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Almost two years after the deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in July 2013, the increasing number of asymmetric terrorist attacks targeting UN peacekeepers - in the context of a drawn-out peace process - has raised a number of questions in Mali, the sub-region, and in New York, over the relevance and adequacies of MINUSMA's mandate and capabilities. It also raises a broader issue, of whether the consent-based UN peacekeeping tool is appropriate and can be effective in carrying out stabilization mandates in such a context and what doctrine such operations should be based on. The UN is indeed under increasing pressure from host countries and some African troop-contributing countries to go on the offensive. Member States have also increasingly recognized terrorism and organized crime as a strategic threat, and while opposed to the UN directly engaging in counterterrorism (CT) operations, some may wish to see the UN playing a greater stabilization role following the January 2013 French military intervention in Mali. However, little guidance and means have been given so far to UN missions for dealing with such threats and implementing effective stabilization mandates. The High-Level Panel on Peace Operations, which recently released its report, noted that the usage of the term \"stabilization\" by the UN requires clarification. This article analyses the complex and evolving nature of threats in northern Mali and implications for MINUSMA and describes the military and political tools - including mediation - so far available within and outside the UN. The article concludes that the UN is bound to move towards stabilization when and if deployed in contexts such as Mali's if it wants to remain relevant. However, such a move should be based on an overarching UN stabilization doctrine and context-specific UN-wide stabilization strategies which are first and foremost political, and should not be confused with the reestablishment of state authority. Such a move should also be accompanied by reforms in the design of 'lighter' but more capable UN operations, and partnership with non-UN parallel fighting forces with shared stabilization objectives, but with a clear division of labor.

China's increasing participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations reached a milestone in 2013 when Beijing agreed to send a large detachment of personnel, including combat forces for the first time, to support UN peacekeeping operations in Mali after that country fell into civil war. This commitment was also distinct in that unlike other African countries where Beijing has supplied peacekeepers, Mali is not a major trading partner with China. However, this mission has both cemented Beijing's greater commitment to building African partnerships as well as demonstrating its determination to move beyond “resource diplomacy” and towards a more comprehensive approach to engaging the continent. Although China has warmed to the principles of humanitarian intervention in civil conflicts, Mali has been a critical test of China's ability to participate in UN operations in a country which is still facing ongoing violence. The Mali mission is an important step in Beijing's turn towards greater realpolitik in Chinese Beijing's peacekeeping policies in keeping with its great power status. At the same time, participation in the Mali mission has been beneficial for China, not only in helping to build the country's peacekeeping credentials in Africa but also in underscoring China's increasingly distinct views on addressing intervention in civil conflicts. 2013 年是中国加大在联合国维和行动里程碑式的一年。在马里陷入内战后，北京同意向其派遣大批人员以支持联合国维和行动，包括第一次派出安全部队。中国在其他一些非洲国家也有维和人员，但因马里并非中国在非洲大陆主要的贸易伙伴，因此在此的维和投入显得非常引人注目。这次行动巩固了北京加深建立与非洲伙伴关系的目标，也展示了中国政府不仅限于追求 “资源外交” 的决心还有更全面参与非洲事务的方法。尽管中国向来对参与在内部冲突情况下的人道主义干预怀有兴趣，马里依然是检验其是否有能力在一个正面临着持续暴力冲突的国家参与联合国维和行动的重要试金石。马里行动既是北京维和政策向 “现实政治” 转变过程中的重要一步，也和中国目前的大国地位相关联。同时，参与此次行动对中国有所裨益，不但利于建立中国在非洲的维和信誉，也有助于凸显中国在其他国家内战情况下如何进行干预的日渐鲜明的观点。

