Explore the vast range of titles available.

Foreign direct investment and private capital flows are highly concentrated geographically, with almost half of them reaching five top destinations. These flows tend to evade many high-risk countries. Regulatory and contractual risks, particularly in infrastructure, have inhibited investments in many parts of the developing world. A core objective of the World Bank Group (WBG) has been to support the flow of private investment for development; guarantees and insurance have been among the instruments that the WBG has used to pursue this objective. This study examines three main questions: • Should the WBG be in the guarantee business? • Have guarantee instruments in the three WBG institutions been used to their potential as reflected in WBG expectations and perceived demand? • Is the WBG appropriately organized to deliver its range of guarantee products in an effective and efficient manner?

Impact evaluation has grown more popular as a method for identifying the causal links between interventions and outcomes. These kind of evaluations assess changes that can be attributed to a particular intervention. Both innovations in statistical methods and the demand for evaluations that can measure such development results are increasing. The World Bank Group is the largest producer of impact evaluations among all development institutions. Thus, IEG has evaluated the relevance, quality, and influence of World Bank and IFC impact evaluations. IEG finds that the World Bank Group portfolio of impact evaluations is largely aligned with sector strategies and project objectives. Selection and coordination of impact evaluations has been improving. Most World Bank impact evaluations meet either medium or high quality standards, and about half of IFC impact evaluations did. Issues related to funding, staff capacity, and incentives, however, constrain the scope and coverage of impact evaluations in the Bank Group. IEG makes five recommendations to strengthen the Bank Group’s impact evaluation efforts, revolving around consistency, coordination, quality standards, and ensuring operational relevance. Both development and evaluation professionals will find valuable lessons in this evaluation. There are real benefits from impact evaluations, including their influence on development practices through contributions to project assessment and design of future projects. Thus, development practitioners engaged in designing projects, evaluators interestedin using similar methodology, and the general evaluation community will be able to use the lessons IEG sets out in this report.

The landscape of multilateral development finance has changed dramatically in the past decades. At Bretton Woods, delegates envisioned the World Bank as the focal organization mobilizing financial support for national development strategies. Today, this issue area is populated by no less than 27 multilateral development banks including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank created under Chinese leadership. This paper shows that, despite this institutional proliferation, the development finance regime remains largely coherent and core governance features designed at Bretton Woods continue to shape the emerging regime complex. We develop a historical institutionalist argument for why newly created institutions are likely to imitate extant institutions. We suggest that states add new institutions not only in response to deficiencies in extant institutions but also to increase their control and reputation. We analyze three causal pathways - path-dependence, orchestration, and independent learning - that contribute to a coherent regime complex. We show that focal international organizations can use their position to prevent incoherence.

Prior research suggests that firm productivity and export activity are mutually reinforcing. Highly productive firms are more likely to enter the export market (i.e., self-selection), and upon doing so, achieve greater productivity levels over time (i.e., learning-by-exporting). We consider how a critical yet unexamined, factor impacts this relationship: the economic development of a firm’s home market. Drawing on institution-based theories, we hypothesize that self-selection effects will be strongest among firms in more developed economies. Drawing on knowledge-based theories, we hypothesize that learning-by-exporting effects will be strongest among firms in less developed economies. Taken together, we posit that firm productivity and export activity indeed reinforce one another; however, the strength of each direction of the relationship will be amplified, at least in part, by the presence of the opposite home-market economic conditions. Analysis of longitudinal data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys composed of responses from 3431 manufacturing firms across 63 countries from 2006 to 2017 supports the proposed hypotheses.

In 1944, the Bretton Woods Conference ushered in a new international economic order. The World Bank emerged as one of the most powerful financial institutions in the world, and a new colonial authority in all but name. But how does it operate, who funds it, and what agenda does it work to promote?In The World Bank: A Critical History, Eric Toussaint answers all of these questions and more. Offering up a highly readable yet uniquely authoritative account, the book analyses the World Bank from its beginnings to the present day. Chapters on gender, climate and the pandemic era complement the peerless research that informed Toussaint's 2007 classic, The World Bank: A Critical Primer, and provide the reader with a truly contemporary, definitive text.Seven international case studies illustrate the impact of World Bank policy, and Toussaint also explores the political, economic and strategic motives of the US government with regard to the World Bank. The book concludes with a proposal for replacing the World Bank, IMF and WTO with new, multilateral and democratic institutions.

