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Harry S. Truman and the Cold War revisionists
The idea of revising what is known of the past constitutes an essential procedure in historical scholarship, but revisionists are often hasty and argumentative in their judgments. Such, argues Robert H. Ferrell, has been the case with assessments of the presidency of Harry S. Truman, who was targeted by historians and political scientists in the 1960s and '70s for numerous failings in both domestic and foreign policy, including launching the cold war—perceptions that persist to the present day.
Widely acknowledged as today's foremost Truman scholar, Ferrell turns the tables on the revisionists in this collection of classic essays. He goes below the surface appearances of history to examine how situations actually developed and how Truman performed sensibly—even courageously—in the face of unforeseen crises.
While some revisionists see Truman as consumed by a blind hatred of the Soviet Union and adopting an unrestrainedly militant stance, Ferrell convincingly shows that Truman wished to get along with the Soviets and was often bewildered by their actions. He interprets policies such as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and support for NATO as prudent responses to perceived threats and credits the Truman administration for the ways in which it dealt with unprecedented problems.
What emerges most vividly from Ferrell's essays is a sense of how weak a hand the United States held from 1945 to1950, with its conventional forces depleted by the return of veterans to civil pursuits after the war and with its capacity for delivery of nuclear weapons in a sorry state. He shows that Truman regarded the atomic bomb as a weapon of last resort, not an instrument of policy, and that he took America into a war in Korea for the good of the United States and its allies. Although Truman has been vindicated on many of these issues, there still remains a lingering controversy over the use of atomic weapons in Japan—a decision that Ferrell argues is understandable in light of what Truman faced at the start of his presidency.
Ferrell argues that the revisionists who attacked Truman understood neither the times nor the man—one of the most clearheaded, farsighted presidents ever to occupy the Oval Office. Harry S. Truman and the Cold War Revisionists shows us that Truman's was indeed a remarkable presidency, as it cautions historians against too quickly appraising the very recent past.
eBook
Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945–1960
The Cold War was in many ways a religious war. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower and other American leaders believed that human rights and freedom were endowed by God, that God had called the United States to defend liberty, and that Soviet communism was evil because of its atheism and enmity to religion. Along with security and economic concerns, these religious convictions helped determine both how the United States defined the enemy and how it fought the conflict. Meanwhile, American Protestant churches failed to seize the moment. Internal differences over theology and politics, and resistance to cooperation with Catholics and Jews, hindered Protestant leaders domestically and internationally. Frustrated by these internecine disputes, Truman and Eisenhower attempted to construct a new civil religion to mobilize domestic support for Cold War measures, determine the strategic boundaries of containment, unite all religious faiths against communism, and to undermine the authority of communist governments abroad.
eBook
Truman and the Bomb
Many myths have grown up around President Harry S. Truman's
decision to use nuclear weapons against Imperial Japan. In
destroying these myths, Truman and the Bomb will
discomfort both Truman's critics and his supporters, and force
historians to reexamine what they think they know about
the end of the Pacific War. Myth : Truman didn't
know of the atomic bomb's development before he became president.
Fact : Truman's knowledge of the bomb is revealed
in his own carefully worded letters to a Senate colleague and
specifically discussed in the correspondence between the army
officers assigned to his Senate investigating committee.
Myth : The huge casualty estimates cited by Truman
and Secretary of War Henry Stimson were a postwar creation devised
to hide their guilt for killing thousands of defenseless civilians.
Fact : The flagrantly misrepresented \"low\" numbers
are based on narrow slices of highly qualified-and limited-U.S.
Army projections printed in a variety of briefing documents and are
not from the actual invasion planning against Japan.
Myth : Truman wanted to defeat Japan without any
assistance from the Soviet Union and to freeze the USSR out of the
postwar settlements. Fact : President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and President Truman desperately wanted Stalin's
involvement in the bloody endgame of World War II and worked
diligently-and successfully-toward that end. Using previously
unpublished material, D. M. Giangreco busts these myths and more.
An award-winning historian and expert on Truman, Giangreco is
perfectly situated to debunk the many deep-rooted falsehoods about
the roles played by American, Soviet, and Japanese leaders during
the end of the World War II in the Pacific. Truman and the
Bomb , a concise yet comprehensive study of Truman's decision
to use the atomic bomb, will prove to be a classic for studying
presidential politics and influence on atomic warfare and its
military and diplomatic components. Making this book particularly
valuable for professors and students as well as for military,
diplomatic, and presidential historians and history buffs are
extensive primary source materials, including the planned U.S.
naval and air operations in support of the Soviet invasion of
Manchuria. These documents support Giangreco's arguments while
enabling the reader to enter the mindsets of Truman and his
administration as well as the war's key Allied participants.
eBook
Harry S. Truman and the Cold War revisionists
\"Ferrell argues that revisionists are often hasty and argumentative in their judgments, understanding neither the times nor the players. These essays challenge the revisionists' perception of President Harry Truman by going below surface appearances of history to examine how this presidency actually functioned in response to unprecedented problems and crises\"--Provided by publisher.
Book
Roosevelt's Lost Alliances
In the spring of 1945, as the Allied victory in Europe was approaching, the shape of the postwar world hinged on the personal politics and flawed personalities of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. Roosevelt's Lost Alliances captures this moment and shows how FDR crafted a winning coalition by overcoming the different habits, upbringings, sympathies, and past experiences of the three leaders. In particular, Roosevelt trained his famous charm on Stalin, lavishing respect on him, salving his insecurities, and rendering him more amenable to compromise on some matters.
eBook
A companion to Harry S. Truman
With contributions from the most accomplished scholars in the field, this fascinating companion to one of America's pivotal presidents assesses Harry S.Truman as a historical figure, politician, president and strategist.
eBook