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"Voting Indonesia."
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The Effectiveness of E-Voting System in Reinforcing the Green Election: The Case of Village Head Elections in Sleman Regency, Indonesia
This study examined the effectiveness of the e-voting system in village head elections in Indonesia to underpin the green election agenda. This paper employed a qualitative method by applying the case study approach in Sleman Regency, the Special Region of Yogyakarta. Data were collected through in-depth interviews and a documentary study. To analyze the e-voting system’s effectiveness, three indicators of Duncan’s effectiveness were adopted, encompassing the target is fulfilled, integration, and adaption. The findings revealed that e-voting could be one of the effective factors in consolidating the green election agenda, although several less effective factors remained. Green elections in Indonesia remained an academic discussion that has not discovered a bright spot on whether or not they can be implemented.
Journal Article
Buying Brokers
Studies of electoral clientelism—the contingent exchange of material benefits for electoral support—frequently presume the presence of strong parties. Parties facilitate monitoring and enforcement of vote buying and allow brokers to identify core voters for turnout buying. Where money fuels campaigns but elections center around candidates, not parties, how do candidates pitch electoral handouts? The authors analyze candidates’ distribution of cash during an Indonesian election. Drawing upon varied data, including surveys of voters and brokers, candidates’ cash-distribution lists, and focus-group discussions, they find heavy spending but little evidence of vote buying or turnout buying. Instead, candidates buy brokers. With little loyalty or party brand to draw on, candidates seek to establish credibility with well-networked brokers, who then protect their turf with token payments for their own presumed bloc of voters. The authors find little evidence of monitoring of either voter or broker behavior, which is consistent with their argument that these payments are noncontingent.
Journal Article
Understanding the Jokowi effect during Indonesia's 2024 presidential election: an integrative model of incumbency advantage
Incumbency advantage in elections has been interpreted as the incumbent's ability to allocate and leverage available resources to build a stronger electoral position than their opponents. This concept is widely recognised as one of the most relevant frameworks for understanding the power dynamics of sitting presidents during election periods. However, the prior studies have not thoroughly explored scenarios where the incumbent president does not seek re-election but instead allocates their power, resources, and accumulated political capital to enhance their equity of incumbency while signaling their heir. This study examines the phenomenon of incumbency effects in the case of Indonesia's 2024 presidential election, focusing on the impact of President Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) to Prabowo-Gibran victory. The study introduces a novel conceptual model grounded in four theoretical perspectives: retrospective voting, cost-benefit voting, signaling theory, and political valence. The findings indicate that the so-called Jokowi effect on the 2024 election is undeniable. Applying these four perspectives significantly contributes to developing the academic discourse on incumbency effects in elections. The Jokowi effect further enriches the Political Science literature, particularly in understanding the influence of a sitting president on the dynamics of presidential candidate competition, voter behavior, and the broader implications for Indonesia's vulnerable democracy.
Journal Article
Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
This article presents an experiment in which 49 Indonesian villages were randomly assigned to choose development projects through either representative-based meetings or direct election-based plebiscites. Plebiscites resulted in dramatically higher satisfaction among villagers, increased knowledge about the project, greater perceived benefits, and higher reported willingness to contribute. Changing the political mechanism had much smaller effects on the actual projects selected, with some evidence that plebiscites resulted in projects chosen by women being located in poorer areas. The results suggest that direct participation in political decision making can substantially increase satisfaction and legitimacy.
Journal Article
The Role of Local Officials in New Democracies: Evidence from Indonesia
This paper shows that the body of appointed officials that a new democracy inherits from the previous regime is a key determinant of the extent of electoral fraud and clientelistic spending in new democracies. I develop a model that predicts that appointed officials have stronger incentives to influence voters during national level elections because of their career concerns. I test the implications of the model using data from Indonesia's transition to democracy. Both the pattern of alignment of electoral results between village and district levels and the pattern of subsequent turnover of appointed village heads corroborate the predictions of the model.
Journal Article
THE NON-DEMOCRATIC ROOTS OF ELITE CAPTURE: EVIDENCE FROM SOEHARTO MAYORS IN INDONESIA
Democracies widely differ in the extent to which powerful elites and interest groups retain influence over politics. While a large literature argues that elite capture is rooted in a country's history, our understanding of the determinants of elite persistence is limited. In this paper, we show that allowing old-regime agents to remain in office during democratic transitions is a key determinant of the extent of elite capture. We exploit quasi-random from Indonesia: Soeharto-regime mayors were allowed to finish their terms before being replaced by new leaders. Since mayors' political cycles were not synchronized, this event generated exogenous variation in how long old-regime mayors remained in their position during the democratic transition. Districts with longer exposure to old-regime mayors experience worse governance outcomes, higher elite persistence, and lower political competition in the medium run. The results suggest that slower transitions towards democracy allow the old-regime elites to capture democracy.
Journal Article
Doing good for political gain: the instrumental use of the SDGs as nonmarket strategies
The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are changing the way multinational enterprises (MNEs) engage with host governments. The SDGs offer MNEs a unique opportunity to build political influence by assisting governments in attaining a host country’s social needs. However, international business scholars have largely remained silent on how MNEs strategize to repurpose ‘doing good’ into political influence. Based on a multiple case study of four Western European MNE subsidiaries in Indonesia, we uncover the strategies that MNEs use to turn their SDG initiatives into political access and influence. Our study reveals three nonmarket strategies – SDG-directed cross-sector partnership, SDG-directed conflict management, and SDG-directed constituency building. These actionable strategies help MNEs manage the tensions arising from misaligned government priorities, high levels of perceived corruption, and skepticism toward foreign firms. Our findings advance the literature on international nonmarket strategy by explaining how MNE subsidiaries resolve these tensions and convert SDG-directed investments into political access and influence without succumbing to locally institutionalized norms of corruption. Finally, our study suggests that emerging-market governments may benefit from rewarding MNEs for their investments that contribute to the SDGs, as long as they provide clear guidance and multi-stakeholder platforms that foster effective collaborations with MNEs.
Journal Article
Gauging the Effects of Social Accountability on Services, Governance, and Citizen Empowerment
Engaging citizens in holding public officials and service providers accountable, referred to as social accountability, is a popular remedy for public sector performance weaknesses, figuring prominently in many international donor-funded projects and leading to widespread replication. However, the contextual factors that influence the successful transfer of social accountability are debated. Demand-side factors (civil society and citizens) are overemphasized in much of the literature. Yet supply-side factors (state structures and processes) and the nature of state—society relations are also important. This article examines four projects in developing countries to explore how these contextual factors influenced social accountability aims and outcomes. The salience of supply factors in enabling social accountability for service delivery and government performance stands out, particularly the degree of decentralization and the availability of space for citizen engagement. The capacity and motivation of citizens to occupy the available space, aggregate and voice their concerns, and participate with state actors in assessing service delivery performance and problems are critical.
Journal Article
Public Goods and Ethnic Diversity
This paper shows that the level of deforestation in Indonesia is positively related to the degree of ethnic fractionalization. To identify a causal relation, we exploit the exogenous timing of variation in the level of ethnic heterogeneity due to the creation of new jurisdictions. We provide evidence consistent with a lower control of politicians, through electoral punishment, in more ethnically fragmented districts. Our results are consistent with the literature on (under) provision of public goods in ethnically diverse societies.
Journal Article