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This article examines the stance held by a Meccan-Indonesian exegete in the 13 AH or 19 AD century, Muḥammad Nawawī al-Bantānī (d. 1230–1314 H/1813–1897 AD), in dealing with Ṣifāt verses in his exegetical work, Marāḥ Labīd li Kashf Ma’nā al-Qur’ān al-Majīd. As an established term, Ṣifāt verses refer to Quranic expressions that ostensibly ascribe anthropomorphic dimensions to God. Interpretation of such ambiguous verses has been bitterly contended since the 2/8th century and remains one of the most debated topics in the pre- and postmodern era. This study applies literature and document analysis focused on many of al-Bantānī’s works. The results show that al-Bantānī actively applied ta’wīl [figurative interpretation] in dealing with Ṣifāt verses without totally discarding amodality position [tafwīḍ].ContributionAlthough al-Bantānī never mentioned Wahhabism in any of his works, his interpretation of Ṣifat verses alludes to his indirect response to the Wahhabi’s literalism and anti-ta’wīl approach. In addition, by accepting both of ta’wīl and tafwīḍ solutions, al-Bantānī underpinned the wasaṭī [moderate] stand, which later became the most distinctive tradition in Malay–Islamic discourse.

The issue of tolerance in religion is crucial to discuss because it is related to laws that allow or prohibit it, so pro-contra traditions arise between one group and another. The pros and cons of the law regarding tolerance between religious communities are divided into two mainstreams: groups that prohibit it and groups that allow it. In detail, groups that prohibit them usually use sad al-dzari’ah instruments to prevent harm to one’s faith. Meanwhile, groups that allow usually use maslahah instruments with the consideration of providing mutual benefit. This paper aims to find the fiqh of tolerance concerning religious moderation in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. This research method employed more library research with a qualitative comparative descriptive method. The research results indicated that in Southeast Asia, especially in three countries that are geographically located in the Southeast Asian region, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, the moderate concept of religion is equally applied (Moderation in Religious Practice). Therefore, religious concepts that are extreme or tend to justify the use of violent means, as adopted by Wahhabism, are often described as the most intolerant schools of thought or madhhab in Islam, which seek by any means, including violence, for the development and implementation of ‘Pure Islam’, which they consider being the truest Islam. It cannot be implemented in these three countries. This research contributes to find the fiqh of tolerance concerning religious moderation in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.

This article frames the late-Ottoman Hashimite-Sacudi rivalry in the Arabian Peninsula as an ideological struggle in terms of competing notions of Islamic modernity and civilisation. I analyse how the Hashimite dynasty in Mecca leveraged Ottoman-era ideas of Islamic civilisation against Al-Sacud during the late Ottoman period and into the 1916–1918 Revolt. Hashimite figures like Husayn and his sons portrayed Wahhabism as antithetical to modern Islamic civilisation to critique the Sacudi family and their allies. They characterised Wahhabism as extreme with its adherents composed of nomadic populations whose fanaticism set them apart from settled, moderate, and ‘civilised’ societies. These distortions reflected a rhetorical front within a global debate over Islamic civilisation that the Hashimites intended to centre themselves as leaders. However, there existed different models of Islamic civilisation, particularly ones in which tribesmen of the Arabian Peninsula were its key agents. Ultimately, these alternative models weakened Hashimite claims that they represented the exclusive civilising force in the Arabian Peninsula and perhaps strengthened the appeal of other Arab leaders like the Sacudis.

This article examines the stance held by a Meccan-Indonesian exegete in the 13 AH or 19 AD century, Muḥammad Nawawī al-Bantānī (d. 1230–1314 H/1813–1897 AD), in dealing with Ṣifāt verses in his exegetical work, Marāḥ Labīd li Kashf Ma’nā al-Qur’ān al-Majīd. As an established term, Ṣifāt verses refer to Quranic expressions that ostensibly ascribe anthropomorphic dimensions to God. Interpretation of such ambiguous verses has been bitterly contended since the 2/8th century and remains one of the most debated topics in the pre- and postmodern era. This study applies literature and document analysis focused on many of al-Bantānī’s works. The results show that al-Bantānī actively applied ta’wīl [figurative interpretation] in dealing with Ṣifāt verses without totally discarding amodality position [tafwīḍ].Contribution: Although al-Bantānī never mentioned Wahhabism in any of his works, his interpretation of Ṣifat verses alludes to his indirect response to the Wahhabi’s literalism and anti-ta’wīl approach. In addition, by accepting both of ta’wīl and tafwīḍ solutions, al-Bantānī underpinned the wasaṭī [moderate] stand, which later became the most distinctive tradition in Malay–Islamic discourse.

This paper revisits Saudi Arabia’s religious statecraft through the lens of Pax Wahhabica, interrogating the transnational diffusion, strategic reconfiguration, and evolving instrumentalisation of Wahhabism as a modality of imperial theopolitics and a conduit of ideological projection. Tracing Wahhabism from its eighteenth-century roots, through its Cold War entrenchment as a bulwark against secular nationalism, to its post-9/11 fragmentation, this study offers a conceptual re-evaluation of Wahhabism not as a fixed theological doctrine but as a malleable constellation of norms and discourses continuously calibrated to state interest. Theoretically anchored in soft power analysis, constructivist norm diffusion, Gramscian hegemony, and Foucauldian governmentality, this paper examines how religious norms are mobilised through affective discourse, institutional socialisation, and securitised governance to advance regime resilience. Through empirical case studies on Bosnia, Indonesia, and Nigeria, it elucidates how Wahhabi norms were localised, hybridised, and, in some instances, weaponised against their progenitors. Finally, this paper examines the domestic reconfiguration and international repositioning of Wahhabism under Muḥammad bin Salmān, arguing that contemporary Saudi theopolitics marks not the abandonment of Wahhabism but its reconversion into a strategically curated, domesticated ideology. Pax Wahhabica, thus, persists—not as an unbroken theological doctrine but as a hybrid ideational empire in which Islam is strategically retooled as an instrument of hegemonic statecraft.

