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The widely held belief that the Schlieffen Plan was the basis of German strategy in 1914 stems from the historical misrepresentation of that plan as a design for the conduct of a two-front war. Schlieffen’s famous memorandum of December 1905, generally known as the Schlieffen Plan, proposed a massive right-wing attack on France but only in the case of a one-front war. His basic principle for the conduct of a two-front war, spelled out in another document of December 1905, was to counter-attack on both fronts in quick succession. The younger Moltke’s decision for a massive right-wing attack on France in 1914 signified a rupture with Schlieffen’s strategic thinking, not a continuation of it. The First World War would have started very differently – with a great battle in Lorraine, not on the Marne – if the Germans had acted in accordance with Schlieffen’s real intentions for a war on two fronts.

Why do some attempts to conclude alliance treaties end in failure? From the inability of European powers to form an alliance that would stop Hitler in the 1930s, to the present inability of Ukraine to join NATO, states frequently attempt but fail to form alliance treaties. In Arguing about Alliances , Paul Poast sheds new light on the purpose of alliance treaties by recognizing that such treaties come from negotiations, and that negotiations can end in failure. In a book that bridges Stephen Walt's Origins of Alliance and Glenn Snyder's Alliance Politics , two classic works on alliances, Poast identifies two conditions that result in non-agreement: major incompatibilities in the internal war plans of the participants, and attractive alternatives to a negotiated agreement for various parties to the negotiations. As a result, Arguing about Alliances focuses on a group of states largely ignored by scholars: states that have attempted to form alliance treaties but failed. Poast suggests that to explain the outcomes of negotiations, specifically how they can end without agreement, we must pay particular attention to the wartime planning and coordinating functions of alliance treaties. Through his exploration of the outcomes of negotiations from European alliance negotiations between 1815 and 1945, Poast offers a typology of alliance treaty negotiations and establishes what conditions are most likely to stymie the attempt to formalize recognition of common national interests.

During the Cold War, information in Western open sources about Bulgarian Land Forces’ war plans, organization, and order of battle was absent or very general, until the last years of the 1980s. Yet there is much more information now available after 30 years, and this is a very valid topic for research. Bulgaria was drawn into Soviet war planning for the elimination of capitalism. Bulgaria’s planned part in this was helping to seize the Turkish Straits, either with or without the use of tactical nuclear weapons. It now appears that there would have been two Fronts advancing in this area, one predominantly Soviet Odessa Military District forces to seize the Turkish Straits, and the other more heavily Bulgarian in composition attacking towards central Greece. Both would have been supported by tactical air forces and, if the circumstances dictated, nuclear weapons. Later, with the commitment of strategic reserves, it was hoped to develop the offensive in depth towards the Syrian border. The forces formed to carry this mission out were reorganized repeatedly from 1945-55, as the Communist Party tightened its control over the country. The organization of the Land Forces was much more settled after the early 1960s. Bulgarian history will be better served by more open debate over these issues.

The US intervention in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks brought about adverse socio-political and economic consequences for Pakistan. Pakistan’s decision to support the US intervention in Afghanistan turned some forces in the former FATA to militancy which resulted in hundreds of terrorist attacks in various parts of Pakistan. While Pakistan adopted various counter-terrorism strategies, the terrorist attack on Peshawar Army Public School on December 16, 2014, drove it to take up a proactive and comprehensive strategy. National Action Plan (NAP), adopted with a national consensus, was the manifestation of this strategy. The NAP for the most part aimed at stopping the activities of banned terrorist groups, bringing the madrasahs (religious seminaries) under an orderly system, countering the terrorist financing, and the trial of terrorists in the military courts. In practice, however, Pakistan turned more to the war model, with intensification and expansion of military operations, and least to the criminal justice model in the fight against terrorism. The then government provided a constitutional cover for counterterrorism military actions by adopting the 21st amendment on January 6, 2015. In consequence, the terrorist incidents have massively decreased but there is little evidence that the NAP has achieved a long-lasting success. This argument builds on the fact that Pakistan’s efforts to assume key reforms promised in the NAP, particularly about Madrassas and the Criminal Justice System CJS remain Lack luster. This paper emphasizes the importance of the CJS in fighting terrorism more effectively. It argues that Pakistan can achieve the counterterrorism objective of the National Action Plan on a sustainable basis only if it reforms and strengthens the current CJS as envisaged.

