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Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective
This paper reviews theoretical and empirical work on financial contracting that is relevant to accounting researchers. Its primary objective is to discuss how the use of accounting information in contracts enhances contracting efficiency and to suggest avenues for future research. We argue that incomplete contract theory broadens our understanding of both the role accounting information plays in contracting and the mechanisms through which efficiency gains are achieved. By discussing its rich theoretical implications, we expect incomplete contract theory to prove useful in motivating future research and in offering directions to advance our knowledge of how accounting information affects contract efficiency.
Journal Article
Sumerian model contracts from the Old Babylonian period in the Hilprecht Collection Jena
During the Old Babylonian period (ca. 2002-1595 B.C.), the city of Nippur was a primary center for transmission of Sumerian culture, and its scribal schools (called edubba in Sumerian, lit. 'the house of the tablets') had a great reputation throughout ancient Mesopotamia. The function of the edubba was twofold: to train the scribes in the skills of their profession, equipping them to record day-to-day affairs, and to preserve and pass on their cultural heritage. In the last phase of early education, pupils were trained comprehensively in the formal rhetoric of administration and law by compilations of the so-called 'model contracts,' together with 'model court cases,' legal phrasebooks and collections of legal principles. While they were not functional documents, but simply didactic tools (being stripped of incidental details, such as list of witnesses and date), model contracts follow the common patterns of Sumerian contract types and represent a comprehensive assortment of all possible transactions that the ancient Mesopotamian administration might have been required to draw up in everyday economic life: barley and silver loans; deeds of real estate, field or slave sale; marriage contracts; adoptions, and so on. The book contains the publication of the Sumerian model contracts from Old Babylonian Nippur kept in the Hilprecht Collection, Jena. The edition provides transliterations, translations, commentaries of the entire corpus and of some duplicates kept in other cuneiform collections; the indexes comprise personal names, deities, toponyms and a glossary. Finally, the plates at the end of the volume offer handcopies and photographs of all the HS tablets.
Book
Why resource-based theory's model of profit appropriation must incorporate a stakeholder perspective
Research Summary: Using arguments derived from transactions cost economics and incomplete contract theory, this article shows that the assumption that shareholders are a firm's only residual claimants is logically inconsistent with resource‐based theory's model of profit generation. It follows from this conclusion that resource‐based theory's model of profit appropriation must incorporate a stakeholder perspective. Some theoretical and empirical implications of this conclusion for resource‐based theory's model of profit generation, profit appropriation, the role of managers and entrepreneurs in resource‐based theory, and how conflicting interests among stakeholders can be resolved are all discussed. Finally, some continuing differences between stakeholder theory and incorporating a stakeholder perspective into resource‐based theory's model of profit appropriation are also discussed. Managerial Summary: Some argue that since shareholders are the only stakeholder who have a claim on a firm's profits, managers should focus only on maximizing shareholder wealth. Not only will this satisfy shareholders, it will also satisfy a firm's other stakeholders, since—in principle—these other stakeholders get paid before shareholders. This article shows that this logic is deeply flawed. In particular, it shows that if the only stakeholder who has a claim on a firm's economic profits is shareholders, then—in most competitive settings—a firm will not be able to attract the kinds of resources it needs to generate these profits. To attract the kinds of resources that can generate profits, managers must recognize that stakeholders, besides shareholders, have claims on the profits that their resources help generate. This, in turn, suggests that managers seeking to generate economic profits must adopt a stakeholder perspective in how they manage their firm. This article explores the managerial implications of this conclusion.
Journal Article
Understanding and resolving major contractual breaches in buyer–seller relationships: a grounded theory approach
In business-to-business relationships, sellers are often faced with instances of contractual breaches by buyers. In many cases, relationship factors preclude legal enforcement of contract terms, requiring sellers to explore alternate resolution options. Literature on contractual breaches has primarily focused on enforcement options based on terms specified in the contract. However, little is known about how companies deal with contractual breaches by their customers when legal enforcement is not a viable option. The authors use a grounded theory approach to investigate this important issue. Based on in-depth interviews with 40 supplier managers and executives in multiple industries, the authors identify: (a) types of out-of-contract alternatives for resolving breaches, (b) factors that lead to use of enforcement options outside the terms specified in the contract, (c) contextual influences, and (d) individual and firm-level consequences of outside-of-contract enforcement.