China has been much more involved in Africa's economy and trade than in its security. However, over the past decade or so, China has increased its participation in the United Nation's Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKOs), particularly in Africa. It has also taken steps to better protect its overseas nationals and, in 2017, established a naval base in Djibouti. This article focuses on the participation of China's People's Liberation Army in the United Nation's Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) since 2013. It aims to unpack the diplomatic process that led China to take part in this mission and to analyse the form of this participation. Mali was the second time (the first being in South Sudan in 2012) that China opted to deploy combat troops under the UN banner, underscoring a deepening involvement in PKOs and an increasing readiness to face risks. Finally, this article explores the implications of China's participation in the MINUSMA for its foreign and security posture as a whole. Often perceived as a realist rising power, by more actively participating in UN PKOs China is trying to demonstrate that it is a responsible and “integrationist” great power, ready to play the game according to the commonly approved international norms. Is this really the case? 中国一直保持同非洲紧密经贸关系，人们却较少提到该国如何介入安全问题。然而，近十年以来，中国越来越热衷于特别在非洲进行的联合国维持和平行动，同时开始关注保护国民以及于吉布提建立海军基地。本文探讨自 2013 年以来，中国人民解放军参与联合国马里多层面综合稳定特派团 (马里稳定团) 的经验，并回顾当年导致中国介入马里问题的外交过程，以及分析介入的具体方式。马里是中国继于 2012 年出兵南苏丹后，第二次派遣作战部队参与联合国维和任务，凸显该国重视维和工作，并越来越愿意面对风险。本文最后探讨中国参与马里稳定团在其整体外交和安全政策上的影响。中国往往被分析家认为是一个现实的新兴大国，通过参与联合国维和行动，北京力图表明，它负责任而且「愿意融入国际社会」，依照一般认可的规范活动: 且看事实是否如此?

Almost two years after the deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in July 2013, the increasing number of asymmetric terrorist attacks targeting UN peacekeepers – in the context of a drawn-out peace process – has raised a number of questions in Mali, the sub-region, and in New York, over the relevance and adequacies of MINUSMA’s mandate and capabilities. It also raises a broader issue, of whether the consent-based UN peacekeeping tool is appropriate and can be effective in carrying out stabilization mandates in such a context and what doctrine such operations should be based on. The UN is indeed under increasing pressure from host countries and some African troop-contributing countries to go on the offensive. Member States have also increasingly recognized terrorism and organized crime as a strategic threat, and while opposed to the UN directly engaging in counterterrorism (CT) operations, some may wish to see the UN playing a greater stabilization role following the January 2013 French military intervention in Mali. However, little guidance and means have been given so far to UN missions for dealing with such threats and implementing effective stabilization mandates. The High-Level Panel on Peace Operations, which recently released its report, noted that the usage of the term “stabilization” by the UN requires clarification. This article analyses the complex and evolving nature of threats in northern Mali and implications for MINUSMA and describes the military and political tools – including mediation – so far available within and outside the UN. The article concludes that the UN is bound to move towards stabilization when and if deployed in contexts such as Mali’s if it wants to remain relevant. However, such a move should be based on an overarching UN stabilization doctrine and context-specific UN-wide stabilization strategies which are first and foremost political, and should not be confused with the reestablishment of state authority. Such a move should also be accompanied by reforms in the design of ‘lighter’ but more capable UN operations, and partnership with non-UN parallel fighting forces with shared stabilization objectives, but with a clear division of labor

Mali and Somalia have both suffered determined Islamist-inspired insurgencies, and in both African Union-led peace operations have been a central pillar in political and security stabilization efforts. Despite challenges in transferring lessons between unique situations, the AMISOM experience can offer some useful lessons for Mali. We have identified several themes that helped to drive success for AMISOM, amongst others the determination of troop contributors and their funding partners, and actively pursuing the support of the host population. At the operational and tactical levels, we have highlighted a number of features that has contributed to more effective operations, including a high degree of adaptability, working with allied armed groups and a dogged determination to see the fight through. The next stage for both countries may be the most challenging yet as African Union and United Nations troops are called to keep a complex and fragile peace in Mali and Somalia.