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In this six-part strategic assessment, I argue that fighting extremism will require practical institutional solutions for ethnically problematic areas and new Western task forces for the interface between ethnicity and religion. Analyzing the model of the territorial autonomy of the Autonomous Province of South Tyrol in Northern Italy, considered as one of the best proven models of ethnic pacification in Europe, I show that addressing key aspects of the extremism problem is possible through the institutional regulation of ethnic rights. Implementing territorial autonomies for ethnic minority areas can benefit all of their citizens, including the members of the ethnic majority living on the ground; and it can help to run dry extremist trends by providing justice through “deep” equality that fosters long-term stability. The situation in Iraq and Syria could be one case of application and a practical test for the validity of the model and its transferability to different conflict areas in today’s global strategic landscape. pp. 7–29

At first, the US Army pronounced Operation Iron Triangle \"mission accomplished.\" About fifteen days later, questions were raised about the rules of engagement, which were to kill every military aged male on sight. The following month, three soldiers were charged with murder. Three sets of sworn statements were given by the defendants in the case, during three different time periods, and intended as the basis for testimony at their trial. But the statements present three distinct versions of what happened. The Prosecution avoided going to trial by accepting the defendants' plea bargains. The officers who issued the unlawful ROE were never prosecuted and neither was anyone further up the chain of command. This book stands alone in analyzing a war crime from Iraq that involved the murder of noncombatants, questionable rules of engagement, and the doctrine of command responsibility. Although it amounts to a murder mystery the focus is on the Rules of Engagement, which is a topic that until now has been completely ignored in books about the war in Iraq. What were the soldiers' orders; were they related to other, similar ROE in Iraq and similar killings; and why was there so much ambivalence on the part of the prosecutors and investigators in deciding exactly what was lawful versus unlawful in this case? At The Hague, the former President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, as well as many other high-ranking commanders, were put on trial for war crimes under the doctrine of command responsibility. In the United States, the contrast in perceptions of responsibility for war crimes could not be more pronounced. Low-ranking soldiers were court-martialed under the principle enshrined in the UCMJ that obedience to unlawful orders is not a defense. Both attitudes are inspired by the Nuremberg trials, albeit in starkly divergent ways. The ICTY seems to reject the excuse for World War II atrocities, namely, \"We didn't know,\" and insists that the commander should have known what his or her subordinates did unlawfully. The US military system seems to reject the excuse for World War II atrocities, namely, \"We were just following orders,\" and insists that low-ranking soldiers are responsible for obeying unlawful orders. Which approach is more just? Far from being a cut and dry legal case, this story can be read as a mystery that will never fully resolved.

An expert witness in legal cases involving rules of engagement and the US military murder of prisoners, Prof. Mestrovic exposes profound contradictions and systemic flaws that confuse criminal brutality and heroism, making victims of soldiers like Sergeant Michael Leahy who won a purple heart but also was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2009.

Gangs of armed Iraqis loyal to Saddam Hussein's clan are still operating in his hometown, Tikrit, US military officials admitted yesterday. Most of the leading figures in the Iraqi regime were members of Saddam's al-Tikriti tribe and many came from Tikrit. The leader promoted his family and relied on their loyalty as he built a complex police state run on fear. Although the US military seized the deserted main square and the main bridge over the Tigris, they still have only a limited presence on the eastern bank of the river where hundreds of Saddam loyalists are thought to be hiding. Unlike Baghdad and Basra, this is a much more rural part of the country where tribal law is far stronger. Tribesmen said they were fighting to prevent looters rather than to resist American troops, but it is unlikely that US forces will ever receive a heartfelt welcome in the town that was once the bastion of Saddam's power.

Unidentified person talks about experience in Tikrit, concerned local citizens program, and views on David Petraeus.

Assesses Tikrit Location Command project in Iraq and notes that lessons learned can be applied in Afghanistan.

Tikrit is the hometown of Saddam Hussein, and early in our occupation it was a feared town of hard cases and Baathist loyalists, of men who shared Saddam's tribe, wealth and cruelty. But while much of Iraq has erupted in violence in recent months, Tikrit has been largely silent, tranquil in the calm of the pacified. Fearsome Tikrit generates no headlines and few bodies. Tikrit, by its silence, condemns those men for their arrogance. Here, at the very core of Saddam's strength, the difficult has been achieved. The calm may be a sullen calm, an enforced calm, but it is a calm nonetheless. This is what might have been elsewhere in Iraq if competence had been valued over blind allegiance, if we had been led into this war by serious people who understood that when you bet high stakes, you play to win and you assume nothing. There, no American dares to set foot in the city. A place that we once controlled has slipped from our grasp because we lack the manpower to hold it, and in our absence the city has become a cancer spreading death throughout Iraq. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian terrorist who beheads innocent civilians on videotape, is believed to operate from a safe haven in Fallujah. Many of the car bombs that wreak havoc in Baghdad on an almost daily basis are assembled in Fallujah and then driven out of the city unhindered.

Examines U.S. reconstruction and relief programs, plans, and operations in Iraq, noting changed operational environment, obstacles to progress, and oversight by U.S. agencies; and provides observations on security, governance, rule of law, and other matters.

In Samarra, a mostly Sunni city south of Tikrit, at least 300 marchers filed past the ruins of the Golden Mosque, the Shiite Muslim shrine attacked in February, by now a symbol of Iraq's civil war. The largely male crowd yelled slogans against the tribunal that tried [Saddam Hussein] and against Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, a Shiite. Iraqi security forces nominally control the area around Tikrit, but U.S. troops on the ground complain that they are untrustworthy, especially the local police. Many of the Iraqi personnel have links to the insurgency, the Americans believe, and U.S. troops suspect that on at least one occasion recently, Iraqi security forces led their American counterparts into an ambush. RALLY: One of the people in Tikrit who gathered to show opposition to the sentence condemning Saddam Hussein to hang holds a portrait of the deposed Iraqi leader. They converged on what U.S. troops call the \"evil mosque.\"; PHOTOGRAPHER: Bassim Daham Associated Press; Barzan Ibrahim Hasan; Taha Yassin Ramadan

Identifies locations of coalition forces bases in Iraq.