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It is well-established that for a considerable period the United Kingdom has spent proportionally less of its gross domestic product (GDP) on health-related services than almost any other comparable country. Average European spending on health (as a % of GDP) in the period 1980 to 2013 has been 19% higher than the United Kingdom, indicating that comparable countries give far greater fiscal priority to its health services, irrespective of its actual fiscal value or configuration. While the UK National Health Service (NHS) is a comparatively lean healthcare system, it is often regarded to be at a 'crisis' point on account of low levels of funding. Indeed, many state that currently the NHS has a sizeable funding gap, in part due to its recently reduced GDP devoted to health but mainly the challenges around increases in longevity, expectation and new medical costs. The right level of health funding is a political value judgement. As the data in this paper outline, if the UK 'afforded' the same proportional level of funding as the mean average European country, total expenditure would currently increase by one-fifth.

As a response to the crisis in the British banking system and reduced lending, the British government established Project Merlin, a series of lending targets aimed at boosting lending to the British economy, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in particular. Given the economic importance of the targets, however, this paper questions why the Merlin agreements were so ineffective. Three explanations are given: first, in light of the challenges in accessing wholesale funding for the largest UK-owned banks, there was a lack of capacity and incentive to lend more; second, the lack of decisive intervention by the British state to compel banks to lend was also a determinant; third, though, I argue that boosting actual lending figures was not the primary aim of Project Merlin. Instead, the targets were performative, rather than substantive. I argue that these three explanations have important implications for the varieties of capitalism (VoC) debate and the economic and political economic literature on foreign versus domestic bank ownership. To the first literature, the article explains the degree to which politics underpins the structure of even the UK's purportedly liberal market economy (LME), whilst to the second, it explores the limitations to political control over even domestically-owned banks.

This beautifully crafted and solidly researched book explains why and how the United States made its first commitment to Vietnam in the late 1940s. Mark Atwood Lawrence deftly explores the process by which the Western powers set aside their fierce disagreements over colonialism and extended the Cold War fight into the Third World. Drawing on an unprecedented array of sources from three countries, Lawrence illuminates the background of the U.S. government's decision in 1950 to send military equipment and economic aid to bolster France in its war against revolutionaries. That decision, he argues, marked America's first definitive step toward embroilment in Indochina, the start of a long series of moves that would lead the Johnson administration to commit U.S. combat forces a decade and a half later. Offering a bold new interpretation, the author contends that the U.S. decision can be understood only as the result of complex transatlantic deliberations about colonialism in Southeast Asia in the years between 1944 and 1950. During this time, the book argues, sharp divisions opened within the U.S., French, and British governments over Vietnam and the issue of colonialism more generally. While many liberals wished to accommodate nationalist demands for self-government, others backed the return of French authority in Vietnam. Only after successfully recasting Vietnam as a Cold War conflict between the democratic West and international communism-a lengthy process involving intense international interplay-could the three governments overcome these divisions and join forces to wage war in Vietnam. One of the first scholars to mine the diplomatic materials housed in European archives, Lawrence offers a nuanced triangulation of foreign policy as it developed among French, British, and U.S. diplomats and policymakers. He also brings out the calculations of Vietnamese nationalists who fought bitterly first against the Japanese and then against the French as they sought their nation's independence.Assuming the Burdenis an eloquent illustration of how elites, operating outside public scrutiny, make decisions with enormous repercussions for decades to come.