Journal Article
An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights Sharing in Software Development Outsourcing
Software development outsourcing (SDO) contracts are plagued with ex post opportunism and underinvestment problems. Property rights theory (PRT) argues that appropriate property rights allocation between vendors and clients can reduce opportunism and incentivize relation-specific investments. We conduct an in-depth content analysis of 171 real SDO contracts and empirically examine how project attributes and contract parties’ bargaining power affect the allocation of intellectual property rights (IPR). We find that clients retained more IPR when software development was modularized whereas they shared more IPR with vendors in contracts that incorporated greater use of a vendor’s proprietary software. Greater levels of task complexity were associated with more IPR sharing with vendors. We also find that the responsiveness of IPR to project attributes varied across the different types of intellectual assets. For example, vendors were more likely to obtain redeployment rights of know-how if they were contracted for novel software development projects. However, clients were less likely to cede ownership of data and confidential information embedded in software customization projects. We control for a variety of firm and transaction characteristics and the results we obtain here are robust to concerns of endogeneity bias.
Journal Article
Calculative Trust and Interfirm Contracts
Interfirm contracts are plagued by opportunism arising from exchange hazards that increase the seller’s gains from holdup in fixed price contracts. These exchange hazards are higher when the seller can engage in unverifiable deliberate obfuscation. Although cost-plus contracts reduce holdup losses, they suffer from cost inefficiency. Past research has underscored the importance of trust as a control instrument to mitigate losses from exchange hazards, especially
social relational trust
that develops from past experiences. However, trust can also be
calculative
when it develops from the expectation of future economic gains to the buyer-seller dyad. We identify two dyadic mechanisms that generate calculative trust and curtail the likelihood of cost-inefficient behavior in cost-plus contracts. These mechanisms include future potential and bilateral reputation capital for cost containment. Analysis using probit estimations on 149 information technology outsourcing contracts for the period 1998 to 2005 suggests that calculative trust increases the likelihood of cost-plus contracts. Thus, calculative trust can mitigate inefficiencies in interfirm contracts.
This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.
Journal Article
Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority
We study relationships between parties who have different preferences about how to tailor decisions to changing circumstances. Our model suggests that relational contracts supported by formal contracts may achieve
relational adaptation
that improves on adaptation decisions achieved by formal or relational contracts alone. Our empirics consider revenue-sharing contracts between movie distributors and an exhibitor. The exhibitor has discretion about whether and when to show a movie, and the parties frequently renegotiate formal contracts
after
a movie has finished its run. We document that such ex post renegotiation is consistent with the distributor rewarding the exhibitor for adaptation decisions that improve their joint payoffs.
This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
Journal Article
The effectiveness of contractual and trust-based governance in strategic alliances under behavioral and environmental uncertainty
Research summary: We examine the interplay of behavioral and environmental uncertainty in shaping the effectiveness of two key governance mechanisms used by strategic alliances: contractual and trust-based governance. We develop and test hypotheses, using a meta-analytic dataset encompassing over 15,000 strategic alliances across 82 independent samples. We find that contractual governance works best under low to moderate levels of behavioral uncertainty and moderate to high levels of environmental uncertainty, while it is detrimental to alliance performance when both types of uncertainty are low or high. Trust-based governance is most effective at high levels of behavioral uncertainty and low levels of environmental uncertainty. It suffers a large loss of usefulness at high behavioral uncertainty as environmental uncertainty increases. Managerial summary: Strategic alliances allow firms to gain greater efficiency and create value. Yet, many such alliances fail because they are not able to deal with the twin challenges posed by behavioral and environmental uncertainty. Findings from our meta-analysis imply that under conditions of high behavioral uncertainty and low-to-moderate levels of environmental uncertainty, the use of trust-based governance alongside contractual governance might enhance the latter's effectiveness. The combined effectiveness of contractual and trust-based governance under high levels of both behavioral and environmental uncertainty is not obvious. When both behavioral and environmental uncertainty are high, contractual governance hurts alliance performance while trust-based governance does not function at its best either. Under these conditions, it might be better for firms to turn to hierarchy or vertical integration.
Journal Article
The smart contract revolution
This paper examines the concept of the holdup problem from an entrepreneurial angle in a world with smart contracts. All entrepreneurs need to use contracts. As theorists (Williamson 1979; Hart and Moore 1999; Hart 2009) point out, information asymmetry and opportunism are part of any contractual transaction between agents. This means that entrepreneurs have to deal with incomplete contracts. Blockchain was born in 1994 (Satoshi Nakamoto), alongside the emergence of smart contracts (Nick Szabo). The supporters of these IT protocols believe that they provide a solution to the holdup problem (Williamson 1985). In this article, we return to the models developed by Hart and Moore (1999) and Hart (2009) and discuss whether smart contracts correspond to the requirements discussed in the literature. We show that entrepreneurs need to carefully consider the use of smart contracts in function of the type of transaction they aim to put in place.
Journal Article