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States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how states and their leaders draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions.Knowing the Adversarydraws on a wealth of historical archival evidence to shed new light on how world leaders and intelligence organizations actually make these assessments. Keren Yarhi-Milo examines three cases: Britain's assessments of Nazi Germany's intentions in the 1930s, America's assessments of the Soviet Union's intentions during the Carter administration, and the Reagan administration's assessments of Soviet intentions near the end of the Cold War. She advances a new theoretical framework-called selective attention-that emphasizes organizational dynamics, personal diplomatic interactions, and cognitive and affective factors. Yarhi-Milo finds that decision makers don't pay as much attention to those aspects of state behavior that major theories of international politics claim they do. Instead, they tend to determine the intentions of adversaries on the basis of preexisting beliefs, theories, and personal impressions. Yarhi-Milo also shows how intelligence organizations rely on very different indicators than decision makers, focusing more on changes in the military capabilities of adversaries. Knowing the Adversaryprovides a clearer picture of the historical validity of existing theories, and broadens our understanding of the important role that diplomacy plays in international security.

Fidel Castro described Salvador Allende's democratic election as president of Chile in 1970 as the most important revolutionary triumph in Latin America after the Cuban revolution. Yet celebrations were short lived. In Washington, the Nixon administration vowed to destroy Allende's left-wing government while Chilean opposition forces mobilized against him. The result was a battle for Chile that ended in 1973 with a right-wing military coup and a brutal dictatorship lasting nearly twenty years.Tanya Harmer argues that this battle was part of a dynamic inter-American Cold War struggle to determine Latin America's future, shaped more by the contest between Cuba, Chile, the United States, and Brazil than by a conflict between Moscow and Washington. Drawing on firsthand interviews and recently declassified documents from archives in North America, Europe, and South America--including Chile's Foreign Ministry Archive--Harmer provides the most comprehensive account to date of Cuban involvement in Latin America in the early 1970s, Chilean foreign relations during Allende's presidency, Brazil's support for counterrevolution in the Southern Cone, and the Nixon administration's Latin American policies. The Cold War in the Americas, Harmer reveals, is best understood as a multidimensional struggle, involving peoples and ideas from across the hemisphere.

At the close of World War II, the United States went from being allied with the Soviet Union against Germany to alignment with the Germans against the Soviet Union -- almost overnight. While many Americans came to perceive the German people as democrats standing firm with their Western allies on the front lines of the Cold War, others were wary of a renewed Third Reich and viewed all Germans as nascent Nazis bent on world domination. These adversarial perspectives added measurably to the atmosphere of fear and distrust that defined the Cold War. InEnemies to Allies, Brian C. Etheridge examines more than one hundred years of American interpretations and representations of Germany. With a particular focus on the postwar period, he demonstrates how a wide array of actors -- including special interest groups and US and West German policymakers -- employed powerful narratives to influence public opinion and achieve their foreign policy objectives. Etheridge also analyses bestselling books, popular television shows such asHogan's Heroes, and award-winning movies such asSchindler's Listto reveal how narratives about the Third Reich and Cold War Germany were manufactured, contested, and co-opted as rival viewpoints competed for legitimacy. From the Holocaust to the Berlin Wall, Etheridge explores the contingent nature of some of the most potent moral symbols and images of the second half of the twentieth century. This groundbreaking study draws from theories of public memory and public diplomacy to demonstrate how conflicting US accounts of German history serve as a window for understanding not only American identity, but international relations and state power.

Because it provided the dominant framework for \"development\" of poor, postcolonial countries, modernization theory ranks among the most important constructs of twentieth-century social science. In Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America Nils Gilman offers the first intellectual history of a movement that has had far-reaching and often unintended consequences. After a survey of the theory's origins and its role in forming America's postwar sense of global mission, Gilman offers a close analysis of the people who did the most to promote it in the United States and the academic institutions they came to dominate. He first explains how Talcott Parsons at Harvard constructed a social theory that challenged the prevailing economics-centered understanding of the modernization process, then describes the work of Edward Shils and Gabriel Almond in helping Parsonsian ideas triumph over other alternative conceptions of the development process, and finally discusses the role of Walt Rostow and his colleagues at M.I.T. in promoting modernization theory during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. By connecting modernization theory to the welfare state liberalism programs of the New Deal order, Gilman not only provides a new intellectual context for America's Third World during the Cold War, but also connects the optimism of the Great Society to the notion that American power and good intentions could stop the postcolonial world from embracing communism.

Based on new and existing research by a world‐class scholar, this is the first book in twenty years to examine the dynamics of the entire American–Western European relationship since 1945. The relationship between the US and Western Europe has always been crucial, and current events dictate that it is becoming ever more so. In this book, the author analyses the balance between the cooperation and conflict that has characterized this relationship in the post‐war period. He examines talk of transatlantic drift, and the strain now apparent between the US and the nation states of Western Europe. The first nine chapters are, for the most part, arranged as a chronological account of the relationship. In the concluding Ch. 10 section, the author offers a topical view of the future of transatlantic interaction. Throughout the work, the author's much cited ‘“Empire” by invitation’ thesis is both put into practice and extended in time and scope. This book is essential reading for anyone interested in one of the most important and enduring international relationships of the last sixty years.

