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Research on the relationship between religion and entrepreneurship has produced mixed findings. We argue such equivocal findings are partly the result of under-specification of the role of religion in entrepreneurial action. To address this issue, we build on the process perspective of entrepreneurial cognition by simultaneously incorporating mental representations and cognitive resources. Specifically, we theorize a cognitive process that incorporates both framing effects of opportunity cues and religious belief integration based on sanctification into the assessment of feasibility and desirability of entrepreneurial action. Through two within-subject experiments, we find (i) positively framed opportunity cues yield more favorable assessments of entrepreneurial action than negatively framed opportunity cues, and (ii) religious belief integration moderates the relationship between framing and assessments of entrepreneurial action, enhancing perceived feasibility and desirability when information framing is negative. We discuss the implications of our model to research the theological turn of entrepreneurship and a cognitive perspective of entrepreneurial action.Plain English SummaryBased on two within-subject experiments, our findings suggest that entrepreneurs who integrate their religious beliefs into their ventures tend to evaluate opportunities more positively, even in the face of negatively framed opportunity cues. Indeed, positively framed opportunity cues yield more favorable assessments than negatively framed cues, but religious belief integration moderates the relationship between framing and opportunity evaluation, enhancing perceived feasibility and desirability when framing is negative. This suggests that deep anchoring religious beliefs might help to foster optimism and cope with uncertainty, which can be beneficial in daunting times. However, it also suggests that religious beliefs are ineffective in debiasing overconfidence—They might even contribute to it. Our study expands research at the intersection of religion and entrepreneurship by specifying how and why religion matters in entrepreneurial action. We specify the role of religion and extend research in the cognitive perspective of entrepreneurial action through a process orientation.

While research has focused on financial and social goals in impact investing, we add to the limited research that focuses on how individuals manage identity multiplicity, defined as three or more role identities. Based on our qualitative study of Christian impact investors, we develop a model of identity multiplicity work, explaining how individuals manage their multiple role identities (financial, social, and religious) to reduce identity tensions during the process of impact investing. We find individuals engaged in an interactive, ongoing three-step process of identity multiplicity work: prioritizing one of their salient identities, managing their identity multiplicity interrelationships, and reinforcing their prioritized identity. Investors generally prioritized an identity that was neither financial nor social, but rather religious. We also find this identity work implemented through three novel mechanisms: shadowing, one identity casts a shadow over another thereby enabling the simultaneous pursuit of related goals; distinguishing, all identities are retained and at least a minimum threshold of role expectations are met; and surrendering, partial sacrificing of goals of one (or more) identity in favor of another identity based on an individual’s self-reflective importance of the role. Our findings offer new insights to multiple identities, impact investing and business ethics literatures.

In France today, philosophy--phenomenology in particular--finds itself in a paradoxical relation to theology. Some debate a \"theological turn.\" Others disavow theological arguments as if such arguments would tarnish their philosophical integrity, while nevertheless carrying out theology in other venues. In Crossing the Rubicon, Emmanuel Falque seeks to end this face-off. Convinced that \"the more one theologizes, the better one philosophizes,\" he proposes a counterblow by theology against phenomenology. Instead of another philosophy of \"the threshold\" or \"the leap\"--and through a retrospective and forward-looking examination of his own method--he argues that an encounter between the two disciplines will reveal their mutual fruitfulness and their true distinctive borders. Falque shows that he has made the crossing between philosophy and theology and back again with audacity and perhaps a little recklessness, knowing full well that no one thinks without exposing himself to risk.

This article explores the responses to nihilism offered by Jean-Luc Marion and Martin Heidegger. In particular, this paper offers a response to Steven DeLay’s ‘The vanity of authenticity’; DeLay’s text argues for the superiority of Marion’s response to nihilism through his notion of vanity and, further, argues that this supposed defeat of Heidegger by Marion lays the foundation for the theological turn in philosophy. This paper will instead suggest that Marion has not in fact surpassed Heidegger, that his concept of vanity does not represent a meaningful innovation, and that his answer to nihilism/vanity through love is more similar to Heidegger’s response than either DeLay or Marion acknowledges. DeLay’s reading focuses on Heidegger’s Being and Time, but uses this reading to dismiss Heidegger’s work in its entirety. This paper will, instead, focus on Heidegger’s later work, which is ignored by both Marion and DeLay, offering particular attention to the shift in Heidegger’s response to nihilism as he increases his engagement with the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche and introduces the concept Gelassenheit, which generally replaces the terminology of authenticity after the 1940s.

