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Based on massive new research, a compelling and surprising account of the twentieth century's closest election The 1960 presidential election between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon is one of the most frequently described political events of the twentieth century, yet the accounts to date have been remarkably unbalanced. Far more attention is given to Kennedy's side than to Nixon's. The imbalance began with the first book on that election, Theodore White's The Making of the President 1960 -in which (as he later admitted) White deliberately cast Kennedy as the hero and Nixon as the villain-and it has been perpetuated in almost every book since then. Few historians have attempted an unbiased account of the election, and none have done the archival research that Irwin F. Gellman has done. Based on previously unused sources such as the FBI's surveillance of JFK and the papers of Leon Jaworski, vice-presidential candidate Henry Cabot Lodge, and many others, this book presents the first even-handed history of both the primary campaigns and the general election. The result is a fresh, engaging chronicle that shatters long†'held myths and reveals the strengths and weaknesses of both candidates.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower is remembered by many as the originator of the American Interstate Highway System. He is also praised for restraining executive overreach, restoring the separation of powers, and presiding over an era of governmental equanimity and goodwill. In Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Federal Highway Act, Charles Zug contests all these assumptions. Through archival research, Zug shows that Eisenhower's attempt to lead highway expansion during 1952-1955 ended in dismal failure. Far from championing the separation of powers, Eisenhower sought to marginalize Congress from the legislative process by secretly writing a transformative highway bill within the confines of his White House. And once it was announced, Eisenhower's highway plan was almost universally panned: Ike's own comptroller general deemed the plan's funding mechanism \"illegal\" before a bipartisan majority laughed it out of the Senate in the spring of 1955. The highway bill that did eventually pass Congress in 1956, and that went on to launch the modern interstate system, was written by congressional Democrats and emphatically rejected Eisenhower's basic approach to highway reform. Drawing on executive politics, American political development, and leadership studies, Zug uses the Federal Highway Act to argue for a foundational reassessment of Eisenhower's legacy as highway founder, president, and political leader.

This seminar study examines the Eisenhower presidency.  The author argues that the presidency marked an important stage in the evolution of modern America, but left a decidedly mixed legacy for future presidents.   Domestically Eisenhower pursued a 'middle way'.  Imbued with a profound district of politics and politicians, Eisenhower sought as much as possible to concentrate public policy making in the hands of an enlightened elite of public and private experts.  Internationally, Eisenhower's policies exacerbated the nuclear arms race, institutionalised the Cold War, and extended the East-West struggles to new arenas in the Third World.   This new account offers an up-to-date synthesis of this newly emerging literature, and reviews Eisenhower's record - from the mishandling of the Civil Rights movement to the escalation of the arms race and the intensification of the Cold War.

In the 1950s, public relations practitioners tried to garner respectability for their fledgling profession, and one international figure helped in that endeavor.President Dwight D.Eisenhower embraced public relations as a necessary component of American democracy, advancing the profession at a key moment in its history.

In today's world of rapid advancements in science and technology, we need to scrutinize more than ever the historical forces that shape our perceptions of what these new possibilities can and cannot do for social progress.In Sputnik's Shadowprovides a lens to do just that, by tracing the rise and fall of the President's Science Advisory Committee from its ascendance under Eisenhower in the wake of the Soviet launching of Sputnik to its demise during the Nixon years. Members of this committee shared a strong sense of technological skepticism; they were just as inclined to advise the president about what technologycouldn'tdo-for national security, space exploration, arms control, and environmental protection-as about what itcoulddo.Zuoyue Wang examines key turning points during the twentieth century, including the beginning of the Cold War, the debates over nuclear weapons, the Sputnik crisis in 1957, the struggle over the Vietnam War, and the eventual end of the Cold War, showing how the involvement of scientists in executive policymaking evolved over time. Bringing new insights to the intellectual, social, and cultural histories of the era, this book not only depicts the drama of Cold War American science, it gives perspective to how we think about technological advancements today.

In a critical Cold War moment, Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency suddenly changed when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the world's first satellite. What Ike called \"a small ball\" became a source of Russian pride and propaganda, and it wounded him politically, as critics charged that he responded sluggishly to the challenge of space exploration. Yet Eisenhower refused to panic after Sputnik-and he did more than just stay calm. He helped to guide the United States into the Space Age, even though Americans have given greater credit to John F. Kennedy for that achievement. InEisenhower's Sputnik Moment, Yanek Mieczkowski examines the early history of America's space program, reassessing Eisenhower's leadership. He details how Eisenhower approved breakthrough satellites, supported a new civilian space agency, signed a landmark science education law, and fostered improved relations with scientists. These feats made Eisenhower's post-Sputnik years not the flop that critics alleged but a time of remarkable progress, even as he endured the setbacks of recession, medical illness, and a humiliating first U.S. attempt to launch a satellite. Eisenhower's principled stands enabled him to resist intense pressure to boost federal spending, and he instead pursued his priorities-a balanced budget, prosperous economy, and sturdy national defense. Yet Sputnik also altered the world's power dynamics, sweeping Eisenhower in directions that were new, even alien, to him, and he misjudged the importance of space in the Cold War's \"prestige race.\" By contrast, Kennedy capitalized on the issue in the 1960 election, and after taking office he urged a manned mission to the moon, leaving Eisenhower to grumble over the young president's aggressive approach. Offering a fast-paced account of this Cold War episode, Mieczkowski demonstrates that Eisenhower built an impressive record in space and on earth, all the while offering warnings about America's stature and strengths that still hold true today.

For most of three decades, Drew Pearson was the most well-known journalist in the United States. In his daily newspaper column-the most widely syndicated in the nation-and on radio and television broadcasts, he chronicled the political and public policy news of the nation. At the same time, he worked his way into the inner circles of policy makers in the White House and Congress, lobbying for issues he believed would promote better government and world peace. Pearson, however, still found time to record his thoughts and observations in his personal diary. Published here for the first time,Washington Merry-Go-Roundpresents Pearson's private impressions of life inside the Beltway from 1960 to 1969, revealing how he held the confidence of presidents-especially Lyndon B. Johnson-congressional leaders, media moguls, political insiders, and dozens of otherwise unknown sources of information. His direct interactions with the DC glitterati, including Bobby Kennedy and Douglas MacArthur, are featured throughout his diary, drawing the reader into the compelling political intrigues of 1960s Washington and providing the mysterious backstory on the famous and the notorious of the era.

Explores how the politics inherent to the Red Scare profoundly affected FCC decisions and policymaking from 1939-1962. The Red Scare at the FCC started when James Lawrence Fly led the agency in many important decisions that were inspired by the New Deal. These decisions outraged both the broadcasting industry and politically conservative legislators, causing them to accuse the FCC of Communist sympathies. This book analyzes the political transition taken by the FCC that turned it into an agency that fully participated in the Red Scare of the 1950s. This book analyzes many significant FCC cases and policies that have never been considered within the context of New Deal policymaking or its impact. This work is the first to look into the impact of the Red Scare on an executive agency. Its combination of new archival and behind-the- scenes information makes this book a great addition to the growing body of research on media history and regulation.

Unearthing the vicissitudes of the relationship between General de Gaulle and American administration in the 1958-69 period, the author assesses the American disposition towards the French leader as well as his mark on the US foreign policy of the time. Reyn draws exhaustively on the records of the consecutive liberal and conservative administrations to outline a shift in American perceptions of the transatlantic relationship as an evolving Atlantic 'community' towards an Atlanticism primarily attuned to the national interest.