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We report from a large-scale randomized field experiment conducted on a unique sample of more than 15,000 taxpayers in Norway who were likely to have misreported their foreign income. By randomly manipulating a letter from the tax authorities, we cleanly identify that moral suasion and the perceived detection probability play a crucial role in shaping taxpayer behavior. The moral letter mainly works on the intensive margin, while the detection letter has a strong effect on the extensive margin. We further show that only the detection letter has long-term effects on tax compliance. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics.

This article refers to the issues associated with the crucial significance of the interpretation of tax law provisions made by administrative courts in the course of the judicial inspection of tax decisions, within the context of protecting the subjective rights of taxpayers. The analysis in that regard has been prepared based on the provisions of art. 153 of the Act of 25 July 2002 on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, which expresses the important rule of binding the court and the administrative authority, whose act was the subject of an appeal, with a legal assessment and instructions regarding the further proceedings described in the decision of the administrative court.As a result of this rule, a decision of an administrative court exerts the results exceeding the scope of judicial administrative proceedings, while its effect also covers the future tax proceedings. If the legal assessment made by the court refers to the regulations that affect the subjective rights of a taxpayer, it means that the administrative court imposes the effects of “its” interpretation of those provisions on a tax authority. In turn, the tax authority is obliged to respect those rights in accordance with the opinions of the court, which usually affects the final resolution of a tax case.It should be borne in mind that a taxpayer, by submitting an appeal against a tax decision to an administrative court, demands not only an inspection of the acts of tax administration, but also - which should be emphasized - demands the execution of its rights, including its subjective rights. Therefore, we should not forget the crucial role of the administrative courts in the protection of the substantive rights of taxpayers. The instrument that allows the administrative courts to guard the subjective rights of taxpayers, consists in the procedural regulations included in the provisions on proceedings before administrative courts, and in particular art. 153 of the Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts in Poland.

This study examines how taxpayer support for government spending can improve tax compliance. While there is ample evidence on the deterrent effect of audit probability on taxpayer noncompliance, there is no evidence related to the moderating role that taxpayer support may have on compliance behavior. We also examine the moderating role that taxpayer ethics plays in compliance decisions. Results of our study indicate that the level of taxpayer support influences taxpayer compliance decisions, in that those with greater support for how tax dollars are spent report higher amounts of taxable income. In addition, we find that audit probability influences taxpayer compliance decisions when there is support for the government’s use of tax dollars for non-welfare programs, such as defense. However, for welfare programs, such as healthcare, taxpayer support leads to increased compliance regardless of audit rate. When taxpayers do not support government programs, their compliance is lower regardless of the audit probability. This highlights the importance of gaining taxpayer support for government programs and indicates that attempts to align the interests of taxpayers with those of the government may increase voluntary compliance among taxpayers. Finally, we find that taxpayer ethics influences compliance such that, for individuals who have lower ethical standards, a high audit rate as well as support for a program may be necessary to improve compliance behavior. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

The slippery slope framework explains tax compliance along two main dimensions, trust in authorities and power of authorities, which influence taxpayers’ compliance attitudes. Through frequentist and Bayesian analyses, we investigated the framework’s assumptions on a sample of 2786 self-employed taxpayers from eleven post-communist and non-post-communist countries doing business in five economic branches. After using scenarios that experimentally manipulated trust and power, our results confirmed the framework’s assumptions regarding the attitudes of the self-employed taxpayers; trust and power fostered intended tax compliance and diminished tax evasion, trust boosted voluntary tax compliance, whereas power increased enforced tax compliance. Additionally, self-employed taxpayers from post-communist countries reported higher intended tax compliance and lower tax evasion than those from non-post-communist countries. Our results offer tax authorities insights into how trust and power may contribute to obtaining and maintaining high tax compliance levels amid global economic challenges, downturns, and increasing tax compliance costs.