In contemporary academic literature, the word \"Salafī\" has a variety of meanings. Most importantly, Western academic literature of the 20th and 21st centuries applies the word to (1) an Islamic reform movement founded by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (d. 1897) and Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849–1905) in the last decades of the 19th century and (2) to contemporary Sunni reform movements that criticize manifestations of Sunni Islam which are based on Sufism, Ash'arism, and traditional madhhab-affiliations to the Shāfi'ī, Ḥanafī, and Mālikī schools. In a 2010-article Henri Lauzière argued that the use of the word \"Salafī\" to describe these two movements is an equivocation based on a mistake. While the movement of contemporary Salafīs may be rightfully called by that name, al-Afghānī and 'Abduh never used the term. Only Western scholars of the 1920s and 30s, most importantly Louis Massignon (1883–1962), called this latter movement \"salafī\". This paper reevaluates the evidence presented by Lauzière and argues that Massignon did not make a mistake. The paper describes analytically both reform movements and draws the conclusion that there is a historic continuity that justifies calling them both \"salafī\". The paper draws an analogy from the use of the word \"socialist\" in European political history, which first applied to a wider movement of the late 19th century before its use was contested and narrowed down in the course of the 20th.

Theological discussions about visits to the Prophet’s grave in Madina are the focus of this paper. The relevant question in this context relates to the idea of a postmortem life of the Prophet and its accessibility for believers after his death. The idea of a spiritual presence of the Prophet in this world is found in the description of religious visits to Madina, namely in the traditional Sunni books of Fiqh (describing the normative rules concerning the Prophet’s grave), as well as in some books of Tafsir. These ideas have been challenged by the Wahhabi movement, in which the idea of becoming connected to the Prophet’s presence is refused and the visit to Madina is seen to be focused on the mosque, not the grave of the Prophet. This reinterpretation is examined in this article on the basis of various textual references.

This article seeks to analyze and focus on institutional Salafism, also referred to as Wahhabism. The term \"Salafism\" was not associated with Wahhabi doctrine until the 1970s. It is said that in the early 20th century, Wahhabis began calling themselves Salafis. In contemporary academic discussions, the terms \"Salafism\" and \"Wahhabism\" are sometimes used interchangeably. Using a library-based research method, this article concludes that not all Salafis hastily declare others as infidels, including the Wahhabis. They distinguish between apparent issues and hidden issues in the matter of individual takfir (excommunication). They hold that anyone who falls into acts of apparent polytheism, after the evidence from the Quran and Sunnah has been presented to them, is individually excommunicated. However, in hidden matters, a person is not declared an infidel unless their doubts have been entirely dispelled.

This article employs the notions of exclusivism and inclusivism to categorise the responses of prospective Islamic religion teachers towards various Islamic religious sects. Despite the prevalent criticism surrounding the perceived oversimplification and a lack of insight provided by the two typologies, we have found them to be valuable tools for elucidating the phenomena under investigation. Quantitative data were collected from 154 respondents using questionnaires containing multiple-choice questions. Data frequency, cross-tabulation and gamma values are statistical techniques employed to analyse and characterise data and ascertain the nature of their associations or dependencies. This study provides evidence indicating that a significant proportion of prospective Islamic religious teachers had a worldview characterised by exclusivity. Their exclusivist stance is seen in their acknowledgment of sects that deviate from their own, such as Wahhabism, Shia, and those engaging in non-scriptural forms of worship. Some individuals agree with the designation of heretical being attributed to those who adhere to distinct religious worship customs. Moreover, these individuals perceive contentious theological assertions, such as those made by Sheikh Panji Gumilang, as warped, misguided and beyond redemption.ContributionThis study implies the need to review and reconstruct higher education curricula to prepare prospective Islamic religion teachers who are moderate, tolerant, inclusive, and uphold human rights.

In his comprehensive work Fayḍ al-wahhāb, ʿAbd Rabbihī ibn Sulaymān al-Qaliyūbī (d. 1968) extensively explores the Prophet Muhammad’s role in theology and argues against interpretations influenced by Wahhābī thought. He emphasizes the prophetic realm, or prophecy and its traces, particularly the means by which believers can establish a connection with it. This article pays special attention to al-Qaliyūbī’s understanding of mediation (tawassul); that is, how the Prophet—by virtue of his elevated status, ordained by God—can serve as a means; similar to how a ritual prayer or any good deed ultimately serves as a means to draw closer to God. For al-Qaliyūbī, following the Prophet means not only regarding him as the founder of the religion, but also incorporating his spirit and character into one’s own life. This article proceeds in four steps: (1) It addresses the systematics of prophecy concerning practical ethics and how this realm can be entered; (2) It introduces the three-layered paradigm of later theology and al-Qaliyūbī’s work; (3) It explores the topic of what constitutes a means (wasīla) and the theological implications of using a means in prayer (tawassul); (4) It zooms in on the aspect of what qualifies a means to be used in an individual prayer.