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This classic work chronicles how New York, London, and Tokyo became command centers for the global economy and in the process underwent a series of massive and parallel changes. What distinguishes Sassen's theoretical framework is the emphasis on the formation of cross-border dynamics through which these cities and the growing number of other global cities begin to form strategic transnational networks. All the core data in this new edition have been updated, while the preface and epilogue discuss the relevant trends in globalization since the book originally came out in 1991.

A well-known approach to modeling international relations treats them as a two-level game played by national governments and international organizations, in which they negotiate with one another while coping with internal constraints on their action posed by domestic politics or organizational governance. Officials in these organizations can play a different two-level game, arising from their simultaneous negotiations within their personal transnational networks and their official duties in their host organizations. In each domain, they can act in ways that improves their outcomes in the other one - informal understandings facilitate subsequent formal agreement, while actions taken within their organizations implement and cement what had been negotiated informally. Multi-organizational innovation can thus be coordinated even in the absence of formal action to do so. This process is illustrated through an examination of the role of an informal transnational network in the shifting of the policies of the government of India and major aid donors in the 1960s.

Informs that licenses to permit foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms to trade with Cuba will be allowed on case-by-case basis.

Recommends that President Ford terminate U.S. sanctions on third-country trade with Cuba.

Reviews restrictions on trade with Cuba placed on U.S. subsidiary companies operating abroad, examines pros and cons of various policy options, and presents recommendations from Undersecretaries' Committee members.

Reviews restrictions on trade with Cuba for U.S. subsidiary companies operating abroad, examines pros and cons of various policy options, and makes recommendations.

Organized crime is spreading like a global virus as mobs take advantage of open borders to establish local franchises at will. That at least is the fear, inspired by stories of Russian mobsters in New York, Chinese triads in London, and Italian mafias throughout the West.

This article devises a method to separate the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) into transnational and domestic terrorist incidents. This decomposition is essential for the understanding of some terrorism phenomena when the two types of terrorism are hypothesized to have different impacts. For example, transnational terrorism may have a greater adverse effect than domestic terrorism on economic growth. Moreover, the causes of the two types of terrorism may differ. Once the data are separated, we apply a calibration method to address some issues with GTD data — namely, the missing data for 1993 and different coding procedures used before 1998. In particular, we calibrate the GTD transnational terrorist incidents to ITERATE transnational terrorist incidents to address GTD's undercounting of incidents in much of the 1970s and its overcounting of incidents in much of the 1990s. Given our assumption that analogous errors characterize domestic terrorist events in GTD, we apply the same calibrations to adjust GTD domestic incidents. The second part of the article investigates the dynamic aspects of GTD domestic and transnational terrorist incidents, based on the calibrated data. Contemporaneous and lagged cross-correlations for the two types of terrorist incidents are computed for component time series involving casualties, deaths, assassinations, bombings, and armed attacks. We find a large cross-correlation between domestic and transnational terrorist incidents that persists over a number of periods. A key finding is that shocks to domestic terrorism result in persistent effects on transnational terrorism; however, the reverse is not true. This finding suggests that domestic terrorism can spill over to transnational terrorism, so that prime-target countries cannot ignore domestic terrorism abroad and may need to assist in curbing this homegrown terrorism.

The right to remedy for victims of human rights abuses by transnational corporations is far from guaranteed. Often, the state where the abuses occurred is unwilling or incapable of offering effective remedies, especially effective judicial remedies. The victims may then choose to “go global” and bring civil suits in the courts of other states, including the home states of the corporations alleged to have committed the abuse. One way in which they have done so is by bringing so-called “foreign direct liability” (FDL) cases: civil claims in domestic courts of foreign states against corporate actors, in the hopes of getting financial compensation as a remedy.

Since the global financial crisis, scholars of international political economy (IPE) have increasingly relied on the concept of 'regulatory capture' to explain the weakness of regulatory oversight and, hence, regulatory failures. Yet despite the widespread use of the concept of regulatory capture, its precise mechanisms are not well understood. This paper empirically investigates this hypothesis by examining one important institution of global financial governance that has been subjected to intense private sector lobbying at the transnational level: the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Using extensive archival material as well as interviews with participants in the generation of the Basel II Capital Accord, I argue that while private sector lobbyists had unprecedented access to the regulatory policymaking process, this access did not always translate into influence. Furthermore, when influence was present, it sometimes had the effect of increasing regulatory stringency, rather than weakening regulation. As such, I argue that our understanding of the process of transnational policy formation would benefit from a more nuanced understanding of the contingency of private sector 'influence' over the regulatory process, rather than the extensive, all-or-nothing depiction of regulatory 'capture' that currently prevails within the IPE literature.