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This study documents the effects of the 2008–09 global financial crisis on poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). In doing so, it describes and decomposes the effects of the crisis on poverty using data from comparable household budget surveys for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, and labor force surveys for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. The study also provides macro-micro modeling of crisis and no-crisis scenarios for Mexico and Brazil, as well as the big picture and program-specific details of the social protection policy responses for these countries and more. Among the findings are the following. First, the effects of the global financial crisis on those living in poverty were not trivial: more than 3 million people fell into or remained mired in poverty in 2009 as a result of the crisis. Of these, 2.5 million were Mexican. Second, the changes in poverty were driven by changes in labor incomes caused by a variable combination of changes in employment rates and real wages. Third, the macro-micro modeling revealed different adjustment mechanisms but similar final incidence results for Brazil and Mexico. The results were regressive overall, with the middle of the income distribution hit even a bit more than the poor. According to the descriptive results from the larger set of countries, changes in inequality accounted for a tenth to a third of changes in poverty. Fourth, countries were quite active in their social protection policy responses, largely taking advantage of programs built in precrisis years. Social transfers partially offset the lower labor earnings of the poor, although income protection for the unemployed was weak. Finally, overall the policy messages are that good policy helps attenuate the links between a global crisis and poverty in the LAC countries, and many of the important things need to be done ex ante such as dealing with the macro fundamentals and building social protection programs.

Throughout the developed and developing world there is growing demand for policies that would facilitate access to jobs by the most vulnerable, improve their earnings, and reduce their dependency on public support. As a result, governments are increasingly focused on removing obstacles faced by employers to create jobs and on instilling incentives for individuals to re-enter the labor market or to move toward more productive employment possibilities. Severance pay a program compensating formal workers for dismissal by employers or with an end-of-service benefit is often blamed for distorting employer hiring and firing decisions. Together with restrictive labor market regulations and other formal labor market features, this program is held responsible for excessive job protection with a negative impact on labor market outcomes, in particular affecting the most vulnerable. Despite this strong negative assessment among many labor market economists, surprisingly little is known about this program that exists in most countries around the world as a legally mandated benefit. This lack of knowledge may derive from the special 'positioning' of the program between labor code and social insurance; its origins were in the first policy domain, but its objectives for key programs were replicated in the second domain in particular unemployment and retirement benefits. This is the first-ever book to shed light on this program in a comprehensive manner its historical origins, its rationale, and its characteristics across the world. It reviews the soundness of the empirical accusation, assesses recent country reforms, and offers policy reform alternatives and policy guidance. The policy directions include folding severance pay into existing social insurance programs, where they exist, and to make severance pay contractual between market partners as a way to enhance efficiency in a knowledge-based economy. Folding severance pay into employment benefits may also be an opportunity to move away from unemployment insurance, which is fraught by moral hazard, toward a promising 'hybrid' system of unemployment insurance savings accounts supplemented by social pooling.

This note extends the model of unemployment insurance reported by D. Zuckerman in 1985. The following extensions are incorporated into the model: The government's objective function is now formulated in a more economically appealing fashion; the search process is allowed to continue beyond the coverage period; the time value of money is explicitly incorporated; and the individual's search strategy is compared with the socially optimal policy. Using techniques and concepts from game theory, we investigate the socially and individually optimal strategies and derive an unemployment insurance strategy that best suits the government's objective.

We study how the marginal welfare gain from increasing the unemployment insurance (UI) benefit level varies over the business cycle. We do this by estimating how the moral hazard cost and the consumption smoothing benefit of UI vary with labour market conditions, which we identify using variation in the interaction of UI benefit levels with the unemployment rate within U.S. states over time. We find that the moral hazard cost is procyclical, greater when the unemployment rate is relatively low. By contrast, we do not find evidence that the consumption smoothing benefit varies with the unemployment rate. We use these empirical results to estimate the marginal welfare gain, and we find that it is modest on average, but varies positively with the unemployment rate.

