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This paper argues that ethnoscientists interested in folk biological classification have paid insufficient attention to the practical significance of such systems of cultural knowledge in their pursuit of general logical and/or perceptual principles governing the form and content of folk biological taxonomies. It is suggested that ethnoscientists adopt an adaptationist stance in recognition of the fact that cultural knowledge is used to guide behavior. The implications of such a shift in emphasis on folk biological classification theory are assessed. Present theory is rent by a fundamental contradiction between a formal taxonomic hierarchy model and one based on the contrast between a general purpose, biologically natural taxonomic core and special purpose, biologically artificial peripheral taxa. The natural core model is advocated as both superior in explanatory power and explicit in recognizing the purposes of classification. C. Brown's life-form universals are criticized for confounding the fundamental contrast between general purpose and special purpose life-form taxa. In conclusion, there is a discussion of the difficulty of developing a valid measure of the practical significance of a taxon, suggesting as a first step toward that goal the systematic description of each taxon's unique \"activity signature.\" Such activity signatures are then to be evaluated in the context of a culture's system of \"routine action plans\" which link cultural knowledge and adaptive behavior. The desired result is a new ethnoecology integrating ethnoscientific and ecological theory.

John C. Harsanyi (Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations, Cambridge U Press, 1977) proposes a theory of morality, \"critical rule utilitarianism,\" which includes a proposed solution to the problem of the interpersonal comparison of utility. This rests on the idea that moral choice involves impartiality, & thus giving equal weight to the preferences of all individuals in choosing social rules. There are formal difficulties in the solution proposed, in that the assumption of equivalence between one individual's personal preferences & another individual's model of those preferences as outcomes of a psychological causal process cannot be sustained, & thus the second individual's \"extended utility function\" is not necessarily valid. Further, this theory presupposes a more fundamental theory of morality by which a distinction can be drawn between social & antisocial preferences, with only the former being taken into account; given this, morality might just as well rely on the more basic theory. Modified HA.

The purpose of this paper is to show how some of the controversial questions concerning utilitarianism can be clarified by the modelling techniques and the other analytical tools of decision theory (and, sometimes, of game theory). It is suggested that the moral rules of utilitarian ethics have a logical status similar to that of the normative rules (theorems) of such formal normative disciplines as decision theory and game theory. The paper argues that social utility should be defined, not in hedonistic or in idealutilitarian terms, but rather in terms of individual preferences, in accordance with the author's equiprobability model of moral value judgments. After describing the difficulties of act utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism is discussed as a possibly superior alternative. Brandt and Lyons have tried to show that these two forms of utilitarianism are actually equivalent. To test Brandt's and Lyons's equivalence thesis, a decision-theoretical model for utilitarian theory is proposed. The model shows that the thesis is definitely false. The basic difference between the two theories results from the expectation effect and the incentive effect, which, surprisingly enough, have been almost completely neglected in the philosophical literature. The paper illustrates these two effects in connection with the moral duty of promise keeping. Yet, even if we do neglect the expectation and the incentive effects, and concentrate on the coordination effect, as most of the philosophical literature does, it can be shown that rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism have very different practical implications. This is demonstrated by analysis of three voting situations. Hence, the equivalence thesis fails even under the assumptions most favorable to it.

For generations sociologists have attacked utilitarian social theory as inadequate theoretically. At the same time, their presentist orientation toward sociology's past has prevented a direct examination of the utilitarians in their own right. This paper rejects that orientation and investigates the social theory of the major utilitarians. David Hume, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. No alleged characteristic of utilitarianism-from the atomistic, rationalistic model of social action to the failure to solve the problem of order-adduced in the traditional attack upon it is actually found in the work of the utilitarians. The paper then outlines the historical process whereby the prevailing mythology concerning utilitarianism developed. The hallmark of that process is not the cumulative development of social theories but the displacement, in changing cultural and social circumstances, of the concerns of utilitarian social theory-a displacement succesively evident in the work of Spencer, early American social scintists, and Park and climaxing in Parson's The Structure of Social Action. The paper concludes by offering a sociological interpretation of Parson's selective account of utilitarian social theory and by identifying the constricting, but still pervasive, theoretical implications of that account.

