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Contrary to the early skepticism, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) has not only survived; in some ways it has actually flourished. KEDO and the DPRK (North Korea) have been able to forge a solid working relationship, which has been reflected in numerous agreements that interpret and implement the original commitments set forth in the 1994 Agreed Framework. More important is what KEDO has prevented—including the halting of its reprocessing of fissile material for atomic bombs. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been allowed continuous access to monitor this \"freeze.\" To date, there have been no publicly confirmed reports of the North cheating on this arrangement. Yet If KEDO were judged on its ability to efficiently manage an international construction project, it would be fortunate to receive a \"gentleman's C.\" But that may be the wrong way to assess its performance. Fundamentally, KEDO is a political endeavor, not a commercial project, and in that respect it has made a substantial contribution to peace building. Even without knowing the ultimate outcome of the KEDO project, its stabilizing presence has allowed the DPRK and the major powers in the region to begin a process of diplomatic and economic engagement.

This article argues that the continued delays in the lightwater reactor construction project are endangering the ultimate success of the project on a number of levels. The longer that the construction of the reactors is delayed, the higher the costs to the members of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, and the less likely that the discrepancies in the DPRK's initial declaration to the International Atomic Energy Agency can be cleared up. A number of incentives are proposed to induce the various parties involved to fulfill their commitments under the Agreed Framework more quickly than currently required. Among these are that South and North Korea can learn a great deal through the decommissioning and dismantling of the DPRK's old graphite-moderated reactor, which might have commercial viability in the future.

This article examines the problems with the implementation of the October 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework and suggests possible modifications. The Agreed Framework is a set of guidelines that help to regulate and render more predictable the behavior of the parties toward each other. There is nothing in the Framework to stop the two parties from reformulating and updating the agreement. The Bush administration and the DPRK will need to come to terms on a new, modernized agreement that serves their current needs while maintaining the diplomatic gains of the Framework to date. The nature of the DPRK's energy-sector problems means a multi-pronged approach on a number of fronts is required. In this article, we identify five priority areas where we see DPRK energy sector assistance as both necessary and in the best interests of all parties. A U.S.-backed, coordinated program of grassroots energy-sector assistance to the DPRK would yield huge dividends in terms of confidence building and regional security. At the same time, in order to retain credibility with the DPRK, the United States must abide by its commitments to date, including the Agreed Framework.

Throughout the Cold War there were longstanding efforts to control the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) through extensive arms control, deterrence, and defense programs. Since then counterproliferation efforts by the U.S. and international community have accelerated. Given the attention to counterproliferation in the last decade, how effective was the leadership provided by President Clinton and his Secretaries of Defense, Aspin, Perry and Cohen, in providing innovative and effective policies for countering the proliferation of WMD? Comparing the cases of U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and U.S. and U.N. efforts in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Joseph R. Cerami examines patterns of organizational leadership and policy innovation in the development and implementation of WMD policy initiatives. Rather than criticize the framework of American and international political institutions, this leadership perspective draws important insights on the capabilities of institutions to further U.S. and international goals and objectives in security policymaking. In doing so, the book argues that the U.S.'s role and the roles of its internal government agencies are most significant in international affairs. Smartly and appealingly positioned at the intersection of theory and practice, Cerami's book crafts a new perspective in international relations and public administration offering great potential for understanding as well as designing policy innovations to counter the proliferation of WMD in the 21st century.

The executive branch has been the chief architect of U.S. policy to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, Congress has also played an important role influencing that policy. Using North Korea policy, the authors examine the increasing role members of Congress play as foreign-policy entrepreneurs.