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This is the first book-length study of why states sometimes ignore, oppose, or undermine elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime-even as they formally support it. Anchored by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the nuclear nonproliferation regime is the constellation of agreements, initiatives, and norms that work in concert to regulate nuclear material and technology. The essays gathered here show that attitudes on nonproliferation depend on a \"complex, contingent decision calculus,\" as states continually gauge how their actions within the regime will affect trade, regional standing, and other interests vital to any nation. The first four essays take theoretical approaches to such topics as a framework for understanding challenges to collective action; clandestine proliferation under the Bush and Obama administrations and its impact on regime legitimacy; threat construction as a lens through which to view resistance to nonproliferation measures; and the debate over the relationship between nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Essays comprising the second part of the book use regional and state-specific case studies to look at how U.S. security guarantees affect the willingness of states to support the regime; question the perceived spoiler role of a \"vocal minority\" within the Non-Aligned Movement; challenge notions that Russia is using the regime to build a coalition hostile to the United States; contrast nonproliferation strategies among Latin American countries; and explain the lag in adoption of an Additional Protocol by some Middle East and North African countries. Getting countries to cooperate on nonproliferation efforts is an ongoing challenge. These essays show that success must be measured not only by how many states join the effort but also by how they participate once they join.

United States grapples with aftermath of withdrawal from Afghanistan.

In \"Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint,\" Gene Gerzhoy argues that the Lyndon Johnson administration used brute, coercive threats to obtain West Germany's signature to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In particular, Gerzhoy asserts that in February 1968 the Johnson administration threatened to abandon West Germany militarily if it did not sign the NPT and, moreover, that these threats were instrumental in prodding German leaders toward accepting the treaty. Three pieces of evidence, however, show that this interpretation is inconsistent with the historical record.

Does the extent or lack of progress toward nuclear disarmament affect the health of the nuclear nonproliferation regime? Commentators have long asserted both positive and negative responses to this question as if the answer were self-evident. Given that opposite positions have been advanced with equal conviction, a more systematic analysis is required. This analysis begins by attempting to identify all of the potential arguments that can be made both for and against the hypothesis of a disarmament-nonproliferation linkage. The arguments are grouped in terms of five broader sets of explanatory factors: security, institutions, norms, domestic politics, and psychology. This approach clarifies the various causal microfoundations that could underpin different arguments in the debate as well as the types of empirical tests that would be most relevant for evaluating the \"linkage hypothesis.\" Comparative assessment of the arguments on both sides suggests that signs of commitment to nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states will tend to enhance support for nonproliferation. Because of the multitude of other factors that affect state decisionmaking, however, progress on disarmament will not by itself address all of the challenges to making the nonproliferation regime effective.

This book analyzes the strengths, weaknesses, development and potential of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, providing new insights on the role of public international law in a field as politicized as that of nuclear arms control.

This volume offers a critical historical assessment of the negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and of the origins of the nonproliferation regime. The NPT has been signed by 190 states and was indefinitely extended in 1995, rendering it the most successful arms control treaty in history. Nevertheless, little is known about the motivations and strategic calculi of the various middle and small powers in regard to their ultimate decision to join the treaty despite its discriminatory nature. While the NPT continues to be central to current nonproliferation efforts, its underlying mechanisms remain under-researched. Based on newly declassified archival sources and using previously inaccessible evidence, the contributions in this volume examine the underlying rationales of the specific positions taken by various states during the NPT negotiations. Starting from a critical appraisal of our current knowledge of the genesis of the nonproliferation regime, contributors from diverse national and disciplinary backgrounds focus on both European and non-European states in order to enrich our understanding of how the global nuclear order came into being. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, Cold War history, security studies and IR.

In July 2007, following protracted and apparently difficult negotiations, the United States and India signed a nuclear cooperation agreement, a predicate for nuclear cooperation and sales under section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act. Conclusion of this \"123 Agreement\" is a further step in U.S. efforts to expand nuclear cooperation with India as a key element of a broader bilateral relationship. India is not party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), so Congress in 2006 enacted special legislation easing statutory restrictions otherwise precluding substantial nuclear cooperation with non-NPT parties. If brought into force, the agreement would allow India to acquire nuclear fuel and technology for its civilian reactors from the United States and other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

As a follow-up to Beyond 1995: The Future of NPT published in 1990, this compilation presents the major issues to be addressed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Renowned academic and diplomatic authorities from around the world contribute original essays and address questions such as: - Will the NPT be faced with a fundamental challege to its existence? - Will the treaty be allowed to lapse? - Will states withdraw? - Will the NPT be succeeded by an alternative treaty or regime?

In March 2006, during a visit to India by President Bush, the United States and India announced conclusion of an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, under which the United States will give India access to civilian nuclear fuel and technology, subject to inspection by international inspectors. India will remain free to continue its nuclear weapons program. The deal fills in details of an earlier framework agreed in July 2005, and is intended by the U.S. administration as an important element in an expanded U.S. relationship with India. The agreement will require congressional action to amend provisions of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act now barring such cooperation with India, which is not a party to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).