The decision rules yielded respectively by J. Rawls' \"maximin\" conception of justice (\"Justice as Fairness,\" Philosophical Review, 1958, 67; A THEORY OF JUSTICE, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard U Press, 1971), & by classical utilitarianism are examined. Sharp differences are brought out assuming a pure distribution problem. Axiomatic analysis of the 2 conceptions shows that both Rawls & utilitarianism omit essential aspects of distributional welfare judgments; Rawls leaves out questions of welfare differences, utilitarianism, & questions of welfare levels. It is possible to consider the ranking of welfare levels without concentrating exclusively on the welfare levels of worst off persons, as does Rawls. But a more complete theory is yet to emerge. 8 Equations. Modified HA.

Australian political ideology can be explained by regarding Australia as an essentially Benthamite society. Jeremy Bentham's political philosophy (Fragment on Government; Constitutional Code, no publication information provided) included the concepts of utilitarianism, legalism, & positivism. Utilitarianism involves reconciling individual interests with those of the state, in contrast to a classical idealism. Australia's parliamentary structure is utilitarian. Legalism, where interests take priority over consent, is the means of classifying institutional forms & functions. Positivism includes the separation of fact & value & the division of speculative thought. Benthamism arrived in Australia during its nineteenth-century colonization & quickly embedded itself via policies concerning land, labor, & education. The federal constitution, adopted in the 1890s, cooperated rather than interfered with the already self-governed communities regarding immigration, trade, & defense. Utilitarianism gave Australia a means of operating within the limits of British imperialism, & a review of history shows utilitarianism to be effective & functional today, as it probably will be in the future. D. Dunseath.

One possible application of decision theory is in analysis of moral concepts. Two basic utilitarian approaches are contrasted: act utilitarianism & rule utilitarianism. Contrasts between these are presented through three voting examples. The moral behavior of act-utilitarian individuals will have the nature of a noncooperative game, played in the extensive mode, & involving action-by-action maximization of social utility by each player. In contrast, the moral behavior of rule-utilitarian individuals will have the nature of a cooperative game, played in the normal mode, & involving a firm commitment by each player to a specific moral strategy, the strategy selected by the rule-utilitarian choice criterion, even if some individual actions prescribed by this strategy fail to maximize social utility when considered in isolation. The most important advantage of rule utilitarianism over act utilitarianism is its ability to give full recognition to rights & obligations. Action-by-action maximization of social utility, as required by act utilitarianism can recognize their moral value, because it focuses on commitment to an overall moral strategy, independent of action-by-action & social-utility maximization. The conventional theory of rational behavior cannot avoid the paradox that, in any large election, voting is always an irrational action because one's own individual vote is extremely unlikely to make any difference to the outcome of any election. But this paradox can be resolved by rule-utilitarian principles, which lead to the conclusion that voting, even in large electorates, may be perfectly rational action. More generally, the example of rule utilitarianism shows what an important role the concept of a rational commitment can play in the analysis of rational behavior. Modified HA.

Max Weber identified a form of individualism he called \"hygienic utilitarianism,\" in the rationale-system of ascetic Protestants. This aspect of Protestant values is located further within the history of Christian religious individualism, as a \"last stage,\" in Weber's sociology of religion. Suggestions taken from this theoretical context are developed to account for some ideological origins & psychological functions of current-day \"therapeutic\" self-help movements, in particular Erhard Seminars Training (EST). It is argued that the individualist rhetoric of these movements is essentially the same as that of the hygienic tendency in the old Protestant ethic. Only now, in its isolated form, & under different sociopsychological conditions, this rhetoric serves perhaps a different, pastoral function: instead of stimulating an insistent inner thoughtfulness about the links between individual purposes & more universal & divine purposes, the hygienic rationales more often promote uncompromising accommodation to all demands, by translating painful tensions between purposes into subjectives or psychic tensions more amenable to control. Since those who are authorized have often abdicated the role of pastoral counselor & director, there is that much less resistance to the accommodationist attractions of a hygienic ethic. AA.