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This paper discusses the possible use of functional magnetic-resonance imaging as potentially useful in jury selection. The author suggests that neuro-voir could provide greater impartiality of trials than the standard voir, while also preserving existing privacy protections for jurors. He predicts that ability to image and understand a wide range of brain activities, most notably bias-apprehension and lie detection, will render neuro-voir dire invaluable. However currently, such neuro-solutions remain preliminary.

Arguably infected t the romanticization of the Lone Star history and the self-assurance with which our Texan hosts approach most any conversation, I dare say that the Midyear Meeting highlighted and displayed what can only be described as IADC exceptionalism. Seasoned trial lawyers educated us about why voir dire is not only among the most critical parts of any trial but also the most entertaining ar fun. Network and join us at a Substantive Law Committee meeting, a Regional Meeting, the Corporate Counsel College, and the Professional Liability Roundtables.

The peremptory challenge is one of the oldest and most well-established jury selection procedures. Its use dates back to the earliest days of English common law, and it was a firmly established and protected practice at the United States' founding and into the early twentieth century. But while peremptory challenges are foundational, they remain perhaps the most controversial aspect of jury selection today. This is because they are regularly used by the government and private parties to advance racist, sexist, and bigoted ends. For this reason, over the last three decades, calls to abolish the practice have been regularly made by U.S. Supreme Court Justices and law students alike. And in 2022, Arizona became the first state in U.S. history to take that dramatic step-eliminating peremptory challenges in all cases. This Article is the first to demonstrate that abolition of peremptory challenges is unconstitutional. Despite some contrary Supreme Court precedent, it contends that the early history, practice, and texts show that the Sixth Amendment secures to criminal defendants, particularly in capital cases, the right to participate in jury selection through peremptory challenges. Whether the Seventh Amendment secures an analogous right to civil litigants is less clear, though there is a strong argument that it should be so read. Crucially, constitutionalizing the right does not mean that peremptories may escape all regulation. The Fourteenth Amendment imposes limitations, and legislatures may make further appropriate restrictions. The Article concludes by reviewing paths for balancing the right to peremptory challenges with the need to eradicate systemic bias from jury selection.

This article examines the impact of jury racial composition on trial outcomes using a data set of felony trials in Florida between 2000 and 2010. We use a research design that exploits day-to-day variation in the composition of the jury pool to isolate quasi-random variation in the composition of the seated jury, finding evidence that (i) juries formed from all-white jury pools convict black defendants significantly (16 percentage points) more often than white defendants, and (ii) this gap in conviction rates is entirely eliminated when the jury pool includes at least one black member. The impact of jury race is much greater than what a simple correlation of the race of the seated jury and conviction rates would suggest. These findings imply that the application of justice is highly uneven and raise obvious concerns about the fairness of trials in jurisdictions with a small proportion of blacks in the jury pool.

A key feature of communication with evidence is skepticism: a receiver will attribute any incomplete disclosure to the sender concealing unfavorable evidence. I study when a change in the receiver\"s prior belief about the sender's evidence induces more skepticism, i.e., induces the receiver, regardless of his preferences, to take an equilibrium action that is less favorable for the sender following every message. I provide a definition of when one receiver's prior belief expects more evidence than another and show that this characterizes more skepticism. As an input, I fully characterize receiver optimal equilibrium outcomes in general verifiable disclosure games.

