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The 'Sunningdale experiment' of 1973-4 witnessed the first attempt to establish peace in Northern Ireland through power-sharing. However, its provisions, particularly the cross-border 'Council of Ireland', proved to be a step too far. The experiment floundered amid ongoing paramilitary-led violence, finally collapsing in May 1974 as a result of the Ulster Workers' Council strike. Drawing on new scholarship from some of the top political historians working on the period, this book presents a series of reflections on how key protagonists struggled with notions of power-sharing and the 'Irish dimension', and how those struggles inhibited a deepening of democracy and the ending of violence for so long.

To understand Sunningdale and its legacy it is necessary to grapple with divisions within Unionism, many of which preceded the Sunningdale Agreement. Divisions on power sharing crystallised between the publication of the Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals in March 1973 and the collapse of the power-sharing Executive at the hands of the Ulster Workers’ Council (UWC) in May 1974. Opposition to Sunningdale created shortlived unity among rival strands of rejectionist Unionism, which subsequently disintegrated after the executive collapsed. After May 1974, Unionists experienced a prolonged limitation of their capacity to influence policy. The absence of a local administration that Unionists could

From the outbreak of the Troubles in 1968 up to 1974 Unionists believed that they had suffered a series of political defeats which included the abolition of the B Specials and the failure of security forces to defeat the Irish Republican Army (IRA), culminating in the suspension (effectively the abolition) of the Northern Ireland Parliament in March 1972. British government plans for a new administration for Northern Ireland suggested the inclusion of individuals like Gerry Fitt and John Hume of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) who, Unionists believed, had been instrumental in destroying the democratically elected Northern Ireland

In the months immediately following the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement it was very much apparent that power sharing as a potential political solution to the problems of Northern Ireland would not work. Whether because of the obvious opposition from its numerous vocal opponents or because of its failure to include those actually conducting the conflict in Northern Ireland, it can be logically stated that consociational democracy in the way it had been foreseen in the Sunningdale Communiqué was not an immediate legacy of that agreement’s failure. Arguably the power-sharing Executive, supported by an assembly elected on 28 June 1973

John Hume was not the sole originator of the ideas that redefined Irish nationalism; he was both a propagator and broker of revisionist nationalism. The New Ireland Forum created an essential ideological consensus among constitutional nationalists, a consensus that Hume played a major part in shaping. The Ulster Workers' Council strike may have acted as a wake-up call to the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Rather than talks between the SDLP and unionists, the Anglo-Irish Agreement first produced an intra-nationalist dialogue. Hume's agreed Ireland was an attempt to convey his conviction that Irish unity was only feasible, and indeed only meaningful, if it had the allegiance of both traditions in Ireland. The SDLP's increasing predetermination towards Irish unity only made it less likely that the party would win any significant Protestant support. Austin Currie suggests that Hume's greatest asset was his political vision.

On 31 December 1973, the members of the Northern Ireland executive were sworn into office. The agreement upon which the executive would be sold was based on a number of issues and promises that had been made earlier in that month. The experience of being a member of the power-sharing executive was a transformative one for both Gerry Fitt and the SDLP. The executive accentuated the divisions that existed between Fitt and his party, as well as his inability to provide effective leadership. The experience also transformed Fitt’s vision of Irish nationalism. It highlighted for him that the power-sharing element

The collapse of the Unionist government did not halt the SDLP’s drift to a more nationalist position. If anything, the political climate in Northern Ireland following Stormont’s suspension only led to a further greening of the party. A number of factors contributed to this. Firstly, the prorogation of Stormont had in itself created a sense of euphoria amongst the minority community. Not only did it bring an end to a regime that had come to be despised by even moderate nationalists, but it also appeared to re-open ‘the Irish Question’ in its entirety. For many nationalists, the fall of Stormont

Appraisal of academic staff is now a formal part of university procedures. Prior to its introduction there was much exhortation as to the beneficial effects appraisal would bring, and equally forceful arguments about the harmful effects of imposing it as a means of exercising tighter managerial control. The paper presents the findings of an investigation of the academic appraisal programme in the University of Ulster. Consideration of two forms of appraisal, manageralist and developmental, with their associated perspectives on the nature of professional practice, its assessment and improvement, provide the context within which the University of Ulster's programme can be considered. The evidence reveals inconsistency, tension and uncertainty about the programme and its effects: the reader is invited to judge the virtues of the different perspectives and the degree to which the programme's intents and operations meet, or fit, with any of them.