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In recent years, researchers and practitioners have increasingly paid attention to food waste, which is seen as highly unethical given its negative environmental and societal implications. Waste recovery is dependent on the creation of connections along the supply chain, so that actors with goods at risk of becoming waste can transfer them to those who may be able to use them as inputs or for their own consumption. Such waste recovery is, however, often hampered by what we call 'circularity holes', i.e., missing linkages between waste generators and potential receivers. A new type of actor, the digital platform organization, has recently taken on a brokerage function to bridge circularity holes, particularly in the food supply chain. Yet, extant literature has overlooked this novel type of brokerage that exploits digital technology for the transfer and recovery of discarded resources between supply chain actors. Our study investigates this actor, conceptualized as a 'circularity broker', and thus unites network research and circular supply chain research. Focusing on the food supply chain, we adopt an interpretive inductive theory-building approach to uncover how platform organizations foster the recovery of waste by bridging circularity holes. We identify and explicate six brokerage roles, i.e., connecting, informing, protecting, mobilizing, integrating and measuring, and discuss them in relation to extant literature, highlighting novelties compared to earlier studies. The final section reflects on contributions, implications, limitations and areas for further research.

A data intermediary acquires signals from individual consumers regarding their preferences. The intermediary resells the information in a product market wherein firms and consumers tailor their choices to the demand data. The social dimension of the individual data—whereby a consumer's data are predictive of others' behavior—generates a data externality that can reduce the intermediary's cost of acquiring the information. The intermediary optimally preserves the privacy of consumers' identities if and only if doing so increases social surplus. This policy enables the intermediary to capture the total value of the information as the number of consumers becomes large.

A data broker sells market segmentations to a producer with private cost who sells a product to a unit mass of consumers. This paper characterizes the revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the data broker. Every optimal mechanism induces quasi-perfect price discrimination. All the consumers with values above a cost-dependent cutoff buy by paying their values while the rest of consumers do not buy. The characterization implies that market outcomes remain unchanged even if the data broker becomes more powerful—either by gaining the ability to sell access to consumers or by becoming a retailer who purchases the product and sells to the consumers exclusively.

We ask whether mutual funds' flows reflect the incentives of the brokers intermediating them. The incentives we address are those revealed in statutory filings: the brokers' shares of sales loads and other revenue, and their affiliation with the fund family. We find significant effects of these payments to brokers on funds' inflows, particularly when the brokers are not affiliated. Tracking these investments forward, we find load sharing, but not revenue sharing, to predict poor performance, consistent with the different incentives these payments impart. We identify one benefit of captive brokerage, which is the recapture of redemptions elsewhere in the family.

This study examined how brokers on creative projects integrate the ideas of others. We use the term \"nexus work\" to refer to brokerage requiring synthesis or integration, rather than just communication or transference of ideas. With an ethnographic investigation of 23 independent music producers in the Nashville country music industry, we examined how producers in the brokerage role fostered the integration of others' contributions throughout four phases of the creative process. We discovered that ambiguity was an inherent part of the collective creative process and identified three types: (1) an ambiguous quality metric (What makes a hit or constitutes success?); (2) ambiguous occupational jurisdictions (Whose claim of expertise entitles them to control the process?); and (3) an ambiguous transformation process (How should the work be done?). We show when each type of ambiguity became acute in the creative process and identify the practices producers used to leverage their brokerage role depending on the type of ambiguity confronted. In doing so, producers moved between two ideal conceptions of brokerage—as strategic actors extracting advantage from their position and as relational experts connecting others to foster creativity and innovation—to foster a collective creative outcome.

This paper analyzes the impact of intermediary concentration on the allocation of revenue in online platforms. We study sponsored search documenting how advertisers increasingly bid through a handful of specialized intermediaries. This enhances automated bidding and data pooling, but lessens competition whenever the intermediary represents competing advertisers. Using data on nearly 40 million Google keyword auctions, we first apply machine learning algorithms to cluster keywords into thematic groups serving as relevant markets. Using an instrumental variable strategy, we estimate a decline in the platform’s revenue of approximately 11 percent due to the average rise in concentration associated with intermediary merger and acquisition activity.

We extend Duffie et al.’s (2005) search-theoretic model of over-the-counter (OTC) asset markets, allowing for a decentralized inter-dealer market with arbitrary heterogeneity in dealers’ valuations (or, equivalently, inventory costs). We develop a solution technique that makes the model fully tractable and allows us to derive, in closed form, theoretical formulas for key statistics analysed in empirical studies of the intermediation process in OTC markets. A calibration to the market for municipal bonds allows us to quantify important unobservable characteristics of this market, including the severity of search and bargaining frictions and the nature of heterogeneity across dealers. We use our calibrated model to study the effect of these market characteristics on total welfare and the distribution of gains from trade across customers and dealers.

While research has investigated various aspects of electronic word of mouth and their effects on business performance, it has neglected detailed topics in reviews. This study explores this new aspect in reviews and examines the effects of review topics on Airbnb listing performance. We use 2,799,420 reviews from 64,464 listings posted on the Airbnb platform in 10 U.S. cities. Using the latent Dirichlet allocation method, we identify 16 key topics of consumer reviews on Airbnb. Then, using a negative binomial regression model, we show that various factors can affect a listing's performance on Airbnb. These findings have implications for Airbnb hosts and the sharing economy.

Die Jobcenter in Deutschland werden entweder als \"gemeinsame Einrichtungen\" von Kommunen und der lokalen Agentur für Arbeit oder in \"Optionskommunen\" allein von den Kommunen geführt. Die Umwandlung von 41 gemeinsamen Einrichtungen in Optionskommunen im Jahr 2012 erlaubt es, den Erfolg der Vermittlungsarbeit der beiden Trägerformen zu evaluieren. Die Analyse zeigt, dass Optionskommunen gegenüber gemeinsamen Einrichtungen 10% weniger Arbeitslose in den ersten Arbeitsmarkt vermitteln. Hingegen weisen sie mehr Personen \"Ein-Euro-Jobs\" zu, die jedoch wenig geeignet sind, die Übergangschancen in den ersten Arbeitsmarkt zu erhöhen.

Suppose an intermediary provides a benefit to buyers when they purchase from sellers using the intermediary’s technology. We develop a model to show that the intermediary would want to restrict sellers from charging buyers more for transactions it intermediates. With this restriction an intermediary can profitably raise demand for its services by eliminating any extra price buyers face for purchasing through the intermediary. We show that this leads to inflated retail prices, excessive adoption of the intermediaries’ services, overinvestment in benefits to buyers, and a reduction in consumer surplus and sometimes welfare. Competition among intermediaries intensifies these problems by increasing the magnitude of their effects and broadening the circumstances in which they arise. We discuss applications to payment card systems, travel reservation systems, rebate services, and various other intermediaries.