Introduction Attendance to sleep clinic appointments is imperative to accurately diagnose sleep-related disorders and offer appropriate treatment. As part of our quality assurance program, we assessed predictors of no-show rates at our sleep clinic. We hypothesize that no-show rates can be predicted by appointment type (new vs. established), insurance status, age, sex, appointment time, day of the week, and season. Methods We performed a 10-month, retrospective chart review of patients scheduled at Saint Louis University’s SLUCare Sleep Disorders Center. Multivariable logistic regression was used to determine which factors were independently associated with no-show rates. Results 2,532 patient charts were reviewed and the overall no-show rate was 21.2%. Factors that were associated with a higher incidence of no-show rates included appointment type (new 39.1% vs. established 28.8%, p<.0001) and insurance status (no insurance 47.5% vs. public 28.3% vs private 24.2%, p<.0001). Multivariable logistic regression confirmed associations between no-show rates and new patient status (adjusted OR=2.96, 95%CI: 2.18-4.03) and the absence of health insurance (adjusted OR=1.74, 95%CI: 1.33, 2.27). Age, sex, appointment time, day of the week, and season did not significantly influence no-show rates. Conclusion Independent predictors of no-show appointments included new patient status and lack of health insurance. Our findings will aid future efforts to identify patients with high predictors of nonadherence. Further studies are needed to develop methods to decrease no-show rates once high risk appointments have been identified. Support (If Any) Other studies have described factors that influence no show rates, although none have specifically addressed no-shows for sleep medicine appointments. Knolhoff et al found that patients with limited health literacy and cigarette smoking had higher no-show rates (1). Drewek et al found that appointments scheduled for 30 days or greater had a higher chance of no-show (2). No-show rates increase the cost of healthcare. Kheirkhah et al analyzed no-show data and found that increased no-show rates occurred at subspecialty clinics, equaling a cost of approximately $196 per no-show (3). Reducing no-show rates can improve quality outcomes by maximizing access to care and reducing overall healthcare spending.

The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees criminal defendants \"the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State.\" Voir dire, the procedure during which the prosecution and the defense may challenge prospective jurors for cause or exercise peremptory challenges, purports to uphold this right. When the prosecution has access to cellular geolocation data on prospective jurors that the defense lacks, however, it may jeopardize the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. This Note proposes a solution to that problem in the form of an addition to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. By amending Rule 16 to specifically compel government disclosure of prospective jurors' cell site location information (CSLI) to the defense, the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is significantly more likely to be protected. Moreover, this addition to Rule 16 would guide courts' adaptation to technological advances, as well as restore the information equilibrium between criminal defendants and the government.

The Fifth Amendment requires statutorily authorized condemnors to provide just compensation to landowners for all takings. The procedural method used by states to determine just compensation varies widely among states and is often separate from the more standard procedures existing in traditional civil litigation. Regardless of their method, all fifty states and the District of Columbia each have their own unique procedure for determining just compensation. This Note distinctly classifies the procedural schemes currently used by states to initially value just compensation of condemned property into three general categories: (1) schemes that rely on commissioners to determine just compensation, (2) schemes that empower judges to valuate property, and (3) other schemes that are unique to only a few states. This Note also compares and contrasts the efficiency and justness of methods used in different states to initially determine what constitutes just compensation. Perhaps most importantly, this Note provides a series of graphics in the Appendix that will help both academics and practitioners understand state-to-state differences in procedurally determining just compensation

When adopted by Washington courts in 2018, General Rule 37 marked a significant advance in the fight against racial discrimination. Modifying the third step of Batson v. Kentucky, GR 37 requires that peremptory challenges must be denied if an \"objective observer\" could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the strike. Applying the objective observer standard to contexts beyond jury selection-such as evaluation of jury verdicts, seizures of persons, and prosecutorial misconduct-has led to major statewide victories toward establishing a more equitable justice system. However, courts have not granted all requests to extend the objective observer standard to other contexts. Most notably, Division III of the Washington Court of Appeals recently rejected a request to apply the objective observer standard in construing the privilege against self-incrimination in custodial police interrogations. Its decision can be attributed to the fact that prior successful applications of the objective observer standard relied upon state law; in contrast, state courts apply Fifth Amendment jurisprudence in the custodial interrogation context. This is because, in outdated precedents, the Supreme Court of Washington interpreted article I, section 9 of the Washington State Constitution-which provides for the privilege against self-incrimination- as being only as protective as the Fifth Amendment. This Comment advances two arguments: (1) article I, section 9 ought to be interpreted as being more protective than the Fifth Amendment, and (2) the objective observer standard should be applied to the custody analysis governing when law enforcement must provide an advisal as required under Miranda v. Arizona.