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We develop a model explaining how criminal organizations strategically use pre-electoral violence as a way of influencing electoral results and politicians’ behaviour. We then characterize the incentives to use such violence under different levels of electoral competition and different electoral rules. Our theory is consistent with the empirical evidence within Sicily and across Italian regions. Specifically, the presence of organized crime is associated with abnormal spikes in violence against politicians before elections—particularly when the electoral outcome is more uncertain—which in turn reduces voting for parties opposed by criminal organizations. Using a very large data set of parliamentary debates, we also show that violence by the Sicilian Mafia reduces anti-Mafia efforts by members of parliament appointed in Sicily, particularly from the parties that traditionally oppose the Mafia.

This article focuses on political dynasties' potential consequences, and particularly investigates whether and when they lead to the selection of dynastic politicians with relatively lower education levels. I exploit the different electoral constraints faced by distinct subsets of Italian local politicians to identify whether weaker constraints on political selection processes induce the selection of dynastic politicians with lower education levels relative to their non-dynastic peers. The analysis which covers almost 540,000 Italian local politicians active during the period 1985-2012 - indicates that a political selection process controlled by politicians rather than the electorate favours dynastic individuals with relatively lower levels of education.

Proportional representation (PR) is often discussed in voting settings as a major desideratum. For the past century or so, it is common both in practice and in the academic literature to look towards the single transferable vote (STV) rule as the solution for achieving PR. Some of the most prominent electoral reform movements around the globe are pushing for the adoption of STV. It has been termed a major open problem to design a voting rule that satisfies the same PR properties as STV and better monotonicity properties. In this paper, we first present a taxonomy of proportional representation axioms for general weak order preferences, some of which generalise and strengthen previously introduced concepts. We then present a rule called the expanding approvals rule (EAR) that satisfies properties stronger than the central PR axiom satisfied by STV, can handle indifferences in a convenient and computationally efficient manner, and also satisfies better candidate monotonicity properties. In view of this, our proposed rule seems to be a compelling solution for achieving proportional representation in voting settings.

We compare turnout under proportional power-sharing electoral systems and winner-take-all elections. The effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voter preferences. If the two parties have relatively equal support, turnout is higher in a winner-take-all system; the result is reversed when there is a clear underdog. We report findings from a laboratory experiment that was designed and conducted to explore this theoretical hypothesis and several other secondary hypotheses that are also implied by the theoretical model. The results are broadly supportive of the theoretical predictions on comparative turnout, the partial underdog compensation effect and the competition effect.

The single transferable vote (STV) voting method is used to elect multiple candidates in ranked-choice elections. One weakness of STV is that it fails multiple fairness criteria related to monotonicity and no-show paradoxes. We analyze 1079 local government STV elections in Scotland to estimate the frequency of such monotonicity anomalies in real-world elections, and compare our results with prior empirical and theoretical research about the rates at which such anomalies occur. In 62 of the 1079 elections we found some kind of monotonicity anomaly. We generally find that anomaly rates are similar to prior empirical research and much lower than what most theoretical research has found. Most STV anomalies we find are the first of their kind to be documented in real-world multiwinner elections.

We propose a model of attentiveness in elections with impressionable voters under three electoral rules: plurality, approval voting, and negative plurality. Voters’ conduct is determined by their attentiveness and impressions of candidates. We show that attentiveness is as important as voters’ preferences for the outcome of the election. Specifically, we show that candidates benefit from increased voter attention under all rules other than negative plurality. We then consider exogenous and endogenous attentiveness and show how our model can account for momentum effects in primaries, where candidates rise quickly and then fade away. Finally we consider the case of news coverage tone and show that under plurality rule e.g., primary elections, candidates may benefit from frequent news coverage even if the news is negative.

How does ballot structure affect party choice? We argue that open lists undermine the electoral support of cohesive parties, to the benefit of internally divided parties. We conduct a survey-embedded experiment in the aftermath of the European migrant crisis, presenting German voters with real parties but fictitious politicians. A crossover design varies ballot type and exposure to candidate positions on immigration. We find that the internally divided Christian Democrats gain votes at the expense of the cohesive Alternative for Germany when open lists are used and candidate positions are known. For individuals who are equally attracted to both parties, switching is most likely if their immigration preferences lie near the midpoint between the two parties. Overall, our analysis establishes conditions under which ballot structure can affect the electoral performance of parties in general, and that of the populist right in particular.

The second-order election (SOE) model as originally formulated by Reif and Schmitt (1980) suggests that, relative to the preceding first-order election result, turnout is lower in SOEs, government and big parties lose, and small and ideologically extreme parties win. These regularities are not static but dynamic and related to the first-order electoral cycle. These predictions of the SOE model have often been tested using aggregate data. The fact that they are based on individual-level hypotheses has received less attention. The main aim of this article is to restate the micro-level hypotheses for the SOE model and run a rigorous test for the 2004 and 2014 European elections. Using data from the European Election Studies voter surveys, our analysis reveals signs of sincere, but also strategic abstentions in European Parliament elections. Both strategic and sincere motivations are also leading to SOE defection. It all happens at once.