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"Unemployment Insurance"
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Reforming severance pay : an international perspective
\"Severance pay, a program that provides compensation to workers on termination of employment, is the most widely used income protection program for the unemployed--yet it is often blamed for creating economic inefficiencies such as reducing employment and limiting access to jobs for disadvantaged groups. Reforming Severance Pay: An International Perspective fills the knowledge gap in evaluating the international experience by providing a collection of worldwide overviews and labor market impact assessments, theoretical analyses, and country case studies. The authors summarize the performance of existing severance pay arrangements around the world and discuss recent innovative severance pay reforms in Austria, Chile, and the Republic of Korea. Reforming Severance Pay proposes policy directions based on country characteristics such as folding severance pay of higher income countries into existing social insurance programs and making severance pay a contractual affair between market partners to live up to the efficiency-enhancing device in a knowledge-based economy. For lower income countries, the authors advise reforming severance pay toward realistic benefit levels, strengthening compliance of benefit payments by the employer, and safeguarding minimum benefits. This report will be of interest to policy makers and researchers working on labor market, unemployment benefit, and pension issues; economic policy reform; poverty reduction; and social analysis and policy\"--P. [4] of cover.
Book
Should Unemployment Insurance Vary with the Unemployment Rate? Theory and Evidence
We study how the marginal welfare gain from increasing the unemployment insurance (UI) benefit level varies over the business cycle. We do this by estimating how the moral hazard cost and the consumption smoothing benefit of UI vary with labour market conditions, which we identify using variation in the interaction of UI benefit levels with the unemployment rate within U.S. states over time. We find that the moral hazard cost is procyclical, greater when the unemployment rate is relatively low. By contrast, we do not find evidence that the consumption smoothing benefit varies with the unemployment rate. We use these empirical results to estimate the marginal welfare gain, and we find that it is modest on average, but varies positively with the unemployment rate.
Journal Article
Being unemployed in Northern Ireland : an ethnographic study
In this study of unemployment in Belfast, Dr Howe successfully refutes some of the widely held myths about the black economy, the welfare benefit system and the so-called culture of dependency. This is a major ethnography of unemployment and the first community-based book on contemporary unemployment in the United Kingdom.
Book
Consumer Spending during Unemployment
Using de-identified bank account data, we show that spending drops sharply at the large and predictable decrease in income arising from the exhaustion of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. We use the high-frequency response to a predictable income decline as a new test to distinguish between alternative consumption models. The sensitivity of spending to income we document is inconsistent with rational models of liquidity-constrained households, but is consistent with behavioral models with present-biased or myopic households. Depressed spending after exhaustion also implies that the consumption-smoothing gains from extending UI benefits are four times larger than from raising UI benefit levels.
Journal Article
Does Extending Unemployment Benefits Improve Job Quality?
Contrary to standard search models predictions, past studies have not found a positive effect of unemployment insurance (UI) on reemployment wages. We estimate a positive UI wage effect exploiting an age-based regression discontinuity design in Austria. A search model incorporating duration dependence predicts two countervailing forces: UI induces workers to seek higher-wage jobs, but reduces wages by lengthening unemployment. Matching-function heterogeneity plausibly generates a negative relationship between the UI unemployment-duration and wage effects, which holds empirically in our sample and across studies, reconciling disparate wage-effect estimates. Empirically, UI raises wages by improving reemployment firm quality and attenuating wage drops.
Journal Article
The Optimal Timing of Unemployment Benefits
This paper provides a simple, yet robust framework to evaluate the time profile of benefits paid during an unemployment spell. We derive sufficient-statistics formulae capturing the marginal insurance value and incentive costs of unemployment benefits paid at different times during a spell. Our approach allows us to revisit separate arguments for inclining or declining profiles put forward in the theoretical literature and to identify welfare-improving changes in the benefit profile that account for all relevant arguments jointly. For the empirical implementation, we use administrative data on unemployment, linked to data on consumption, income, and wealth in Sweden. First, we exploit duration-dependent kinks in the replacement rate and find that, if anything, the moral hazard cost of benefits is larger when paid earlier in the spell. Second, we find that the drop in consumption affecting the insurance value of benefits is large from the start of the spell, but further increases throughout the spell. In trading off insurance and incentives, our analysis suggests that the flat benefit profile in Sweden has been too generous overall. However, both from the insurance and the incentives side, we find no evidence to support the introduction of a declining tilt in the profile.
Journal Article
Knowledge of Future Job Loss and Implications for Unemployment Insurance
This paper studies the implications of individuals' knowledge of future job loss for the existence of an unemployment insurance (UI) market Learning about job loss leads to consumption decreases and spousal labor supply increases. This suggests existing willingness to pay estimates for UI understate its value. But it yields new estimation methodologies that account for and exploit responses to learning about future job loss. Although the new willingness to pay estimates exceed previous estimates, I estimate much larger frictions imposed by private information. This suggests privately traded UI policies would be too adversely selected to be profitable, at any price.
Journal Article
The Effect of Unemployment Benefits and Nonemployment Durations on Wages
We estimate that unemployment insurance (UI) extensions reduce reemployment wages using sharp age discontinuities in UI eligibility in Germany. We show this effect combines two key policy parameters: the effect ofUI on reservation wages and the effect of nonemployment durations on wage offers. Our framework implies if UI extensions do not affect wages conditional on duration, then reservation wages do not bind. We derive resulting instrumental variable estimates for the effect of nonemployment durations on wage offers and bounds for reservation wage effects. The effect of UI on wages we find arises mainly from substantial negative nonemployment duration effects.
Journal Article