We provide new evidence on the effect of the unemployment insurance (UI) weekly benefit amount on unemployment insurance spells based on administrative data from the state of Missouri covering the period 2003-2013. Identification comes from a regression kink design that exploits the quasi-experimental variation around the kink in the UI benefit schedule. We find that UI durations are more responsive to benefit levels during the recession and its aftermath, with an elasticity between 0.65 and 0.9 as compared to about 0.35 pre-recession.

The COVID-19 crisis has led to spiking unemployment rates with disproportionate impacts on low-income families. School and child-care center closures have also meant lost free and reduced-price school meals. Food prices have increased sharply, leading to reduced purchasing power for families with limited income. The Families First Coronavirus Response Act and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act constituted a robust response, including expansions to unemployment insurance (expansions in eligibility and a $600 per week supplement), a onetime payment of $1,200 per adult and $500 per dependent, an increase in SNAP payments, and the launch of the Pandemic EBT program to replace lost school meals. Despite these efforts, real-time data show significant distress—notably, food insecurity rates have increased almost three times over the pre-COVID-19 rates and food pantry use has also spiked. In this paper, we explore why there is so much unmet need despite a robust policy response. We provide evidence for three explanations: (1) timing—relief came with a substantial delay, due to overwhelmed unemployment insurance (UI) systems and the need to implement new programs; (2) magnitude—payments outside UI are modest; and (3) coverage gaps—access is lower for some groups, and other groups are statutorily excluded.

Much attention has been given to the large increases in safety net spending during the Great Recession. We examine the relationship between poverty, the safety net, and business cycles historically and test whether there has been a significant change in this relationship. We find that post–welfare reform, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families did not respond during the Great Recession and extreme poverty is more cyclical than in prior recessions. Food Stamps and Unemployment Insurance are providing more protection—or no less protection—in the Great Recession, and there is some evidence of less cyclicality for 100% poverty.

In response to the recession of 2007–2009, the maximum duration of U.S. unemployment insurance (UI) benefits was extended to an unprecedented 99 weeks. We exploit variation in the timing and size of the UI benefit extensions across states to estimate their overall impact on unemployment exits, comparing the most recent and prior extension episodes. We find a small but statistically significant increase in labor force attachment due to extended UI in both periods with little or no impact on job finding. Despite these small estimates, extended benefits can account for a substantial share of the increase in long-term unemployment.

Should the generosity of unemployment benefits and the progressivity of income taxes depend on the presence of business cycles? This paper proposes a tractable model where there is a role for social insurance against uninsurable shocks to income and unemployment, as well as business cycles that are inefficient due to the presence of matching frictions and nominal rigidities. We derive an augmented Baily–Chetty formula showing that the optimal generosity of the social insurance system depends on a macroeconomic stabilization term. This term pushes for an increase in generosity when the level of economic activity is more responsive to social programmes in recessions than in booms. A calibration to the US economy shows that taking concerns for macroeconomic stabilization into account substantially raises the optimal unemployment insurance replacement rate but has a negligible impact on the optimal progressivity of the income tax. More generally, the role of social insurance programmes as automatic stabilizers affects their optimal design.

abstract Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC) provided unemployment insurance beneficiaries an extra $600 a week during the unprecedented economic downturn during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, but it initially expired in July 2020. We applied difference-in-differences models to nationally representative data from the Census Bureau's Household Pulse Survey to examine changes in unmet health-related social needs and mental health among unemployment insurance beneficiaries before and after initial expiration of FPUC. The initial expiration was associated with a 10.79-percentage-point increase in risk for self-reported missed housing payments. Further, risk for food insufficiency, depressive symptoms, and anxiety symptoms also increased among households that reported receiving unemployment insurance benefits, relative to the period when FPUC was in effect. As further unemployment insurance reform is debated, policy makers should recognize the potential health impact of unemployment insurance.