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The shift from manufacturing- to service-based economies has often been accompanied by the expansion of low-wage and insecure employment. Many consider the effects of this shift inevitable. InDisintegrating Democracy at Work, Virginia Doellgast contends that high pay and good working conditions are possible even for marginal service jobs. This outcome, however, depends on strong unions and encompassing collective bargaining institutions, which are necessary to give workers a voice in the decisions that affect the design of their jobs and the distribution of productivity gains. Doellgast's conclusions are based on a comparative study of the changes that occurred in the organization of call center jobs in the United States and Germany following the liberalization of telecommunications markets. Based on survey data and interviews with workers, managers, and union representatives, she found that German managers more often took the \"high road\" than those in the United States, investing in skills and giving employees more control over their work. Doellgast traces the difference to stronger institutional supports for workplace democracy in Germany. However, these democratic structures were increasingly precarious, as managers in both countries used outsourcing strategies to move jobs to workplaces with lower pay and weaker or no union representation. Doellgast's comparative findings show the importance of policy choices in closing off these escape routes, promoting broad access to good jobs in expanding service industries.

This paper examines recent changes in collective bargaining and employer strategies in the German telecommunications industry following market liberalization in the late 1990s. Germany's distinctive co-determination and vocational training institutions encouraged large firms to adopt employment systems in technician and call center workplaces that relied on high levels of worker skill and discretion. However, organizational restructuring is undermining these gains, as firms use outsourcing and the creation of subsidiaries to escape or weaken company-level collective agreements. These trends have substantially weakened unions and contributed to the further disorganization of coordinated bargaining structures. Findings are based on interviews with union and works council representatives, managers, and employees at Deutsche Telekom and its major competitors conducted between 2003 and 2007, as well as secondary analysis of company documents and industry reports.

This study examines how different participation rights and structures affect employee control over working time. The analysis is based on a comparison of matched call center and technician workplaces in two major telecommunications firms in Germany and Denmark. It draws on data from semi-structured interviews with managers, supervisors, and employee representatives between 2010 and 2016. Unions and works councils in both firms agreed to a series of concessions on working time policies in the early 2010s in exchange for agreements to halt or reverse outsourcing. The authors use Lukes’ concepts of decision-making and agenda-setting power to explain these common trends, as well as later divergence in outcomes. Germany’s stronger formal co-determination rights over working time proved a critical power resource for employee representatives as they sought to re-establish employee control in new, more flexible working time models.

This article examines union responses to the reorganization of call centre work in Germany, drawing on case studies from the telecommunications, financial services and subcontractor industries. Service unions initially adopted innovative strategies to organize these workplaces, in response to threats and opportunities presented by the rapid growth of a new 'sector'. However, the new conglomerate service union, ver.di, has been unable to sustain these alternative strategies due to both institutional and organizational factors. The increasingly fragmented character of the German industrial relations system provides growing exit options for employers, while the union is disadvantaged by declining membership, resource scarcity and an organizational structure reflecting past industry (and union) boundaries. Ver. di thus finds itself in an institutionally enhanced innovation dilemma. Sustaining innovations necessary to organize new workplaces would require organizational slack and redundant resources. However, environmental pressures of changing employer strategies and institutional erosion limit the possibilities for mobilizing these resources.

In the 1990s, telecommunications markets were transformed by a range of new technologies and by legislation aimed at easing the entry of new competitors.¹ The industry’s history as a regulated monopoly left a legacy of strong unions and public sector involvement. However, former monopolists initially pursued different strategies as they adjusted to more competitive markets. In the United States, AT&T and the regional Bells aggressively cut costs and downsized. Meanwhile, unions and works councils at Deutsche Telekom in Germany successfully slowed deregulation, promoted up-skilling, and eased worker displacement. The U.S. and German telecommunications markets looked more similar by the 2000s.

Deutsche Telekom AG has reached an agreement with German labor unions on a package of wage hikes, retirement benefits and worker training programs.