empirical findings and generalizes his argument to other societies in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe.

This study examines how taxpayer support for government spending can improve tax compliance. While there is ample evidence on the deterrent effect of audit probability on taxpayer noncompliance, there is no evidence related to the moderating role that taxpayer support may have on compliance behavior. We also examine the moderating role that taxpayer ethics plays in compliance decisions. Results of our study indicate that the level of taxpayer support influences taxpayer compliance decisions, in that those with greater support for how tax dollars are spent report higher amounts of taxable income. In addition, we find that audit probability influences taxpayer compliance decisions when there is support for the government’s use of tax dollars for non-welfare programs, such as defense. However, for welfare programs, such as healthcare, taxpayer support leads to increased compliance regardless of audit rate. When taxpayers do not support government programs, their compliance is lower regardless of the audit probability. This highlights the importance of gaining taxpayer support for government programs and indicates that attempts to align the interests of taxpayers with those of the government may increase voluntary compliance among taxpayers. Finally, we find that taxpayer ethics influences compliance such that, for individuals who have lower ethical standards, a high audit rate as well as support for a program may be necessary to improve compliance behavior. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

The Municipal Office of Tax Administration of Santiago de Cuba faces a sustained growth in the level of tax debt of the sector of self-employed workers who pay taxes under the general regime. In this paper, the factors that have the greatest influence on the behaviour of tax compliance in this segment of taxpayers are examined. Surveys were applied to selected experts from the institution, and to a selected sample, processed in SPSS 28.0 and applying prospective planning methods. It showed as key factors: the perception of risk, institutional control, tax justice, keeping documentation of fiscal relevance, trust in ONAT, communication and knowledge of the destination of their contributions to the budget. In addition, strategic recommendations are offered to strengthen strategic alliances with territorial organizations that intervene in compliance management. La Oficina municipal de Administración Tributaria de Santiago de Cuba enfrenta un crecimiento sostenido del nivel de deuda tributaria del sector de trabajadores por cuenta propia que tributan por el régimen general. En este trabajo se exponen los factores que mayor incidencia tienen sobre el comportamiento de cumplimiento tributario en este segmento de contribuyentes. Se aplicaron encuestas a expertos seleccionados de la institución y a una muestra seleccionada de trabajadores por cuenta propia, fueron procesadas en el SPSS 28.0 y se aplicaron métodos de planificación prospectiva. Dichas encuestas arrojaron como factores clave la percepción del riesgo, el control institucional, la justicia tributaria, la conservación de la documentación de relevancia fiscal, la confianza en la ONAT, la comunicación y el conocimiento del destino de sus aportes al presupuesto. Se ofrecen, además, recomendaciones estratégicas para potenciar las alianzas estratégicas con organismos del territorio que intervienen sobre la gestión de cumplimiento.

This article refers to the issues associated with the crucial significance of the interpretation of tax law provisions made by administrative courts in the course of the judicial inspection of tax decisions, within the context of protecting the subjective rights of taxpayers. The analysis in that regard has been prepared based on the provisions of art. 153 of the Act of 25 July 2002 on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, which expresses the important rule of binding the court and the administrative authority, whose act was the subject of an appeal, with a legal assessment and instructions regarding the further proceedings described in the decision of the administrative court.As a result of this rule, a decision of an administrative court exerts the results exceeding the scope of judicial administrative proceedings, while its effect also covers the future tax proceedings. If the legal assessment made by the court refers to the regulations that affect the subjective rights of a taxpayer, it means that the administrative court imposes the effects of “its” interpretation of those provisions on a tax authority. In turn, the tax authority is obliged to respect those rights in accordance with the opinions of the court, which usually affects the final resolution of a tax case.It should be borne in mind that a taxpayer, by submitting an appeal against a tax decision to an administrative court, demands not only an inspection of the acts of tax administration, but also - which should be emphasized - demands the execution of its rights, including its subjective rights. Therefore, we should not forget the crucial role of the administrative courts in the protection of the substantive rights of taxpayers. The instrument that allows the administrative courts to guard the subjective rights of taxpayers, consists in the procedural regulations included in the provisions on proceedings before administrative courts, and in particular art. 153 of the Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts in Poland.

