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The paper explores the functions of mediation during peaceful negotiations with a focus on the roles and models of intervention by a Third Party. The paper aims particularly to identify the conditions for the success or failure of negotiations accompanied by the model of Third-Party intervention in mediating peaceful settlements during armed conflicts. Apart from the method of mediation through the contrast approach, it also analyzes the differences with other mechanisms of conflict resolution including arbitration and litigation. It looks closely at the two different Third-Party roles: with authority, and third-party roles without authority. The latter option gravitates more towards mediation functions. As the factor of culture will also often affect how early in a dispute’s history third parties become involved, the paper also identifies which Third Party roles are available to disputants, as well as the third party’s inclination to focus on interests and rights. Through the method of a case study of the peaceful negotiations for achieving the Ohrid Framework Agreement (which stopped the armed conflict of 2001 in North Macedonia) the paper explores the comparative functions of the intervention by the international envoys in the capacity of a Third Party.

•Heterogeneity in third-party intervention is explored with a novel approach.•IS-RSA is applied to rs-fMRI.•rs-FC patterns in TPP networks are related to the general intervention propensity.•Distinct rs-FC patterns are linked with the helping and punishment propensity.•Post-hoc predictive modeling confirms the validity of IS-RSA findings. When confronted with injustice, individuals often intervene as third parties to restore justice by either punishing the perpetrator or helping the victim, even at their own expense. However, little is known about how individual differences in third-party intervention propensity are related to inter-individual variability in intrinsic brain connectivity patterns and how these associations vary between help and punishment intervention. To address these questions, we employed a novel behavioral paradigm in combination with resting-state fMRI and inter-subject representational similarity analysis (IS-RSA). Participants acted as third-party bystanders and needed to decide whether to maintain the status quo or intervene by either helping the disadvantaged recipient (Help condition) or punishing the proposer (Punish condition) at a specific cost. Our analyses focused on three brain networks proposed in the third-party punishment (TPP) model: the salience (e.g., dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, dACC), central executive (e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, dlPFC), and default mode (e.g., dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, dmPFC; temporoparietal junction, TPJ) networks. IS-RSA showed that individual differences in resting-state functional connectivity (rs-FC) patterns within these networks were associated with the general third-party intervention propensity. Moreover, rs-FC patterns of the right dlPFC and right TPJ were more strongly associated with individual differences in the helping propensity rather than the punishment propensity, whereas the opposite pattern was observed for the dmPFC. Post-hoc predictive modeling confirmed the predictive power of rs-FC in these regions for intervention propensity across individuals. Collectively, these findings shed light on the shared and distinct roles of key regions in TPP brain networks at rest in accounting for individual variations in justice-restoring intervention behaviors.

We explore economic incentives for third parties to intervene in ongoing internal wars. We develop a three-party model of the decision to intervene in conflict that highlights the role of the economic benefits accruing from the intervention and the potential costs. We present novel empirical results on the role of oil in motivating third-party military intervention. We find that the likelihood of a third-party intervention increases when (a) the country at war has large reserves of oil, (b) the relative competition in the sector is limited, and (c) the potential intervener has a higher demand for oil.

How does foreign support for rebel groups affect rebel governance of civilians during armed conflict? Existing studies primarily examine the local and domestic politics of rebel rule, leaving the effects of foreign intervention on rebel governance underexplored. Focusing on rebel provision of social services, this study considers two competing arguments. The first suggests that foreign sponsorship reduces rebels’ need to rely on local civilians for resources and hence decreases rebels’incentives to provide services. The second anticipates that by augmenting rebels’ resources and military capabilities, foreign support increases their capacity to provide welfare services. These competing logics suggest that different types of foreign support have divergent effects on rebel social service provision. The article tests this theory using cross-sectional time-series data on external support for rebel groups and rebel governance for the post-1945 period. It finds that rebel groups that receive external funding, weapons or training are significantly more likely to provide education and health services to civilians. In contrast, direct military intervention to assist insurgent forces has no effect on rebel service provision. This article is among the first to systematically study the impact of external support and third-party intervention on rebel social service provision during civil war and holds implications for civilian welfare in contested territories.

Third-party adjudicators, be they governments, or politicians or academics, can take positions regarding who initiated a conflict, who is to blame for harm or damage, and who has violated international law. Decisions need not always be objective. There can be bias. I consider the anomaly of biased adjudicators providing incentives for harm to their favored side. The anomaly arises in real-life circumstances. The puzzle is why adjudicators with good intentions cooperate in bringing harm to the civilian population of the side with which they sympathize. Anomalies are usually addressed in a context of behavioral economics. I consider both behavioral and rational explanations.

