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This article considers the concept of Competence as applied to educational theory and policy, and illuminates the possibility of significant variations in meaning. Referring to Wittgenstein's distinctions between transitive and intransitive uses of notions and Holland's description of mastery, the article argues in favour of two senses in which someone can be described as being competent: i) as expressive of a value judgment; and ii) as pointing to a person's (formal) qualifications. While the latter opens a path towards different forms of measurements of competence, being competent as a value judgment eludes any such treatment. Making this distinction, it is argued that competence is a less illuminative theoretical term than, for example, the pair of concepts Bildung versus Ausbildung ((self-)subjectivation vs training), that has been used in the Continental tradition in order to describe a similar distinction. With examples from educational contexts, the article demonstrates that the moment educational theory is using one word for two meanings, this central distinction in education is either concealed or forgotten. Focusing on competence purely as an empirically assessable notion risks playing into the hands of instrumentalising education.

Fuelled by contemporary concerns of risk and majoritarian calls to adhere to 'the values the majority hold dear' there can be said to be a 'crisis of criminalization' in liberal democracies. Whilst criminalization is clearly an important theme in criminology there has been little attention on the value judgments behind processes of criminalization. By drawing on elements of moral philosophy and by applying these ideas to everyday criminalization in Toronto, this article takes a first step towards addressing this omission. The article adopts a pluralist and social constructivist perspective where differential interpretations lead to the same behaviour being celebrated, tolerated or censured, depending on context and power. A model of value judgment and criminalization is offered that includes consideration of moral, prudential, economic and aesthetic judgments. Value consensus is questioned and the political capital required to dictate values is considered.

Objectives: We explore how broader aspects of a treatment's value and the impact of the condition on patients not captured by routine health technology assessment (HTA) methods using clinical and economic evidence, defined as “other considerations,” may influence HTA processes in different settings. Methods: Countries included were England, Scotland, Sweden, and France. Data sources were the publicly available reports on HTA recommendations. Ten drugs with European Medicines Agency orphan designation and appraised in England were selected. Qualitative thematic analysis was used to systematically identify and code all “other considerations” based on a previously developed methodological framework, which also coded whether it was provided by stakeholders, and how it influenced the decision. Results: A classification framework of scientific and social value judgments was developed and used throughout the study. A total of 125 “other considerations” were identified and grouped into ten subcategories based on the information provided. Eighteen to 100 percent of these, depending on the agency, were put forward as one of the main reasons for the final decision potentially contributing to accepting a higher incremental cost-effectiveness ratio or uncertain evidence. Some of these were nonquantified or nonelicited and pertained to the assessor's judgment. A taxonomy of these value judgments was created to be used in future cases. Results also contributed to better defining the determinants of social value and improving accountability for reasonableness. Conclusions: The systematic identification of the scientific and social value judgments enables to better understanding the dimensions of value, which can be used to improve their transparency and consistent use across decisions and settings.

In this paper, we discuss the relationship between multi-attribute utility theory and data envelopment analysis (DEA) models without explicit inputs (DEA-WEI), including dual models and some theoretical analysis of DEA-WEI models. We then propose generic DEA-WEI models with quadratic utility terms. Finally, we provide illustrative examples to show that DEA-WEI with suitable quadratic utility terms are able to reflect some value judgments that the standard DEA models cannot.

Both normative theories of ethics in philosophy and contemporary models of moral judgment in psychology have focused almost exclusively on the permissibility of acts, in particular whether acts should be judged on the basis of their material outcomes (consequentialist ethics) or on the basis of rules, duties, and obligations (deontological ethics). However, a longstanding third perspective on morality, virtue ethics, may offer a richer descriptive account of a wide range of lay moral judgments. Building on this ethical tradition, we offer a person-centered account of moral judgment, which focuses on individuals as the unit of analysis for moral evaluations rather than on acts. Because social perceivers are fundamentally motivated to acquire information about the moral character of others, features of an act that seem most informative of character often hold more weight than either the consequences of the act or whether a moral rule has been broken. This approach, we argue, can account for numerous empirical findings that are either not predicted by current theories of moral psychology or are simply categorized as biases or irrational quirks in the way individuals make moral judgments.

Taking as its starting-point Guido Calabresi’s latest book – – the present article aims to explore the often neglected issue of value judgments and normativity in Law and Economics. I will show the importance of enquiring Calabresi’s methodological distinction between Law and Economics and Economic Analysis of Law and the related bilateralism thesis in order to understand the problematic relationship between methodological value judgments and ethical value judgments, the ‘distance’ between Calabresi and Posner and the problematic notion of reformism. Then I will try to introduce a different notion of normativity. I will also show the existence of an unresolved tension in Calabresi’s methodological discourse between a positive approach, which seems to be privileged in this book, and his insistence on the inevitability of value judgments in economic analysis. Finally, I clarify the reasons for the ‘ignorance’ of values by the economist by distinguishing between economists’ “lack of self-awareness”, economists’ idolatry and the economists’ lenses.

Values are proposed to have an influence on politics via multiple expressions, and two such value expressions are explored in this manuscript: abstract value expressions and judgmental value expressions. In particular, it is believed that judgmental value expressions (or perceptions of value violations) will have a particularly strong influence in determining attitudes toward policies designed to help specific groups in society. This study analyzed data from two samples regarding attitudes toward welfare and marriage rights for gays. It was found that perceptions that each group violates a specific value played a more important role in predicting political attitudes than abstract value expressions, general negative affect directed toward the group, and political ideology. The results are contextualized in a discussion of the role values play in the politics of intergroup relations.

The role of emotion in moral judgment is currently a topic of much debate in moral psychology. One specific claim made by many researchers is that irrelevant feelings of disgust can amplify the severity of moral condemnation. Numerous researchers have found this effect, but there have also been several published failures to replicate it. Clarifying this issue would inform important theoretical debates among rival accounts of moral judgment. We metaanalyzed all available studies—published and unpublished—in which incidental disgust was manipulated prior to or concurrent with a moral judgment task (k = 50). We found evidence for a small amplification effect of disgust (d = 0.11), which is strongest for gustatory/olfactory modes of disgust induction. However, there is also some suggestion of publication bias in this literature, and when this is accounted for, the effect disappears entirely (d = -0.01). Moreover, prevalent confounds mean that the effect size that we estimate is best interpreted as an upper bound on the size of the amplification effect. On the basis of the results of this meta-analysis, we argue against strong claims about the causal role of affect in moral judgment and suggest a need for new, more rigorous research on this topic.

Although many philosophers have employed the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” roles for values in science, I argue that it merits further clarification. The distinction can be formulated in several ways: as a logical point, as a distinction between epistemic attitudes, or as a clarification of different consequences associated with accepting scientific claims. Moreover, it can serve either as part of a normative ideal or as a tool for policing how values influence science. While various formulations of the distinction may (with further clarification) contribute to a normative ideal, they have limited effectiveness for regulating how values influence science.

The science of morality has drawn heavily on well-controlled but artificial laboratory settings. To study everyday morality, we repeatedly assessed moral or immoral acts and experiences in a large (N = 1252) sample using ecological momentary assessment. Moral experiences were surprisingly frequent and manifold. Liberals and conservatives emphasized somewhat different moral dimensions. Religious and nonreligious participants did not differ in the likelihood or quality of committed moral and immoral acts. Being the target of moral or immoral deeds had the strongest impact on happiness, whereas committing moral or immoral deeds had the strongest impact on sense of purpose. Analyses of daily dynamics revealed evidence for both moral contagion and moral licensing. In sum, morality science may benefit from a closer look at the antecedents, dynamics, and consequences of everyday moral experience.