Local taxes are one of the local government's resource revenue in creating happiness. This study aims to analyze the influence of Good Governance Implementation, Tax Literacy, Demographic Factors, and Motivation on Land and Building Taxpayers' Compliance and Happiness in East Lombok Regency and analyze the role of Taxpayer Compliance in the mediation of Good Governance Implementation, Tax Literacy, Demographic Factors, and Motivation towards the Taxpayers Happiness of LB in East Lombok Regency. The population in this study was 26,965 taxpayers, and 177 respondents were selected as the sample using stratified sampling techniques. The data were collected from non-participant observation and in-depth structured interviews and were analyzed using SEM-PLS. The results showed that: (a) The implementation of good governance, tax literacy, demographic factors and taxpayer motivation was able to improve LB taxpayer compliance in East Lombok Regency; (b) Taxpayer motivation and taxpayer compliance could increase taxpayer happiness optimally, but the implementation of good governance, tax literacy and demographic factors could not increase the LB taxpayers happiness in East Lombok Regency; and (c) Indirect implementation of good governance, tax literacy, demographic factors and taxpayer activity could increase taxpayer happiness through LB taxpayer compliance in East Lombok Regency.

Reducing tax evasion is a priority for many governments. A growing literature argues that verifying taxpayer reports against third-party information is critical for tax collection. However, effectiveness can be limited when tax authorities face constraints to credible enforcement and taxpayers make offsetting adjustments on other margins. We exploit a policy intervention in which Ecuadorian firms were notified about detected revenue discrepancies. Most firms simply failed to respond. Firms that responded increased reported revenue, matching the discrepancy amount when provided. However, they also increased reported costs by 96 cents per dollar of revenue adjustment, resulting in minor increases in tax collection.

The slippery slope framework explains tax compliance along two main dimensions, trust in authorities and power of authorities, which influence taxpayers’ compliance attitudes. Through frequentist and Bayesian analyses, we investigated the framework’s assumptions on a sample of 2786 self-employed taxpayers from eleven post-communist and non-post-communist countries doing business in five economic branches. After using scenarios that experimentally manipulated trust and power, our results confirmed the framework’s assumptions regarding the attitudes of the self-employed taxpayers; trust and power fostered intended tax compliance and diminished tax evasion, trust boosted voluntary tax compliance, whereas power increased enforced tax compliance. Additionally, self-employed taxpayers from post-communist countries reported higher intended tax compliance and lower tax evasion than those from non-post-communist countries. Our results offer tax authorities insights into how trust and power may contribute to obtaining and maintaining high tax compliance levels amid global economic challenges, downturns, and increasing tax compliance costs.

To investigate the enforcement value of third-party information on potentially collusive taxpayers, I study an anti-tax evasion program that rewards consumers for ensuring that firms report sales and establishes a verification system to aid whistle-blowing consumers in São Paulo, Brazil (Nota Fiscal Paulista). Firms reported sales increased by at least 21 percent over 4 years. The results are consistent with fixed costs of concealing collusion, increased detection probability from whistle-blower threats, and with behavioral biases associated with lotteries amplifying the enforcement value of the program. Although firms increased reported expenses, tax revenue net of rewards increased by 9.3 percent.

Ensuring compliance with the tax laws is an enduring challenge for all governments. However, the methods by which governments enforce the tax laws, and by which individuals and firms evade their taxes, change over time, due at least in part to changing technology. In this paper I examine how changing technology, especially changes driven by the transformation of information into digital formats for use by computers, seems likely to affect tax evasion in the years ahead. I argue that many of these changes in technology will improve the ability of governments to decrease tax evasion, mainly by increasing the flow of information to governments. However, I also argue that these changes in technology will open up new avenues by which some individuals and some firms can evade (and avoid) taxes. At this point it is unclear which trend will dominate, so that the effects of technology on the overall level of tax evasion are uncertain. Even so, I believe that the distributional effects of these technological changes are more predictable, given the differential effects of technology on the abilities of individuals of different levels and types of income to evade their taxes. Indeed, I argue that changing technology will make evasion increasingly difficult for most taxpayers, especially those subject to employer withholding and third party information reporting, but that evasion will be increasingly viable for a small number of taxpayers, especially very high income taxpayers. Regardless of the overall impact of technology on the level of tax evasion, I conclude that the effects of technology will likely increase economic inequality.