Some proponents of new atheism, including Dawkins, claim that religion, especially Islam, is the cause of the war because it encourages divisiveness and labeling. In this article, in the first step, I will show that Islam is not the cause of war, but rather it is a misconception of Islam that is the cause of divisiveness and eventually war. Then, I will demonstrate that the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on societies and religious behaviors somehow could, and still can, modify this misconception and blur divisions. This effect occurs in two ways: firstly, a pandemic creates common human problems for all people worldwide, making people more aware of their common points that Islam refers to as fitrah. This awareness of human beings’ common fitrah provides the grounds for presenting and accepting a humanistic interpretation of Islam. Secondly, the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on correcting Islamic beliefs is seen in epistemological explanations made possible thanks to online religious programs. Finally, I will try to apply this model to three types of religious conflict and explain why the COVID-19 pandemic can explain the decrease in the conflict in each: first, Muslims’ violence against non-Muslims; second, non-Muslims’ violence against Muslims; and third, violence within Islam, such as Shiite-Sunni conflicts. It seems that the closure of religious centers, transference of religious rituals to cyber-Islam, and the creation of global human-ethical existence have increased the amount of digital content produced in any religion and sect. Moreover, these contents have shifted towards intellectual, discursive, and epistemological topics. Finally, these contents put more emphasis on common human and ethical issues such as helping fellow human beings.

This paper deals with a research hypothesis tying the legacy of German idealism to the first foundation of Michel Henry’s “phenomenology of life”. Based on a series of archive documents, the paper reconstitutes the hermeneutical horizon in contrast with which the young Henry (1946–1963) defined his conception of phenomenology, philosophy, and religion, i.e., the French existential–Hegelian debate (Wahl, Kojève). The reconstitution of this dialogue between the young Henry and the French Hegelianism of the 20th century will provide the theoretical framework for the analysis of the “religious attitude” in Henry’s philosophy and in his attempt to rethink the transcendental connection between phenomenality and (philosophical) discourse.

This paper is a critical account on Emmanuel Falque’s project of the revision of the disciplinary boundaries between phenomenology and theology. Falque advices philosophers to embrace theology in order to philosophize better; and requests theologians to allow liberate themselves by philosophy. This proposal caused the earthquake in the field of the theological turn and earned heavy criticism. Firstly, I will contextualise and will present the background of Falque’s thought. Secondly, I will engage with major objections to his project and I will argue that critics often misread it. The centre of gravity is the definition of theology. Despite using the same sources, namely Heidegger’s radical distinction between the ontic science of theology and the ontological science of philosophy, Falque and his critics come to mutually exclusive conclusions. I will argue that critics employ a reductive definition of theology which results in the rejection of Falque’s general revision of the boundaries between disciplines. However, as it will be argued, Falque contributes not only to a philosophically plausible enrichment of phenomenological thought but also to a credible revision of theological practice in a phenomenological fashion.

This article examines the possibility that phenomenology was “always already” a theological enterprise, by outlining some of the foundational criticisms levelled by Michel Foucault and Louis Althusser. For both thinkers, the phenomenological stress on “lived experience” grants an undue primacy to the realm of “interiority”; as a result, subjectivity is left, not just reified, but also deified. By contrast, both Foucault and Althusser will argue for understanding the subject as constituted rather than constitutive; philosophy’s task, accordingly, is to delineate the broader structures (economic, ideological, discursive, linguistic, etc.) that create “lived experience,” rather than to hypostatize the subject as the privileged bearer of logos. As well as outlining the contours of this critique, however, the article indicates some of the shortcomings entailed in a total disavowal of “lived experience.”

The background concern of this paper is the well-rehearsed debate on the “theological turn” (or “veerings”) in French Phenomenology that was ignited by Dominique Janicaud some 25 years ago in his vociferous critique of several leading French thinkers. It also responds to subsequent contestations against Janicaud by numerous scholars defending these thinkers radicalising of phenomenology in their attempts to account for what Emanuel Levinas had “stirred up in the phenomenological field” by re-posing the question of the philosophical status of the idea of God. What is pivotal to Janicaud in his exclusionary critique and drawing of phenomenological boundaries is to hold dearly to the method as Edmund Husserl intended. In doing so, only describable phenomena that appear (or are logically subtended to appear) provide the litmus for a bona fide phenomenology. In opening and broadening the method to include experiences of a transcendent, religious nature as the French thinkers do, orthodox Husserlian thinking places these projects into question. The purpose of this paper is to question these post-Husserlian thinkers with a more faithful reading of Husserl. I analyse three key areas to suggest a ‘divine limit’ to phenomena: first, the concept of “the phenomenon” as developed in Husserl’s project; second, the ‘status of the idea of God’ in Husserl’s writings; and third, the relevant philosophical discourse on God that emerges from the Janicaud-led debate through critical commentary on the phenomenology of the “inapparent”. As a consequence, God is argued to be a divine limit to Husserlian phenomenology, but not religious belief itself.

Dominique Janicaud considered Paul Ricœur an ally in the dispute with those who, like Emmanuel Lévinas and Jean-Luc Marion, allegedly failed to keep phenomenology within its proper methodological limits. Janicaud also claimed to have been guided by Ricœur when it came to developing positive proposals for the future direction of phenomenology. This paper argues, however, that Janicaud misinterpreted key passages in works by Ricœur that address phenomenological issues. It also offers alternative readings which take account of the wider context. Thus, for example, Ricœur’s comments on Lévinasian phenomenology are shown to be appreciative rather than polemical. The paper also discusses Ricœur’s rarely commented upon oblique and indirect response to Janicaud, which establishes that Ricœur chose to align himself with phenomenologists who had taken “the theological turn.”