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We study insurance markets in which privately informed consumers can purchase coverage from several firms whose pricing strategies are subject to an anti-dumping regulation. The resulting regulated game supports a single allocation in which each layer of coverage is fairly priced given the consumer types who purchase it. This competitive allocation cannot be Pareto-improved by a social planner who can neither observe consumer types nor monitor their trades with firms. Accordingly, we argue that public intervention under multiple contracting and adverse selection should penalize firms that cross-subsidize between contracts, while leaving consumers free to choose their preferred amount of coverage.

We optimize a life insurance company's asset allocation in the context of classical portfolio theory when the firm needs to adhere to the market risk capital requirements of Solvency II. The discussion starts with a brief review of the standard formula and the introduction of a parsimonious partial internal model. Subsequently, we estimate empirical risk–return profiles for the main asset classes held by European insurers and run a quadratic optimization program to derive nondominated frontiers with budget, short-sale, and investment constraints. We then compute the capital charges under both solvency models and identify those efficient portfolio compositions that are permitted for an exogenously given amount of equity. Finally, we consider a systematically selected set of inefficient portfolios and check their admissibility, too. Our results show that the standard formula suffers from severe shortcomings that interfere with economically sensible asset management decisions. Therefore, the introduction of Solvency II in its current form is likely to have an adverse impact on certain parts of the European insurance sector.

This is the first study to investigate whether country institutional quality influences the impact of supervisory power on insurer soundness. It tests the hypothesis arguing that institutional quality enhances the implementation capacity of supervisors versus the one that maintains that institutional quality mitigates the impact of supervisory power on insurer soundness, particularly when this effect is negative. An analysis is carried out on firms operating in the insurance markets of 12 Muslim-populous countries over the eight-year sample period 2009–2016. As a proxy of insurers’ financial stability, we use the Z-score and conduct the study by employing the two-step system generalised method of moments. We find a negative impact of supervisory power on insurer soundness—exercised by increasing portfolio risk—that is mitigated by national institutional quality, in particular by government effectiveness, regulatory quality and control of corruption. The findings emphasise the view that national institutional quality avoids private use of supervision.

Purpose Following the United Kingdom's (UK) withdrawal from the European Union (EU), there is uncertainty in the financial services industry on equivalence of regulatory regimes. This also affects the insurance industry. As of now, it is not clear if the UK’s supervisory regime (“Solvency UK”) will be classified as equivalent to the European Solvency II supervisory regime. After no equivalence decision was taken during the Brexit transition period and there are efforts by the UK in the form of the UK Solvency II Review and the Financial Services and Markets Bill to adapt Solvency II more to the characteristics of the national insurance market, the uncertainties are intensified. Although Solvency II non-equivalence would have a significant impact on insurance groups operating in both the UK and the EU, there has been no detailed analysis of whether these initiatives could have an impact on a future Solvency II equivalence decision. The purpose of this paper is to address and close this research gap with a literature review and a subsequent equivalence mapping and discussion. Design/methodology/approach Based on the literature review methodology, this paper draws on academic sources as well as publications from governments and regulators, articles from consultancies and subject matter experts and uses this literature to provide an overview of the current state of research on equivalence in the wider financial services industry, but specifically on Solvency II equivalence, the UK Solvency II Review and the Financial Services and Markets Bill. Based on this literature review, the paper also forms the basis for an innovative and forward-looking Solvency II equivalence mapping and discussion. Findings Several articles state that differences between Solvency II and Solvency UK could harm a future Solvency II equivalence decision. The UK Solvency II Review and the Financial Services and Markets Bill are two initiatives that support the objective of aligning the Solvency II supervisory regime more closely with the circumstances of the UK insurance market. Although both initiatives contribute to the fact that Solvency UK differs in parts from Solvency II, based on the literature review and the subsequent equivalence mapping and discussion, there are currently no reforms that should harm future Solvency II equivalence decisions. Originality/value This paper provides a previously non-existent overview of equivalence in the wider financial services industry, but specifically on Solvency II equivalence, the UK Solvency II Review and the Financial Services and Markets Bill, and brings them together in an innovative equivalence discussion. It thus presents the current state of knowledge on Solvency II after Brexit and develops it further around a mapping against the equivalence criteria. As non-equivalence could have significant implications for insurance groups operating in both the UK and the EU, this paper is a useful and practical study that provides a previously non-existent equivalence mapping and discussion based on current initiatives and publications. It thus closes the research gap identified and reduces uncertainties in the insurance industry and can be used as a blueprint for detailed and forward-looking equivalence mappings and discussions for the wider financial services industry.

The traditional model of (re)insurance lacks the elements that make a financial institution systemically important: risks are effectively pulverized; liabilities tend to be prefunded, which eliminates most of the leverage in the traditional sense; and active asset-liability management reduces most of the liquidity mismatch that traditionally propagates systemic risk. (Re)insurers that have stuck to this traditional business model have successfully weathered the crisis, even playing a stabilizing role. Unfortunately, this is not sufficiently recognized in the current IAIS/FSB debate on assessing systemic risk in the (re)insurance sector.

This article analyzes the interconnectedness between reinsurers and U.S. property–casualty (P/C) insurers and presents the first detailed examination on the likely impact of major global reinsurer insolvency on the U.S. P/C insurance industry, in order to illustrate the potential systemic risk caused by the interconnectedness of the insurance sector through reinsurance. We find that the likelihood of a primary insurer's downgrade increases with its reinsurance default risk exposure from downgraded reinsurers. Counterparty primary insurers' stocks also react negatively to their reinsurers' downgrades. The negative effects also spill over to insurers that are not directly exposed to the credit risk of downgraded reinsurers. Despite the close interconnectedness, worst-case scenario analyses show that the likelihood of systemic risk caused by reinsurance transactions is relatively small for the U.S. P/C insurance industry.

The China Risk-Oriented Solvency System (C-ROSS) was fully implemented in 2016. We analyse the effects of C-ROSS on the financial position, product mix and asset allocation of life insurers in the Chinese insurance market. Based on a data set of 66 life insurers, we find that the solvency position of life insurers specialising in writing long-term traditional life products with heavy protection elements improves under C-ROSS, but that the insurers are more vulnerable to decreases in interest rates. In contrast, the solvency position of life insurers specialising in writing short-term endowments and high cash value products deteriorates. C-ROSS also incentivises life insurers to consider asset–liability duration matching, accounting classification of fixed-income assets and underlying risks of equity investments when formulating their investment strategies. Life insurers may find it difficult to manage interest rate risk under C-ROSS due to the lack of available long-term bonds in the Chinese financial market. A stock market boom has a slightly negative effect on life insurers’ solvency ratios, and most life insurers can survive a severe market crash due to the pro-cyclical component embedded in the minimum capital requirements.

This paper explores the Solvency II standards for EU supervision of insurance groups operating across borders as detailed by the guidelines issued by EIOPA. The EU legislator has preferred to reinforce the tool of the colleges of supervisors, which are multilateral platforms where national supervisors involved in the supervision of a single insurance group cooperate, instead of opting for a single EU supervisor. The paper analyses cooperation between supervisory authorities in the context of the colleges in order to clarify the fields covered by the colleges as well as those that are not. In this respect, the paper argues for including in the mandate of the colleges the task of defining and implementing a common principle of group interest to administer the governance system of cross-border insurance groups, and to extend the supervision of colleges to the distribution of insurance products.