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The study explored the contribution of prior knowledge and reliance on L1 syntactic knowledge to L2 written sentence comprehension. Participants, 102 native Hebrew speakers at three education levels (junior high, high school, and postsecondary), answered questions in two sentence categories: Semantically plausible sentences that readers can understand by linking their content words to prior knowledge; semantically neutral sentences, whose comprehension requires adequate syntactic processing. To track the benefits of linguistic transfer from Hebrew (L1) to English (L2), the study manipulated the languages’ cross‐linguistic structural similarity. The results suggest that Hebrew‐speaking students rely on prior knowledge and/or on structural similarities between Hebrew and English to interpret English sentences. When they cannot rely on either of these two factors, they manifest remarkably poor understanding of quite basic English constructions even at the postsecondary level. The Challenge Prior knowledge, although crucial to L2 reading, may mask inadequate syntactic knowledge, another essential factor in skilled reading. Without support of prior knowledge or L1 transfer, L2 SC remains poor even at the postsecondary level. L2 reading instructors must detect and remedy these problems.

Brains, it has recently been argued, are essentially prediction machines. They are bundles of cells that support perception and action by constantly attempting to match incoming sensory inputs with top-down expectations or predictions. This is achieved using a hierarchical generative model that aims to minimize prediction error within a bidirectional cascade of cortical processing. Such accounts offer a unifying model of perception and action, illuminate the functional role of attention, and may neatly capture the special contribution of cortical processing to adaptive success. This target article critically examines this “hierarchical prediction machine” approach, concluding that it offers the best clue yet to the shape of a unified science of mind and action. Sections 1 and 2 lay out the key elements and implications of the approach. Section 3 explores a variety of pitfalls and challenges, spanning the evidential, the methodological, and the more properly conceptual. The paper ends (sections 4 and 5) by asking how such approaches might impact our more general vision of mind, experience, and agency.

Many neuropsychiatric illnesses are associated with psychosis, i.e., hallucinations (perceptions in the absence of causative stimuli) and delusions (irrational, often bizarre beliefs). Current models of brain function view perception as a combination of two distinct sources of information: bottom-up sensory input and top-down influences from prior knowledge. This framework may explain hallucinations and delusions. Here, we characterized the balance between visual bottom-up and top-down processing in people with early psychosis (study 1) and in psychosis-prone, healthy individuals (study 2) to elucidate the mechanisms that might contribute to the emergence of psychotic experiences. Through a specialized mental-health service, we identified unmedicated individuals who experience early psychotic symptoms but fall below the threshold for a categorical diagnosis. We observed that, in early psychosis, there was a shift in information processing favoring prior knowledge over incoming sensory evidence. In the complementary study, we capitalized on subtle variations in perception and belief in the general population that exhibit graded similarity with psychotic experiences (schizotypy). We observed that the degree of psychosis proneness in healthy individuals, and, specifically, the presence of subtle perceptual alterations, is also associated with stronger reliance on prior knowledge. Although, in the current experimental studies, this shift conferred a performance benefit, under most natural viewing situations, it may provoke anomalous perceptual experiences. Overall, we show that early psychosis and psychosis proneness both entail a basic shift in visual information processing, favoring prior knowledge over incoming sensory evidence. The studies provide complementary insights to a mechanism by which psychotic symptoms may emerge.

Since Darwin’s seminal works, the universality of facial expressions of emotion has remained one of the longest standing debates in the biological and social sciences. Briefly stated, the universality hypothesis claims that all humans communicate six basic internal emotional states (happy, surprise, fear, disgust, anger, and sad) using the same facial movements by virtue of their biological and evolutionary origins [Susskind JM, et al. (2008) Nat Neurosci 11:843–850]. Here, we refute this assumed universality. Using a unique computer graphics platform that combines generative grammars [Chomsky N (1965) MIT Press, Cambridge, MA] with visual perception, we accessed the mind’s eye of 30 Western and Eastern culture individuals and reconstructed their mental representations of the six basic facial expressions of emotion. Cross-cultural comparisons of the mental representations challenge universality on two separate counts. First, whereas Westerners represent each of the six basic emotions with a distinct set of facial movements common to the group, Easterners do not. Second, Easterners represent emotional intensity with distinctive dynamic eye activity. By refuting the long-standing universality hypothesis, our data highlight the powerful influence of culture on shaping basic behaviors once considered biologically hardwired. Consequently, our data open a unique nature–nurture debate across broad fields from evolutionary psychology and social neuroscience to social networking via digital avatars.

Previous studies have demonstrated that visual memory is improved when stimuli are processed by larger cortical regions. For example, a physically large stimulus that recruits larger areas of the retinotopic cortex is better remembered. However, the spatial extent of neural responses in the visual cortex is not only modulated by the retinal size of a stimulus, but also by the perceived size of the stimulus. In this online study, we modulated the perceived size of the visual stimuli using the Ebbinghaus illusion and asked participants to remember the stimuli. The results showed that perceptually larger images were remembered better than perceptually smaller but physically same-sized images. Our finding supports the idea that visual memory is modulated by top-down feedback from higher visual regions to the early visual cortex.