Why do some attempts to conclude alliance treaties end in failure? From the inability of European powers to form an alliance that would stop Hitler in the 1930s, to the present inability of Ukraine to join NATO, states frequently attempt but fail to form alliance treaties. In Arguing about Alliances , Paul Poast sheds new light on the purpose of alliance treaties by recognizing that such treaties come from negotiations, and that negotiations can end in failure. In a book that bridges Stephen Walt's Origins of Alliance and Glenn Snyder's Alliance Politics , two classic works on alliances, Poast identifies two conditions that result in non-agreement: major incompatibilities in the internal war plans of the participants, and attractive alternatives to a negotiated agreement for various parties to the negotiations. As a result, Arguing about Alliances focuses on a group of states largely ignored by scholars: states that have attempted to form alliance treaties but failed. Poast suggests that to explain the outcomes of negotiations, specifically how they can end without agreement, we must pay particular attention to the wartime planning and coordinating functions of alliance treaties. Through his exploration of the outcomes of negotiations from European alliance negotiations between 1815 and 1945, Poast offers a typology of alliance treaty negotiations and establishes what conditions are most likely to stymie the attempt to formalize recognition of common national interests.

Research background: The Russian-Ukrainian war has become a significant factor that has prompted millions of Ukrainian citizens to migrate in search of safety. The demographic situation in Ukraine is deteriorating in both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. The mentioned changes are impacting the domestic and European labour markets. Purpose: The article examines the consequences of war migration of the population for domestic and European labour markets. Research methodology: The study covers the period between 2013 and 2023. Empirical research methods were use in the article: observation, comparison, generalization, forecasting. Results: Ukrainian migrants presently comprise approximately 1% of the population in European Union countries and represent 15% of Ukraine’s overall demographic composition. The prevailing inclination among the majority of these migrants is not to return to Ukraine in the immediate future, with the principal determinant being identified as the prevailing sense of peril. Notably, within the age structure of Ukrainian migrants, a significant 81.2% fall within the economically productive age bracket of 18-49 years. This demographic composition sets the stage for a positive economic effect within the European Union, while concurrently engendering adverse repercussions for the domestic labour market in Ukraine. Novelty: A three-year projection regarding the migration volumes of Ukrainians to the European Union has been delineated. Drawing upon post-war reconstruction experiences worldwide and taking into account the critical demographic landscape in Ukraine, a proposition has been put forth to synergize efforts among the government, international organizations, and donors. This collaborative endeavour seeks to establish a financial fund, wherein resources will be allocated towards the formulation of recommendations and the subsequent design and implementation of programs aimed at the restoration of the domestic labour market.

Gerhard Gross says that he has discovered new documents which show that there was a Schlieffen plan. His description of those documents is both cursory and inaccurate. A thorough analysis of these documents proves that there never was a 'Schlieffen plan'. Gross also attempted to refute my 'Schlieffen plan' thesis. I show that Gross's rebuttal is unconvincing.

This chapter contains sections titled: Prior to 1947 Creation of Department of Defense, 1946–9 Gradual Centralization of Authority 1949–86 Goldwater–Nichols Act and Beyond, 1986–2008 Bibliography

Chapter Three is about the coming war and the invention of American air power. Kuter said on his arrival in Washington D.C. in 1939 that “One thing was apparent: whoever was running the Air Corps at that time, it wasn’t the Chief of the Air Corps.” This chapter will discuss the planning for the coming air war and the writing of Air War Planning Document-1 in only nine days. Beyond planning for an air war with an air force that did not exist, Kuter also led the effort to set up an Air Staff and in 1942 drew national attention by making a huge jump in rank. On January 5th, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and less than a month later to brigadier general on February 2nd, skipping the rank of bird colonel entirely. This made Kuter, at 36, the youngest general officer of his time and the youngest since William Sherman.

This chapter contains sections titled: Value of War Planning Concept of War Institutional Capabilities The Spanish–American War and its Aftermath World War I The Interwar Period World War II The Cold War Era Post ‐ Cold War Now and into the Future The Dearth of War Planning Histories Bibliography