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Thomas Schelling (Arms and influence, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966) cites bridge burning as a method of commitment. While such a commitment can increase the chances of success in a conflict, it generally will lower one’s payoff if the conflict is lost. I use a contest framework and establish conditions under which such commitment can raise a player’s expected payoff. The comparative static effects of bridge burning never are favorable at an interior equilibrium, but the strategy may induce the opponent to concede the contest’s outcome. I also analyze the strategy, associated with Sun Tzu, of leaving an escape path open for one’s enemy. This strategy always succeeds at an interior equilibrium and raises the expected payoffs of both players. Under certain parameter restrictions, leaving an open escape path also has the potential of inducing the opponent to concede the contest. A special case of the model is offered to explain why a group vulnerable to a wealth transfer might prefer a less efficient tax system to a more efficient system.

For contractarians, justice is the result of a rational bargain. The goal is to show that the rules of justice are consistent with rationality. The two most important bargaining theories of justice are David Gauthier's and those that use the Nash's bargaining solution. I argue that both of these approaches are fatally undermined by their reliance on a symmetry condition. Symmetry is a substantive constraint, not an implication of rationality. I argue that using symmetry to generate uniqueness undermines the goal of bargaining theories of justice.

Nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons, with their ballistic missile defense (BMD) penetrating capability, will provide an overall strategically stabilizing effect in the global arena but will further destabilize regional competitions. Development and deployment of BMD is a strategically destabilizing agent since adversaries perceive that they can no longer hold each other at risk of a retaliatory nuclear strike. Nuclear hypersonic weapons, with their promised capability to defeat missile defenses, will bolster expectations of reciprocal nuclear strikes. When this capability to provide retaliation is undermined, strategic instability ensues and manifests as arms races, aggressive posturing, and bellicose rhetoric. Therefore, global nuclear powers, with their robust counterforce capabilities, should develop nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons to return deterrence to an era of assured vulnerability that keeps nuclear weapons holstered. However, introducing hypersonics, with first-strike counterforce and decapitation capabilities, to regional nuclear power competitions will have the opposite effect, further destabilizing an already uneasy peace. In both cases, some period of greater strategic instability will exist as nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons become operational in an unbalanced manner. That is, as one nuclear power attains BMD-defeating capability, opposing powers will perceive that they are at a disadvantage. To mitigate this transition period of instability, global powers should proceed in developing hypersonic weapons but counter regional instability by banning regional development and curtailing hypersonic technology proliferation.

Threats of armed force are frequently employed in international affairs, yet they have received little ethical scrutiny in their own right. This article addresses that deficit by examining how threats, taken as a speech act, require a moral assessment that is distinctive vis-à-vis the actual use of armed force. This is done first by classifying threats within the framework of speech act theory. Then, applying standard just war criteria, we analyze conditional threats of harm under Thomas Schelling's twofold distinction of compellence and deterrence. We aim to show how threats of armed attack, while subject to many of the same evaluative principles as the corresponding use of force, nevertheless have distinctive characteristics of their own. These are outlined under the headings of just cause, ad bellum proportionality, legitimate authority, and right intention. The overall aim is to explain how threats in the international sphere represent a special category that warrants a just war analysis.

This article develops a spatial model of internal and external forced migration. We propose a model reminiscent of Hotelling’s spatial model in economics and Schelling’s model of segregation. Conflict is modeled as a shock that hits a country at certain location and generates displacement of people located near the shock’s location. Some displaced people cross a border, thus becoming refugees, while others remain as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The model delivers predictions about how the fractions of a country’s population that become refugees and IDPs ought to be related with the intensity of the shock, country size, terrain ruggedness and the degree of geographical proximity of the country with respect to the rest of the world. The predictions of the model are then tested against real data using a panel of 161 countries covering the period 1995-2016. The empirical evidence is mostly in line with the predictions of the model.

Coworking spaces are a rapid growing feature of modern cities, and increasingly popular with freelancers, knowledge workers, start-up communities, and others engaged in non-standard creative urban work. Drawing on ethnographic data gathered in a large case study of coworking spaces in Australia, we develop an economic model of an important aspect of coworking spaces in which a coworking space is a Schelling point. This argues that the main margin of value a coworking space provides is not price competition with serviced offices, or a more pleasant environment than working at home, but as a focal (Schelling) point for finding people, ideas and other resources when you lack the information necessary for coordination. Drawing on ethnographic research, we test some specific predictions the model makes about the organizational and institutional form of successful coworking spaces.