One outstanding question in the contemplative science literature relates to the direct impact of meditation experience on the monitoring of internal states and its respective correspondence with neural activity. In particular, to what extent does meditation influence the awareness, duration and frequency of the tendency of the mind to wander. To assess the relation between mind wandering and meditation, we tested 2 groups of meditators, one with a moderate level of experience (non-expert) and those who are well advanced in their practice (expert). We designed a novel paradigm using self-reports of internal mental states based on an experiential sampling probe paradigm presented during ~1 h of seated concentration meditation to gain insight into the dynamic measures of electroencephalography (EEG) during absorption in meditation as compared to reported mind wandering episodes. Our results show that expert meditation practitioners report a greater depth and frequency of sustained meditation, whereas non-expert practitioners report a greater depth and frequency of mind wandering episodes. This is one of the first direct behavioral indices of meditation expertise and its associated impact on the reduced frequency of mind wandering, with corresponding EEG activations showing increased frontal midline theta and somatosensory alpha rhythms during meditation as compared to mind wandering in expert practitioners. Frontal midline theta and somatosensory alpha rhythms are often observed during executive functioning, cognitive control and the active monitoring of sensory information. Our study thus provides additional new evidence to support the hypothesis that the maintenance of both internal and external orientations of attention may be maintained by similar neural mechanisms and that these mechanisms may be modulated by meditation training.

Visual recognition is often thought to depend on neural representations that primarily reflect the physical properties of the environment. However, in this study we demonstrate that the intent of the observer fundamentally perturbs cortical representations of visual objects. Using functional MRI we measured the patterns of response to identical objects under six different tasks. In any given task, these patterns could be used to distinguish which object was being viewed. However, this ability was disrupted when the task changed, indicating that object representations reflect not only the physical properties of the stimulus, but also the internal state of the observer. Perception reflects an integration of “bottom-up” (sensory-driven) and “top-down” (internally generated) signals. Although models of visual processing often emphasize the central role of feed-forward hierarchical processing, less is known about the impact of top-down signals on complex visual representations. Here, we investigated whether and how the observer’s goals modulate object processing across the cortex. We examined responses elicited by a diverse set of objects under six distinct tasks, focusing on either physical (e.g., color) or conceptual properties (e.g., man-made). Critically, the same stimuli were presented in all tasks, allowing us to investigate how task impacts the neural representations of identical visual input. We found that task has an extensive and differential impact on object processing across the cortex. First, we found task-dependent representations in the ventral temporal and prefrontal cortex. In particular, although object identity could be decoded from the multivoxel response within task, there was a significant reduction in decoding across tasks. In contrast, the early visual cortex evidenced equivalent decoding within and across tasks, indicating task-independent representations. Second, task information was pervasive and present from the earliest stages of object processing. However, although the responses of the ventral temporal, prefrontal, and parietal cortex enabled decoding of both the type of task (physical/conceptual) and the specific task (e.g., color), the early visual cortex was not sensitive to type of task and could only be used to decode individual physical tasks. Thus, object processing is highly influenced by the behavioral goal of the observer, highlighting how top-down signals constrain and inform the formation of visual representations.

An unresolved issue in speech perception concerns whether top-down linguistic information influences perceptual responses. We addressed this issue using the event-related-potential technique in two experiments that measured cross-modal sequential-semantic priming effects on the auditory N1, an index of acoustic-cue encoding. Participants heard auditory targets (e.g., “potatoes”) following associated visual primes (e.g., “MASHED”), neutral visual primes (e.g., “FACE”), or a visual mask (e.g., “XXXX”). Auditory targets began with voiced (/b/, /d/, /g/) or voiceless (/p/, /t/, /k/) stop consonants, an acoustic difference known to yield differences in N1 amplitude. In Experiment 1 (N = 21), semantic context modulated responses to upcoming targets, with smaller N1 amplitudes for semantic associates. In Experiment 2 (N = 29), semantic context changed how listeners encoded sounds: Ambiguous voice-onset times were encoded similarly to the voicing end point elicited by semantic associates. These results are consistent with an interactive model of spoken-word recognition that includes top-down effects on early perception.

The unique characteristics of neocortical pyramidal neurons are thought to be crucial for many aspects of information processing and learning in the brain. Experimental data suggests that their segregation into two distinct compartments, the basal dendrites close to the soma and the apical dendrites branching out from the thick apical dendritic tuft, plays an essential role in cortical organization. A recent hypothesis states that layer 5 pyramidal cells associate top-down contextual information arriving at their apical tuft with features of the sensory input that predominantly arrives at their basal dendrites. It has however remained unclear whether such context association could be established by synaptic plasticity processes. In this work, we formalize the objective of such context association learning through a mathematical loss function and derive a plasticity rule for apical synapses that optimizes this loss. The resulting plasticity rule utilizes information that is available either locally at the synapse, through branch-local NMDA spikes, or through global Ca 2+ events, both of which have been observed experimentally in layer 5 pyramidal cells. We show in computer simulations that the plasticity rule enables pyramidal cells to associate top-down contextual input patterns with high somatic activity. Furthermore, it enables networks of pyramidal neuron models to perform context-dependent tasks and enables continual learning by allocating new dendritic branches to novel contexts.

Temporal context is a crucial factor in timing. Previous studies have revealed that the timing of regular stimuli, such as isochronous beats or rhythmic sequences (termed beat-based timing), activated the basal ganglia, whereas the timing of single intervals or irregular stimuli (termed duration-based timing) activated the cerebellum. We conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment to determine whether top-down processing of perceptual duration-based and beat-based timings affected brain activation patterns. Our participants listened to auditory sequences containing both single intervals and isochronous beats and judged either the duration of the intervals or the tempo of the beats. Whole-brain analysis revealed that both duration judgments and tempo judgments activated similar areas, including the basal ganglia and cerebellum, with no significant difference in the activated regions between the two conditions. In addition, an analysis of the regions of interest revealed no significant differences between the activation levels measured for the two tasks in the basal ganglia as well as the cerebellum. These results suggested that a set of common brain areas were involved in top-down processing of both duration judgments and tempo judgments. Our findings indicate that perceptual duration-based timing and beat-based timing are driven by stimulus regularity irrespective of top-down processing.