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In a bold reappraisal, Katherine Epstein uncovers the origins of the \"military-industrial complex\" not in the Cold War but in the decades before WWI, as the United States and Great Britain struggled to perfect a crucial new weapon: the self-propelled torpedo. Torpedo R&D sparked intellectual property battles that reshaped national security law.

In this report we focus on the definition of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). We provide a comparative analysis of existing official definitions of AWS as provided by States and international organisations, like ICRC and NATO. The analysis highlights that the definitions draw focus on different aspects of AWS and hence lead to different approaches to address the ethical and legal problems of these weapons systems. This approach is detrimental both in terms of fostering an understanding of AWS and in facilitating agreement around conditions of deployment and regulations of their use and, indeed, whether AWS are to be used at all. We draw from the comparative analysis to identify essential aspects of AWS and then offer a definition that provides a value-neutral ground to address the relevant ethical and legal problems. In particular, we identify four key aspects—autonomy; adapting capabilities of AWS; human control; and purpose of use—as the essential factors to define AWS and which are key when considering the related ethical and legal implications.

2021 CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title Moral Responsibility in Twenty-First-Century Warfare explores the complex relationship between just war theory and the ethics of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). One of the challenges facing ethicists of war, particularly just war theorists, is that AWS is an applicative concept that seems, in many ways, to lie beyond the human(ist) scope of the just war theory tradition. The book examines the various ethical gaps between just war theory and the legal and moral status of AWS, addresses the limits of both traditional and revisionist just war theory, and proposes ways of bridging some of these gaps. It adopts a dualistic notion of moral responsibility-or differing, related notions of moral responsibility and legitimate authority-to study the conflicts and contradictions of legitimizing the autonomous weapons that are designed to secure peace and neutralize the effects of violence. Focusing on the changing conditions and dynamics of accountability, responsibility, autonomy, and rights in twenty-first-century warfare, the volume sheds light on the effects of violence and the future ethics of modern warfare.

This book addresses an important but little-noticed phenomenon in the revolutionary world of military technology. Across a wide range of otherwise-unrelated weapons programs, the Pentagon is now pursuing arms that are deliberately crafted to be less powerful, less deadly, and less destructive than the systems they are designed to supplement or replace. This direction is historically anomalous; military forces generally pursue ever-bigger bangs, but the modern conditions of counter-insurgency warfare and military operations 'other than war' (such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance) demand a military capable of modulated force. By providing a capacity to intervene deftly yet effectively, the new generations of 'useable' weaponry should enable the U.S. military to accomplish its demanding missions in a manner consistent with legal obligations, public relations realities, and political constraints. Five case studies are provided, regarding precision-guided 'smart bombs', low-yield nuclear weapons, self-neutralizing anti-personnel land mines, directed-energy anti-satellite weapons, and non-lethal weapons.

Abstract In this article, we focus on the attribution of moral responsibility for the actions of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). To do so, we suggest that the responsibility gap can be closed if human agents can take meaningful moral responsibility for the actions of AWS. This is a moral responsibility attributed to individuals in a justified and fair way and which is accepted by individuals as an assessment of their own moral character. We argue that, given the unpredictability of AWS, meaningful moral responsibly can only be discharged by human agents who are willing to take a moral gambit: they decide to design/develop/deploy AWS despite the uncertainty about the effects an AWS may produce, hoping that unintended and unwanted or unforeseen outcomes may never occurs, but also accepting to be held responsible if such outcomes will occur. We argue that, while a moral gambit is permissible for the use of non-lethal AWS, this is not the case for the actions of lethal autonomous weapon systems.

Technological developments in the sphere of artificial intelligence (AI) inspire debates about the implications of autonomous weapon systems (AWS), which can select and engage targets without human intervention. While increasingly more systems which could qualify as AWS, such as loitering munitions, are reportedly used in armed conflicts, the global discussion about a system of governance and international legal norms on AWS at the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW) has stalled. In this article we argue for the necessity to adopt legal norms on the use and development of AWS. Without a framework for global regulation, state practices in using weapon systems with AI-based and autonomous features will continue to shape the norms of warfare and affect the level and quality of human control in the use of force. By examining the practices of China, Russia, and the United States in their pursuit of AWS-related technologies and participation at the UN CCW debate, we acknowledge that their differing approaches make it challenging for states parties to reach an agreement on regulation, especially in a forum based on consensus. Nevertheless, we argue that global governance on AWS is not impossible. It will depend on the extent to which an actor or group of actors would be ready to take the lead on an alternative process outside of the CCW, inspired by the direction of travel given by previous arms control and weapons ban initiatives.

In Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Norms Ingvild Bode and Hendrik Huelss present an innovative analysis of how testing, developing, and using weapons systems with autonomous features shapes ethical and legal norms, arguing that they have already established standards for what counts as meaningful human control.

In this article, we focus on the scholarly and policy debate on autonomous weapon systems (AWS) and particularly on the objections to the use of these weapons which rest on jus ad bellum principles of proportionality and last resort. Both objections rest on the idea that AWS may increase the incidence of war by reducing the costs for going to war (proportionality) or by providing a propagandistic value (last resort). We argue that whilst these objections offer pressing concerns in their own right, they suffer from important limitations: they overlook the difficulties of calculating ad bellum proportionality; confuse the concept of proportionality of effects with the precision of weapon systems; disregard the ever-changing nature of war and of its ethical implications; mistake the moral obligation imposed by the principle of last resort with the impact that AWS may have on political decision to resort to war. Our analysis does not entail that AWS are acceptable or justifiable, but it shows that ad bellum principles are not the best set of ethical principles for tackling the ethical problems raised by AWS; and that developing adequate understanding of the transformations that the use of AWS poses to the nature of war itself is a necessary, preliminary requirement to any ethical analysis of the use of these weapons.

This article reflects on securitization efforts with respect to ‘killer robots’, known more impartially as autonomous weapons systems (AWS). Our contribution focuses, theoretically and empirically, on the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a transnational advocacy network vigorously pushing for a pre-emptive ban on AWS. Marking exactly a decade of its activity, there is still no international regime formally banning, or even purposefully regulating, AWS. Our objective is to understand why the Campaign has not been able to advance its disarmament agenda thus far, despite all the resources, means and support at its disposal. For achieving this objective, we challenge the popular assumption that strong stigmatization is the universally best strategy towards humanitarian disarmament. We investigate the consequences of two specifics present in AWS, which set them apart from processes and successes of the campaigns to ban anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions, and laser-blinding weapons: the complexity of AWS as a distinct weapons category, and the subsequent circumvention of its complexity through the utilization of pop-culture, namely science fiction imagery. We particularly focus on two mechanisms through which such distortion has occurred: hybridization and grafting. These provide the conceptual basis and heuristic tools to unpack the paradox of over-securitization: success in broadening the stakeholder base in relation to the first mechanism and deepening the sense of insecurity in relation to the second one does not necessarily lead to the achievement of the desired prohibitory norm. In conclusion, we ask whether it is not the time for a more epistemically-oriented expert debate with a less ambitious, lowest common denominator strategy as the preferred model of arms control for such a complex weapons category.

In the design of Infantry Squad Weapon Equipment System-of-Systems (ISWES), traditional text-based systems engineering primarily relies on empirical methods derived from historical designs. This approach suffers from low design efficiency, protracted development cycles, and incomplete system requirements analysis. In addition, determining effective equipment configurations to maximize the integrated operational capabilities of weapon systems has garnered increasing attention. This study proposes a micro-scenario-oriented squad equipment system design framework featuring manned–unmanned teaming collocation optimization. First, an MBSE method applicable to ISWES modeling is proposed, and the initial allocation scheme of ISWES is obtained. Subsequently, a multi-objective optimization model for an allocation scheme is established based on operation loop theory with the objectives of maximizing combat effectiveness and network robustness while minimizing weapon costs, and the CCMO algorithm is employed to obtain the Pareto set. Then, a multi-attribute scheme selection method leveraging Successive Elimination of Alternatives Based on Order and Degree of Efficiency (SEABODE)-improved TOPSIS is proposed to identify the optimal collocation. Finally, a case study on infantry squad-level equipment system design validates the framework’s feasibility and effectiveness.