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We propose a theory of the market as an \"intertemporal\" process that integrates multiple theoretical perspectives. Using event-history methods, we analyze the dissolution of interorganizational market ties between advertising agencies and their clients as a function of three forces-competition, power, and institutional forces. The informal \"rules of exchange\" institutionalized in the \"emergence\" phase of the advertising services market include exclusivity (sole-source) and loyalty (infrequent switching). We find that most exchange relationships between advertising agencies and their clients are indeed exclusive, and most last for several years; but competition, power, and institutional forces support or undermine these rules. Most institutional forces reduce the risk of dissolution of agency-client ties. Powerful advertising agencies mobilize resources to increase tie stability, but powerful clients mobilize resources to increase or decrease stability. Competition is the weakest market force, but it has a consistent and substantial effect on tie dissolution: Competition always increases the risk of dissolution. We conclude that the market is institutionalized as imperfectly repeated patterns of exchange, because competition and changing norms about the duration of market ties destabilize market relationships.

In markets where buyers and suppliers negotiate, supplier costs, buyer willingness to pay, and competition determine only a range of potential prices, leaving the final price dependent on other factors (e.g., negotiating skill), which I call bargaining ability . I use a model of buyer demand and buyer–supplier bargaining, combined with detailed data on prices and quantities at the buyer–supplier relationship level, to estimate firm-bargaining abilities in the context of the coronary stent industry where different hospitals (buyers) pay different prices for the exact same product from the same supplier. I estimate that (1) variation in bargaining abilities explains 79% of this price variation, (2) bargaining ability has a large firm-specific component, and (3) changes in the distribution of bargaining abilities over time suggest learning as an important channel influencing bargaining ability. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2006 . This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.

I develop a general theory of monopoly pricing of networks. Platforms use insulating tariffs to avoid coordination failure, implementing any desired allocation. Profit maximization distorts in the spirit of A. Michael Spence (1975) by internalizing only network externalities to marginal users. Thus the empirical and prescriptive content of the popular Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (2006) model of two-sided markets turns on the nature of user heterogeneity. I propose a more plausible, yet equally tractable, model of heterogeneity in which users differ in their income or scale. My approach provides a general measure of market power and helps predict the effects of price regulation and mergers.

Many important issues in business-to-business markets involve price discrimination and negotiated prices, situations where theoretical predictions are ambiguous. This paper uses new panel data on buyer-supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market. While many phenomena that restrict different prices to different buyers are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs (e.g., mergers, group purchasing organizations, and transparency), I find that: (i) more uniform pricing works against hospitals by softening competition; and (ii) results depend ultimately on a previously unexplored bargaining effect.

Both Anderson and Gatignon and the Uppsala internationalization model see the initial mode of foreign market entry and subsequent modes of operation as unilaterally determined by multinational enterprises (MNEs) arbitraging control and risk and increasing their commitment as they gain experience in the target market. OLI and internalization models do recognize that foreign market entry requires the bundling of MNE and complementary local assets, which they call location or country-specific advantages, but implicitly assume that those assets are freely accessible to MNEs. In contrast to both of these MNE-centric views, I explicitly consider the transactional characteristics of complementary local assets and model foreign market entry as the optimal assignment of equity between their owners and MNEs. By looking at the relative efficiency of the different markets in which MNE and complementary local assets are traded, and at how these two categories of assets match, I am able to predict whether equity will be held by MNEs or by local firms, or shared between them, and whether MNEs will enter through greenfields, brownfields, or acquistions. The bundling model I propose has interesting implications for the evolution of the MNE footprint in host countries, and for the reasons behind the emergence of Dragon MNEs.

We provide a road map to the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets and present new results. We identify two-sided markets with markets in which the structure, and not only the level of prices charged by platforms, matters. The failure of the Coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two-sidedness. We build a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality, and obtain new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end-users.

The Uppsala internationalization process model is revisited in the light of changes in business practices and theoretical advances that have been made since 1977. Now the business environment is viewed as a web of relationships, a network, rather than as a neoclassical market with many independent suppliers and customers. Outsidership, in relation to the relevant network, more than psychic distance, is the root of uncertainty. The change mechanisms in the revised model are essentially the same as those in the original version, although we add trust-building and knowledge creation, the latter to recognize the fact that new knowledge is developed in relationships.

In this paper, we suggest that internalization theory might be extended by incorporating complementary insights from GVC theory. More specifically, we argue that internalization theory can explain why lead firms might wish to externalize selected activities, but that it is largely silent on the mechanisms by which those lead firms might exercise control over the resultant externalized relationships with their GVC partners. We advance an explanation linking the choice of control mechanism to two factors: power asymmetries between the lead firms and their GVC partners, and the degree of codifiability of the information to be exchanged in the relationship.

Many markets involve two groups of agents who interact via \"platforms,\" where one group's benefit from joining a platform depends on the size of the other group that joins the platform. I present three models of such markets: a monopoly platform; a model of competing platforms where agents join a single platform; and a model of \"competitive bottlenecks\" where one group joins all platforms. The determinants of equilibrium prices are (i) the magnitude of the cross-group externalities, (ii) whether fees are levied on a lump-sum or per-transaction basis, and (iii) whether agents join one platform or several platforms.

In this article we reveal how network-enabled imitation processes impact young small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) internationalization, and how a firm's network position as well as its experiential knowledge moderate imitative behavior in internationalization modes. Building on institutional, network, and organizational-learning theory, we suggest that firms imitate the internationalization modes of their peers in their network. Moreover, we argue that a firm's imitation propensity depends on two important boundary conditions: network position and past experience. Applying a longitudinal event history analysis to analyze the complete population of 977 German biotechnology firms between 1996 and 2012 largely supports our hypotheses. Our findings reveal that firms imitate the internationalization modes of their peers in a precise manner. This implies that the imitation of others can initially serve as a presumably convenient low-risk shortcut to a planned or experience-driven internationalization process. Furthermore, our results confirm that this imitation process is channeled through formal network relations and that central network positions that are associated with superior information access, enhanced legitimacy, and status may promote deviating behavior. Acknowledging the interplay of different learning sources, our findings additionally show that initial internationalization mode choices of SMEs can have a lasting effect on subsequent internationalization behavior. Overall, our study contributes to a more nuanced view of imitative behavior of internationalizing SMEs and its boundary conditions, and highlights future research opportunities that exist for considering imitation and its implications in international business research.