Integrated assessment models (IAMs) of climate and the economy provide estimates of the social cost of carbon and inform climate policy. With the Nested Inequalities Climate Economy model (NICE) (Dennig et al. PNAS 112:15,827–15,832, 2015 ), which is based on Nordhaus’s Regional Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy (RICE), but also includes inequalities within regions, we investigate the comparative importance of several factors—namely, time preference, inequality aversion, intraregional inequalities in the distribution of both damage and mitigation cost and the damage function. We do so by computing optimal carbon price trajectories that arise from the wide variety of combinations that are possible given the prevailing range of disagreement over each factor. This provides answers to a number of questions, including Thomas Schelling’s conjecture that properly accounting for inequalities could lead the inequality aversion parameter to have an effect opposite to what is suggested by the Ramsey equation.

Agent‐based models of residential segregation have been of persistent interest to various research communities since their origin with James Sakoda and popularization by Thomas Schelling. Frequently, these models have sought to elucidate the extent to which the collective dynamics of individual preferences may cause segregation to emerge. This open question has sustained relevance in U.S. jurisprudence. Previous investigation that incorporated heterogeneity of behaviors (preferences) showed reductions in segregation. Meanwhile, previous investigation that incorporated heterogeneity of social network topologies showed no significant impact to observed segregation levels. In the present study, we examined the effects of the concurrent presence of both behavioral and topological heterogeneities in network segregation models. Simulations were conducted using both homogeneous and heterogeneous preference models on 2D lattices with varied levels of densification to create topological heterogeneities (i.e., clusters and hubs). Results show a richer variety of outcomes, including novel differences in resultant segregation levels and hub composition. Notably, with concurrent increased representations of heterogeneous preferences and heterogeneous topologies, reduced levels of segregation emerge. Simultaneously, we observe a novel dynamic of segregation between tolerance levels as highly tolerant nodes take residence in dense areas and push intolerant nodes to sparse areas mimicking the urban–rural divide.

Abstract Claims about the deterrent role of forward military deployments often depend on the argument that attacks on troops stationed abroad will activate a “tripwire effect.” It is assumed that this effect would generate strong domestic pressure for further military intervention by the country whose troops have come under attack. In theory, the anticipation of a strong tripwire effect prospectively ties the hands of leaders, thereby bolstering the reliability of extended deterrent threats and promises. In this paper, we define the tripwire effect and use both conjoint and vignette survey experiments to evaluate its operation and magnitude among Americans. Results suggest that the tripwire effect is, at best, far weaker than many analysts and policymakers commonly assume. This finding raises serious questions about a core logic underpinning the United States’ forward military posture and highlights the need for more research on the deterrent functions of forward deployment.

Why do Internet, financial service, and beer commercials dominate Super Bowl advertising? How do political ceremonies establish authority? Why does repetition characterize anthems and ritual speech? Why were circular forms favored for public festivals during the French Revolution? This book answers these questions using a single concept: common knowledge. Game theory shows that in order to coordinate its actions, a group of people must form \"common knowledge.\" Each person wants to participate only if others also participate. Members must have knowledge of each other, knowledge of that knowledge, knowledge of the knowledge of that knowledge, and so on. Michael Chwe applies this insight, with striking erudition, to analyze a range of rituals across history and cultures. He shows that public ceremonies are powerful not simply because they transmit meaning from a central source to each audience member but because they let audience members know what other members know. For instance, people watching the Super Bowl know that many others are seeing precisely what they see and that those people know in turn that many others are also watching. This creates common knowledge, and advertisers selling products that depend on consensus are willing to pay large sums to gain access to it. Remarkably, a great variety of rituals and ceremonies, such as formal inaugurations, work in much the same way. By using a rational-choice argument to explain diverse cultural practices, Chwe argues for a close reciprocal relationship between the perspectives of rationality and culture. He illustrates how game theory can be applied to an unexpectedly broad spectrum of problems, while showing in an admirably clear way what game theory might hold for scholars in the social sciences and humanities who are not yet acquainted with it. In a new afterword, Chwe delves into new applications of common knowledge, both in the real world and in experiments, and considers how generating common knowledge has become easier in the digital age.