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Medicare's value-based purchasing (VBP) program potentially puts safety-net hospitals at a financial disadvantage compared to other hospitals. In 2014, the second year of the program, patient mortality measures were added to the VBP program's algorithm for assigning penalties and rewards. We examined whether the inclusion of mortality measures in the second year of the program had a disproportionate impact on safety-net hospitals nationally. We found that safety-net hospitals were more likely than other hospitals to be penalized under the VBP program as a result of their poorer performance on process and patient experience scores. In 2014, 63 percent of safety-net hospitals versus 51 percent of all other sample hospitals received payment rate reductions under the program. However, safety-net hospitals' performance on mortality measures was comparable to that of other hospitals, with an average VBP survival score of thirty-two versus thirty-one among other hospitals. Although safety-net hospitals are still more likely than other hospitals to fare poorly under the VBP program, increasing the weight given to mortality in the VBP payment algorithm would reduce this disadvantage.

Policy Points Strategically purchasing health care has been and continues to be a popular policy idea around the world. Key asymmetries in information, market power, political power, and financial power hinder the effective implementation of strategic purchasing. Strategic purchasing has consistently failed to live up to its promises for these reasons. Future strategies based on strategic purchasing should tailor their expectations to its real effectiveness. Context Strategic purchasing of health care has been a popular policy idea around the world for decades, with advocates claiming that it can lead to improved quality, patient satisfaction, efficiency, accountability, and even population health. In this article, we report the results of an inquiry into the implementation and effects of strategic purchasing. Methods We conducted three in‐depth case studies of England, the Netherlands, and the United States. We reviewed definitions of purchasing, including its slow acquisition of adjectives such as strategic, and settled on a definition of purchasing that distinguishes it from the mere use of contracts to regulate stable interorganizational relationships. The case studies review the career of strategic purchasing in three different systems where its installation and use have been a policy priority for years. Findings No existing health care system has effective strategic purchasing because of four key asymmetries: market power asymmetry, information asymmetry, financial asymmetry, and political power asymmetry. Conclusions  Further investment in policies that are premised on the effectiveness of strategic purchasing, or efforts to promote it, may not be worthwhile. Instead, policymakers may need to focus on the real sources of power in a health care system. Policy for systems with existing purchasing relationships should take into account the asymmetries, ways to work with them, and the constraints that they create.

In 2015 the Medicare Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) program paid hospitals $1.4 billion in performance-based incentives; 30 percent of a hospital's VBP Total Performance Score was based on performance on Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) measures of the patient experience of care. Hospitals receive patient experience points based on three components: achievement, improvement, and consistency. For 2015 we examined how the three components affected reimbursement for 3,152 hospitals, including their impact on low-performing and high-minority hospitals. Achievement accounted for 96 percent of the differences among hospitals in total HCAHPS points. Although achievement had the biggest influence on payments, payments related to improvement and consistency were more beneficial for low-performing hospitals that disproportionately served minority patients. The findings highlight the important inducement that paying for improvement provides to initially low-performing hospitals to improve care and the role this incentive structure plays in minimizing resource redistributions away from hospitals serving minority populations. Additional emphasis on improvement points could benefit hospitals serving disadvantaged patients.

Background: In the context of serious concerns over the affordability of healthcare, various authors and international policy bodies advise that strategic purchasing is a key means of improving health system performance. Such advice is typically informed by theories from the economics of organization (EOO). This paper proposes that these theories are insufficient for a full understanding of strategic purchasing in healthcare, because they focus on safeguarding against poor performance and ignore the coordination and adaptation needed to improve performance. We suggest that insights from other, complementary theories are needed. Methods: A realist review method was adopted involving 3 steps: first, drawing upon complementary theories from the EOO and inter-organizational relationships (IOR) perspectives, a theoretical interpretation framework was developed to guide the review; second, a purposive search of scholarly databases to find relevant literature addressing healthcare purchasing; and third, qualitative analysis of the selected texts and thematic synthesis of the results focusing on lessons relevant to 3 key policy objectives taken from the international health policy literature. Texts were included if they provided relevant empirical data and met specified standards of rigour and robustness. Results: A total of 58 texts were included in the final analysis. Lessons for patient empowerment included: the need for clearly defined rights for patients and responsibilities for purchasers, and for these to be enacted through regular patientpurchaser interaction. Lessons for government stewardship included: the need for health strategy to contain specific targets to incentivise purchasers to align with national policy objectives, and for national government actors to build close, trusting relationships with purchasers to facilitate access to local knowledge about needs and priorities. Lessons for provider performance included: provider decision autonomy may drive innovation and efficient resource use, but may also create scope for opportunism, and interdependence likely to be the best power structure to incentivise collaboration needed to drive performance improvement. Conclusion: Using complementary theories suggests a range of general policy lessons for strategic purchasing in healthcare, but further empirical work is needed to explore how far these lessons are a practically useful guide to policy in a variety of healthcare systems, country settings and purchasing process phases.