Preventing large-scale atrocities has emerged as an important policy goal of the post—Cold War period. However, a debate exists about the effects of creating an international institution to prevent atrocities. Advocates of intervention argue that a credible threat to intervene should deter perpetrators and stop atrocities when deterrence fails. Critics argue that third-party intervention, by strengthening weak minority groups and lowering the cost of war, encourages rebellions and so makes war and atrocities more likely. We develop a model of intervention to analyze this debate. The model shows that the negative effects of intervention highlighted by critics can be mitigated if the third party is relatively neutral and if alternative costs are imposed on decision makers. We conclude that with appropriate institutional design, the net impact of stronger third-party commitments to end atrocities will be to lower the expected level of atrocities.

The current research integrates theory on the contextual characteristics that impact bystanders’ decisions to prosocially intervene against workplace incivility. We built a model based upon two of the most influential theories of prosocial intervention—Latané and Darley’s (1970) decision-tree model and Piliavin et al.’ (1981) arousal: cost-reward model—and assert that decisions to intervene are affected by the inherent ambiguity of the uncivil context as well as the costs versus rewards of intervention in ways that facilitate action. Yet, depending on the gender composition of the dyad involved in the uncivil exchange, and both the moral identity and the role (i. e., supervisor versus coworker) of the observer, ambiguity and cost-reward considerations may differ in their relative impact. Policy capturing methodology was used to test the relative influence of ambiguity-reduction (i. e., harm to the target, appeal for help) versus cost-reward (i. e., target’s task performance level, bystander workload) situational cues on coworker and supervisor bystanders’decisions to intervene with either social support to the target or confronting the perpetrator. Results of a large-scale experiment with over 3400 participants revealed that each of the situational cues surrounding the uncivil exchange positively influenced observers’decisions to intervene in theorized ways and that cost-reward considerations and role obligations are intricately intertwined.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024 9(1), 53-68 | European Forum Insight of 2 May 2024 | (Table of Contents) I. Le contexte des interventions devant la CIJ. – II. Les modalités d’intervention devant la CIJ. – II.2. L’intervention en interprétation de l’art. 62 du Statut de la CIJ. – II.2. L’intervention en interprétation de l’art. 63 du Statut de la CIJ. – III. Les principaux arguments des interventions. – III.1. La question centrale de la compétence de la Cour: art. IX de la Convention. – III.2. L’interprétation des arts I et VIII de la Convention. – III.3. L’interprétation des arts II et III de la Convention. – IV. Impact procédural des interventions multiples devant la CIJ. – IV.1. Le double objectif des déclarations d’intervention des États membres de l’Union européenne. – IV.2. Une crainte de retard rapidement rassurée. – IV.3. L’ordonnance du 5 juin 2023. – V. Conclusion. | (Abstract) In the context of the litigation relating to the Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v Russian Federation) before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Member States of the European Union (EU) have in turn filed a declaration of intervention on the basis of art. 63 of the Statute of the ICJ. Scarcely deployed in practice, this procedure allows third parties’ States to the proceedings to declare the interpretation they adopt on the convention in dispute to which they are parties. In the present case, the States, on the one hand, interpret the convention in such a way as to ensure the jurisdiction of the Court and, on the other hand, that the use of armed force without the authorization of the Security Council is not a means of prevention or repression, even in the case of a potential genocide. In doing so, the intervening States openly show their support for Ukraine. Furthermore, the massive use of the declaration of intervention also tends to look like a instrumentalization of the law, directed towards Russia.

What explains the effect of external intervention on the duration of civil war? The literature on intervention has made some progress in addressing this question, but it has been hindered by an assumption that states intervene in civil wars either to help one side win or to facilitate negotiations. Often, however, external states become involved in civil war to pursue an agenda which is separate from the goals of the internal combatants. When states intervene in this fashion, they make wars more difficult to resolve for two reasons. First, doing so introduces another actor that must approve any settlement to end the war. Second, external states generally have less incentive to negotiate than internal actors because they bear lower costs of fighting and they can anticipate gaining less benefit from negotiation than domestic insurgents. Through Cox regressions using data on the goals of all interventions in civil wars since World War II, this article shows that when states intervene with an independent agenda, they make wars substantially longer. The effect of independent interventions is much larger than that of external interventions generally, suggesting that the established finding that external interventions prolong civil war is driven by a subset of cases where states have intervened in conflicts to pursue independent goals.

This paper models a rent-seeking contest which allows for the provision of third-party support. Support can be either provided by reducing the supported player’s cost of fighting or by increasing the ability to fight. I present and solve a rent-seeking contest which nests these two intervention mechanisms. Among others, I find that for identical intervention costs of the two mechanisms, the intervention mechanism becomes irrelevant for the outcome of the contest if the supported player’s cost ability parameter as well as the ability to fight are identical. Additionaly, the model endogenizes the third party’s choice of the applicable intervention mechanism. Among others, I find that different intervention mechanisms can lead to identical outcomes, despite different levels of fighting efforts.