Recent American foreign policy has depended heavily on the use of negative inducements to alter the behavior of other states. From public browbeating through economic sanctions to military invasion, the last several presidents have chosen to use coercion to advance U.S. interests when dealing with adversaries. In this respect, as Miroslav Nincic notes, the United States differs from many of its closest allies: Canada has long maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba, and several of the European democracies have continued diplomatic engagement with governments that the United States considers pariah regimes. InThe Logic of Positive Engagement, Nincic outlines the efficacy of and the benefits that can flow from positive rather than negative engagement. Nincic observes that threats and punishments may be gratifying in a symbolic sense, but that they haven't affected the longevity or the most objectionable policies of the regimes against which they are directed. Might positive inducements produce better results? Nincic examines two major models of positive inducements: the exchange model, in which incentives are offered in trade for altered behavior, and the catalytic model, in which incentives accumulate to provoke a thorough revision of the target's policies and priorities. He examines the record with regard to long-term U.S. relations with Cuba, Libya, and Syria, and then discusses the possibility that positive inducements might bring policy success to current relations with Iran and North Korea.

Exploring 'the great work of subjugation and conquest' which began with Columbus, in 'Year 501' Chomsky surveys the history of American imperial power in the ensuing 500 years that followed. Touching on everything from the British in India to the Americans in Beirut, 'Year 501' is a searing condemnation of the excesses of Western colonial and neo-colonial politics. For those seeking to understand the nature and structure of the imperial project as it reaches down to us today this work is a vital resource.

This book examines the evolution of European-American relations with the Middle East since 1945. Placing the current transatlantic debates on the Middle East into a broader context, this work analyses how, why, and to what extent European and US roles, interests, threat perceptions, and policy attitudes in the region have changed, relating to both the region as a whole and the two main issues analysed: Gulf Security and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The contributors then go on to discuss the implications of these developments for Western policymaking. The volume makes four key contributions. First, it examines the subject matter from a truly transatlantic perspective, with all chapters adopting a bi- or multilateral approach, taking into account the views from both the US and individual European countries or the EC/EU collectively. Second, the book takes a long-term view, covering a series of crises and developments over the past six decades. Third, it has a systematic structure, with the predominantly chronological order of the chapters being geared towards depicting trends and evolutions with regard to the key themes of the book. Finally, the book builds bridges between historians and political scientists/analysts, as well as between experts of transatlantic relations and Middle East scholars. This book will be of great interest to students of transatlantic relations, the Middle East, US foreign policy, European politics, international history and IR in general. Daniel Möckli is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich. He is also the editor of CSS Analyses in Security Policy. Victor Mauer is Deputy Director and Head of Research of the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, and Lecturer in the Department of Social Sciences and Humanities at ETH Zurich. Daniel Möckli is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich. He is also the editor of CSS Analyses in Security Policy. Victor Mauer is the Deputy Director and Head of Research of the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, and Lecturer in the Department of Social Sciences and Humanities at ETH Zurich. Introduction Daniel M öckli and Victor Mauer Part 1: Changing Roles and Interests: From Suez to Iraq 1. Suez 1956: European Colonial Interests and US Cold War Prerogatives Tore T. Petersen 2. Iraq 2003: Regime Change and Its European Discontents Victor Mauer Part 2: The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the West 3. Anglo-American Relations and the Palestine Question, 1945-56 John Sakkas 4. At Odds in the Middle East: Paris, Washington, and the Six-Day War, 1967 Garret Martin 5. The EC-Nine and Transatlantic Conflict During the October War and the Oil Crisis, 1973/74 Daniel Möckli 6. The Euro-Arab Dialogue, the Venice Declaration, and Beyond: The Limits of a Distinct EC Policy, 1974-89 David Allen and Andrin Hauri 7. From Madrid to Camp David: Europe, the US, and the Middle East Peace Process in the 1990s Patrick Müller and Claire Spencer 8. The Middle East Quartet: A New Role for Europe? Constanza Musu Part 3: Gulf Security and Transatlantic Relations 9. Dealing with Iran: The US, Britain, and Regime Change 1951-3 Malcolm Byrne 10. Securing Gulf Oil: Britain, NATO, and the Question of Military Intervention East of Suez, 1949-68 Stephen Blackwell 11. Subcontracting Security: The US, Britain, and Gulf Security Before the Carter Doctrine Roland Popp 12. Great Game Redux: The US, Europe, and Gulf Security in the Late Cold War Peter John Brobst 13. Europe, the US, and the Gulf After the Cold War Gerd Nonneman 14. Iran and the Bomb: Washington, the EU, and Iranian Nuclear Ambitions Harsh V. Pant. Conclusion: Major Trends in European-American Relations and the Middle East since 1945 Daniel Möckli and Victor Mauer

What is the role of intelligence agencies in strategy and policy? How do policymakers use (or misuse) intelligence estimates? When do intelligence-policy relations work best? How do intelligence-policy failures influence threat assessment, military strategy, and foreign policy? These questions are at the heart of recent national security controversies, including the 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq. In both cases the relationship between intelligence and policy broke down-with disastrous consequences.InFixing the Facts, Joshua Rovner explores the complex interaction between intelligence and policy and shines a spotlight on the problem of politicization. Major episodes in the history of American foreign policy have been closely tied to the manipulation of intelligence estimates. Rovner describes how the Johnson administration dealt with the intelligence community during the Vietnam War; how President Nixon and President Ford politicized estimates on the Soviet Union; and how pressure from the George W. Bush administration contributed to flawed intelligence on Iraq. He also compares the U.S. case with the British experience between 1998 and 2003, and demonstrates that high-profile government inquiries in both countries were fundamentally wrong about what happened before the war.