In environmental management, many studies have examined the energy consumption-emission nexus in detail. However, for the first time in the literature, this study considers how the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) and economic policy uncertainty (EPU) moderate the contribution of energy consumption to emissions for the four World Bank Income clusters. The system generalised methods of moments are applied to data for 109 countries from 1996 to 2016. Based on the main model (grouped clusters) estimations, the result revealed the existence of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis. Also, an increase in air transport and consumption of energy releases more carbon emissions to the climate. Interestingly, ECI decreases carbon emission significantly while EPU does not have a significant impact. Moreover, the study revealed that ECI moderated the impact of other variables on emission, but EPU is not a significant moderator. Furthermore, a comparative analysis among the four incomes suggests that the EKC hypothesis holds only in the high-income clusters; ECI is a significant predictor of carbon emission in the four clusters, but it only decreases the emission in high-income clusters. This corroborates the debate on climate change and the productive capacity of high-income countries. Given the foregoing, several policy measures were recommended.

Recent scholarship has uncovered convincing evidence of systematic donor influence in international financial institutions such as the World Bank. Less clear is how donors influence international financial institutions’ decisions. Possible avenues are formal and informal: formal influence through official decisions of the Board of Executive Directors and informal influence over decisions not made at the board level. This article explores the role of informal influence at the World Bank by examining the flow of funds after loans are approved. Controlling for commitments (loan approvals), are subsequent disbursements linked to the geopolitical interests of important donors? Since the Board of Executive Directors is formally involved in loan approval but not in disbursement decisions, this provides an interesting case to identify the avenues of influence. The results indicate the scope of reforms needed to bolster the independence of the World Bank.

This article reviews Bretton Woods Institutions’ approach to public services, including during the recent COVID-19 crisis. Drawing on the specific case of IMF and World Bank’s response to the multiple crisis triggered by the pandemic, it shows that there is a discourse-practice disjuncture in the institutions approach to public services as they continue to favour austerity and market-oriented solutions for the delivery of public services. The article therefore seeks to demystify the Bretton Woods institutions rhetoric and demand the adoption of a different way of understanding public services, and social policy more broadly.

Occupational health and safety is poorly served by United Nations agencies designated to protect workers: the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Labor Organization (ILO). The neoliberal programs initially adopted by the United Nations supported institutions of social protection and regulation and expanded worker protections and union growth. Neoliberalism later became synonymous with globalism and shared in its international success. The fundamental change under neoliberalism was the exchange and accumulation of capital. The major beneficiaries of neoliberalism, at the expense of workers, were large transnational corporations and wealthy investors. During this period, WHO and ILO activities in support of workers declined. As neoliberalism ultimately became neoconservatism, occupational health and safety was purposely ignored, and labor was treated with hostility. Neoliberalism had evolved into a harsh economic system detrimental to labor and labor rights. The United Nations is now in decline, taking with it the trivial WHO and ILO programs. Replacements for the WHO and ILO programs must be developed. It is not enough to call for renewed funding, given the United Nations’ failure to direct the global effort to protect workers. A new direction must be found.

This article analyses the World Bank’s environmental and social Safeguards against the backdrop of changing paradigms of global legal order. In January 2017, a new ‘Environmental and Social Framework’ (ESF) entered into force and replaced older ‘Safeguard Policies’ that had incrementally emerged since the 1980s in response to harmful impacts of investment projects financed by the Bank. The Safeguards reform epitomizes the changing structures and geopolitical shifts that shape international law in the twenty-first century and provides a fascinating looking glass on the evolution of global order since the end of the cold war. In this perspective, we see the first generation of Safeguards, introduced since the late 1980s, as an element of incremental legalization in the emerging global governance regime, a regime characterized by unipolar multilateralism and geopolitical dominance of ‘the West’. The 2016 reform not only reflects the increased politicization of global governance by civil society but also the emergence of a more competitive multilateralism, characterized by counter-institutionalization on the part of emerging powers like China. A comparison of the old and new Safeguards thus allows us to analyse different forms of contestation and resulting normative evolution in the key area of global governance of development and finance.