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This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1988.

This volume examines the evolution of reproductive law in Italy from the 'far west' of the 1980s and 90s through to one of the most potentially restrictive systems in Europe. The book employs an array of sociological, philosophical and legal material in order to discover why such a repressive piece of legislation has been produced at the end of a period of substantial change in the dynamic of gender relations in Italy. The book also discusses Italian policy within the wider European policy framework.

Synopsis: The Uniform Parentage Act (2017) permits the creation of a parent-child relationship between a deceased individual and a child conceived by posthumous pregnancy only if the embryo is in utero not later than 36 months, or the child is born not later than 45 months, after the deceased individual's death. These time limits derive from the 2008 Uniform Probate Code, which applied the time limits in the context of probate administration, where there is a need for finality within a defined time after the decedent's death. The Uniform Parentage Act applies the time limits for all parentage purposes. Using the facts of In re Martin B. as a springboard, the Article argues that the time limits are not appropriate in some contexts, such as distributions pursuant to a class gift of a future interest in trust. The Article urges the Uniform Law Commission to replace the Parentage Act's blanket time limits with a more calibrated approach to parentage finality, in order to be more successful at achieving the purposes of wealth transfer law and parentage law.

Roe conceded that if, as Texas there argued, \"the fetus is a 'person' within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,\" the case for a constitutional right to abortion \"collapses.\" But then the Court hurdled over text and history to an error-strewn denial that unborn human beings are persons under the Amendment. Scholarship exposing those errors has cleared the ground for a reexamination of Texas's position in Roe. Here, Gorge sheds fresh light on the Amendment's original public meaning, focusing on common-law and pre-Civil War history.

This book delves into the controversial subject of late-term abortions, particularly those occurring after 24 weeks of gestation. It emphasizes that the abortion debate is multifaceted, involving ethical, legal, medical, and philosophical aspects. Different countries have diverse policies on abortion, from strict prohibitions to more permissive approaches. Recent legal developments in the United States, exemplified by the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization case overturning Roe v. Wade, have stirred significant legal, political, and public upheaval surrounding abortion rights. Advancements in medical technology have enabled early detection of fetal defects, forcing expectant mothers to make complex decisions regarding continuing a pregnancy with potential health challenges for the child or opting for termination. The book introduces the concept of viewing the fetus as a \"quasi person\" with the right to be born and enjoy good health, especially after the 24th week of pregnancy. It aims to strike a balance between women's autonomy and fetal rights, considering advances in fetal therapy. Employing a multidisciplinary approach, drawing insights from law, philosophy, ethics, medicine, psychology, and public policy, the book seeks to reconcile the rights of women and fetuses. It unequivocally supports protecting the right to life for viable fetuses, justifying this stance through historical context, advancements in fetal therapy, and ethical considerations related to women's autonomy and fetal rights. In summary, this book provides a thorough examination of abortions performed after 24 weeks of gestation, exploring the ethical, legal, medical, and philosophical dimensions while advocating for the preservation of the right to life for viable fetuses.

Advances in reproductive biotechnology increase control over who is born and under what circumstances.Consequently, the question arises: what do we owe to the future children who are born with the help of these technologies?To address this question, we must understand how we should approach the future child.

This essay on the law and politics of abortion analyzes the constitutional principles governing new challenges to Roe. The essay situates the Court's recent decision in Gonzales v. Carhart in debates of the antiabortion movement over the reach and rationale of statutes designed to overturn Roe--exploring strategic considerations that lead advocates to favor incremental restrictions over bans, and to supplement fetal-protective justifications with woman-protective justifications for regulating abortion. The essay argues that a multi-faceted commitment to dignity links Carhart and the Casey decision on which it centrally relies. Dignity is a value that bridges communities divided in the abortion debate, as well as diverse bodies of constitutional and human rights law. Carhart invokes dignity as a reason for regulating abortion, while Casey invokes dignity as a reason for protecting women's abortion decisions from government regulation. This dignity-based analysis of Casey/Carhart offers principles for determining the constitutionality of woman-protective abortion restrictions that are grounded in a large body of substantive due process and equal protection case law. Protecting women can violate women's dignity if protection is based on stereotypical assumptions about women's capacities and women's roles, as many of the new woman-protective abortion restrictions are. Like old forms of gender paternalism, the new forms of gender paternalism remedy harm to women through the control of women. The new woman-protective abortion restrictions do not provide women in need what they need: they do not alleviate the social conditions that contribute to unwanted pregnancies, nor do they provide social resources to help women who choose to end pregnancies they otherwise might bring to term. The essay concludes by reflecting on alternative--and constitutional--modes of protecting women who are making decisions about motherhood.

Since the Supreme Court decided Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey in 1992, there has been a race to the bottom to use the doctrine of so-called \"informed consent\" to coerce pregnant women into becoming mothers by giving birth to a child. Pregnant women are handed glossy brochures with four-week-old fetuses magnified into portrayals of living children and falsely told that their decision to terminate their pregnancy is likely to lead to increased risks of breast cancer, depression, and future fertility problems. Childbirth, by contrast, is romantically portrayed as a risk-free, wholly positive experience, consistent with pregnant women's natural destiny as mothers. This race to the bottom is inconsistent with standard tort principles that apply to medical procedures, but courts have tolerated it because of their stereotypical conception of the pregnant person as a \"mother\" and the fetus as an \"unborn child.\" This Article argues that an equality-based conception of reproductive rights can help unmask the gender-based stereotypes that underlie this race to the bottom. Constructively, this Article argues that informed consent is possible within abortion jurisprudence. The Down syndrome proinformation campaign has been a successful part of such a movement. Unfortunately, the current rush by states to criminalize an individual's decision to terminate a pregnancy after a prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome is the latest coercive step that is unraveling such important advances in informed consent. Pregnant people, like all patients, are entitled to receive fair and balanced information to make informed decisions about their personal autonomy. It is important to recognize their right to decide whether to become parents rather than to conceptualize them as already being \"mothers\" due to their pregnancy.

The author’s premise is that in claims allocated to the multi-track, Judicial-Early Neutral Evaluation ('JENE') is the new normal. He discusses: the rationale; jurisdiction; and powers of the court to order JENE; its benefits; and the procedure. He concludes that, except where a claim involves the interests of minors and unborn beneficiaries, use of this case management tool is likely to become increasingly routine at the first case management conference where, for example, one party has proposed JENE, and the other has refused consent because he prefers mediation. Whereas mediation requires consent, JENE does not, and the court has the power at the first Case Management Conference to order a stay during which the parties must: (i) take stock and (ii) each carry out a reality check, i.e. before substantial costs are incurred in preparing for trial. Therefore, in an appropriate case, where a binary outcome on liability can open the door to settlement in relation to quantum, relief, and costs, JENE should be considered.