Policy makers have been trying to replace Medicare's fee-for-service payment system for years with approaches that pay one price for an aggregation of services. The intent is to reward providers for offering needed care in the most appropriate and cost-effective manner. Medicare's first payment change designed to accomplish such a change was the hospital prospective payment system, introduced during 1983-84. But because it focused only on hospital care, its impact on total Medicare spending was limited. In 2011 Medicare began a new initiative to expand the \"bundled payment\" concept to link payments for multiple services that patients receive during an episode of care. The goal of Medicare's current bundled payment initiative is to provide incentives to deliver health care more efficiently while maintaining or improving quality. This article provides a detailed analysis of how Medicare implemented the hospital prospective payment system, how hospitals responded to the new incentives, and lessons learned that are applicable to the bundled payment initiative. The lessons include that any Medicare payment reform needs to continuously respond to the many different components of the health system and that payment reform should be coupled with analogous reforms in private insurance payment, so that providers receive consistent signals to alter their behavior. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

Context: In recent decades, practitioners and policymakers have turned to value-based payment initiatives to help contain spending on health care and to improve the quality of care. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation funded 7 grantees across the country to design and implement value-based, multistakeholder payment reform projects in 6 states and 3 regions of the United States. Methods: As the external evaluator of these projects, we reviewed documents, conducted Internet searches, interviewed key stakeholders, cross-validated factual and narrative interpretation, and performed qualitative analyses to derive cross-site themes and implications for policy and practice. Findings: The nature of payment reform and its momentum closely reflects the environmental context of each project. Federal legislation such as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and federal and state support for the development of the patient-centered medical home and accountable care organizations encourage value-based payment innovation, as do local market conditions for payers and providers that combine a history of collaboration with independent innovation and experimentation by individual organizations. Multistakeholder coalitions offer a useful facilitating structure for galvanizing payment reform. But to achieve the objectives of reduced cost and improved quality, multistakeholder payment innovation must overcome such barriers as incompatible information systems, the technical difficulties and transaction costs of altering existing billing and payment systems, competing stakeholder priorities, insufficient scale to bear population health risk, providers' limited experience with risk-bearing payment models, and the failure to align care delivery models with the form of payment. Conclusions: From the evidence adduced in this article, multistakeholder, value-based payment reform requires a trusted, widely respected \"honest broker\" that can convene and maintain the ongoing commitment of health plans, providers, and purchasers. Change management is complex and challenging, and coalition governance requires flexibility and stable leadership, as market conditions and stakeholder engagement and priorities shift over time. Another significant facilitator of value-based payment reform is outside investment that enables increased investment in human resources, information infrastructure, and care management by provider organizations and their collaborators. Supportive community and social service networks that enhance population health management also are important enablers of value-based payment reform. External pressure from public and private payers is fueling a \"burning bridge\" between the past of fee-for-service payment models and the future of payments based on value. Robust competition in local health plan and provider markets, coupled with an appropriate mix of multistakeholder governance, pressure from organized purchasers, and regulatory oversight, has the potential to spur value-based payment innovation that combines elements of \"reformed\" fee-for-service with bundled payments and global payments.

Patients spend more time with nurses during an admission than with any other profession in the hospital. Nurses and their interactions with patients are central to shaping and improving the patient’s experience. Patient experience, as measured by the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey, drives 30% of value-based purchasing (VBP) scores and incentive payments, as prescribed under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Hospital performance on the communication with nurses’ domain within HCAHPS predicts performance on several other domains. In addition, nurses at the bedside have significantly lower engagement scores than nurses who are not involved in direct patient care. Considering the relationship between nurse engagement and patient experience and the relationship between patient experience and hospital success under VBP, pursuing strategies and tactics that will foster and sustain nurse engagement is critical for nurse executives.

Over the past decade Medicare has put in place several pay-forperformance programs for hospitals, including one that stopped paying hospitals for treating hospital-acquired conditions and the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program that went into effect in October 2012. In this article we describe how the State of Maryland crafted two pay-forperformance programs applicable to all hospitals and payers-a Quality- Based Reimbursement Program similar to Medicare's value-based purchasing program and a separate program that compared hospitals' risk-adjusted relative performance on a broad array of hospital-acquired conditions. In the first program, all clinical process-of-care measures improved from 2007 to 2010, and variations among hospitals decreased substantially. For example, the statewide average rate of provision of influenza vaccines to patients with pneumonia increased by 20.5 percentage points, from 71.5 percent in 2007 to 92.0 percent in 2010. As a result of the second program, hospital-acquired conditions in the state declined by 15.26 percent over two years, with estimated cost savings of $110.9 million over that period. Extrapolating these results, the Medicare fee-for-service program nationally would have saved $1.3 billion over two years by implementing a similar hospital-acquired conditions program. The state programs used strong and consistent financial incentives to motivate hospitals' efforts to improve quality. This experience demonstrates that successful state experimentation can inform and influence federal policy and efforts to coordinate payment strategies in other states. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]