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Several major theories have been established in research on motivation in education to describe, explain, and predict the direction, initiation, intensity, and persistence of learning behaviors. The most commonly cited theories of academic motivation include expectancy-value theory, social cognitive theory, self-determination theory, interest theory, achievement goal theory, and attribution theory. To gain a deeper understanding of the similarities and differences among these prominent theories, we present an integrative framework based on an action model (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2018). The basic model is deliberately parsimonious, consisting of six stages of action: the situation, the self, the goal, the action, the outcome, and the consequences. Motivational constructs from each major theory are related to these determinants in the course of action, mainly revealing differences and to a lesser extent commonalities. In the integrative model, learning outcomes represent a typical indicator of goal-directed behavior. Associated recent meta-analyses demonstrate the empirical relationship between the motivational constructs of the six central theories and academic achievement. They provide evidence for the explanatory value of each theory for students’ learning.

Voluntary action is a fundamental element of self-consciousness. The readiness potential (RP), a slow drift of neural activity preceding self-initiated movement, has been suggested to reflect neural processes underlying the preparation of voluntary action; yet more than fifty years after its introduction, interpretation of the RP remains controversial. Based on previous research showing that internal bodily signals affect sensory processing and ongoing neural activity, we here investigated the potential role of interoceptive signals in voluntary action and the RP. We report that (1) participants initiate voluntary actions more frequently during expiration, (2) this respiration-action coupling is absent during externally triggered actions, and (3) the RP amplitude is modulated depending on the respiratory phase. Our findings demonstrate that voluntary action is coupled with the respiratory system and further suggest that the RP is associated with fluctuations of ongoing neural activity that are driven by the involuntary and cyclic motor act of breathing. Voluntary action and free will have been associated with cortical activity, referred to as “the readiness potential” that precedes self-initiated actions by about 1 s. Here, the authors show that the involuntary and cyclic motor act of breathing is coupled with voluntary action and the readiness potential.

In humans, spontaneous movements are often preceded by early brain signals. One such signal is the readiness potential (RP) that gradually arises within the last second preceding a movement. An important question is whether people are able to cancel movements after the elicitation of such RPs, and if so until which point in time. Here, subjects played a game where they tried to press a button to earn points in a challenge with a brain–computer interface (BCI) that had been trained to detect their RPs in real time and to emit stop signals. Our data suggest that subjects can still veto a movement even after the onset of the RP. Cancellation of movements was possible if stop signals occurred earlier than 200 ms before movement onset, thus constituting a point of no return.

Much recent research suggests that willpower—the capacity to exert self-control—is a limited resource that is depleted after exertion. We propose that whether depletion takes place or not depends on a person's belief about whether willpower is a limited resource. Study I found that individual differences in lay theories about willpower moderate ego-depletion effects: People who viewed the capacity for self-control as not limited did not show diminished self-control after a depleting experience. Study 2 replicated the effect, manipulating lay theories about willpower. Study 3 addressed questions about the mechanism underlying the effect. Study 4, a longitudinal field study, found that theories about willpower predict change in eating behavior, procrastination, and self-regulated goal striving in depleting circumstances. Taken together, the findings suggest that reduced self-control after a depleting task or during demanding periods may reflect people's beliefs about the availability of willpower rather than true resource depletion.

•Previous research revealed that the breathing system is involved in diverse motor processes including running, orofacial movements, and even voluntary motor action.•In this study, we investigated whether the breathing system is associated with voluntary initiation of mental actions (i.e., motor and visual imagery) which are not accompanied by any overt movement.•We found that the breathing cycle is synchronized with the onset of self-initiated mental imagery performance which was preceded by the cortical readiness potential.•Our findings suggest breathing-action coupling is involved in more general action preparation processing, regardless of any subsequent motor process. Previous research has suggested that bodily signals from internal organs are associated with diverse cortical and subcortical processes involved in sensory-motor functions, beyond homeostatic reflexes. For instance, a recent study demonstrated that the preparation and execution of voluntary actions, as well as its underlying neural activity, are coupled with the breathing cycle. In the current study, we investigated whether such breathing-action coupling is limited to voluntary motor action or whether it is also present for mental actions not involving any overt bodily movement. To answer this question, we recorded electroencephalography (EEG), electromyography (EMG), and respiratory signals while participants were conducting a voluntary action paradigm including self-initiated motor execution (ME), motor imagery (MI), and visual imagery (VI) tasks. We observed that the voluntary initiation of ME, MI, and VI are similarly coupled with the respiration phase. In addition, EEG analysis revealed the existence of readiness potential (RP) waveforms in all three tasks (i.e., ME, MI, VI), as well as a coupling between the RP amplitude and the respiratory phase. Our findings show that the voluntary initiation of both imagined and overt action is coupled with respiration, and further suggest that the breathing system is involved in preparatory processes of voluntary action by contributing to the temporal decision of when to initiate the action plan, regardless of whether this culminates in overt movements.

Free will is a cornerstone of our society, and psychological research demonstrates that questioning its existence impacts social behavior. In six studies, we tested whether believing in free will is related to the correspondence bias, which reflects people’s automatic tendency to overestimate the influence of internal as compared to external factors when interpreting others’ behavior. All studies demonstrate a positive relationship between the strength of the belief in free will and the correspondence bias. Moreover, in two experimental studies, we showed that weakening participants’ belief in free will leads to a reduction of the correspondence bias. Finally, the last study demonstrates that believing in free will predicts prescribed punishment and reward behavior, and that this relation is mediated by the correspondence bias. Overall, these studies show that believing in free will impacts fundamental social-cognitive processes that are involved in the understanding of others’ behavior.

Most people believe in free will. Whether this belief is warranted or not, free will beliefs (FWB) are foundational for many legal systems and reducing FWB has effects on behavior from the motor to the social level. This raises the important question as to which specific FWB people hold. There are many different ways to conceptualize free will, and some might see physical determinism as a threat that might reduce FWB, while others might not. Here, we investigate lay FWB in a large, representative, replicated online survey study in the US and Singapore (n = 1800), assessing differences in FWB with unprecedented depth within and between cultures. Specifically, we assess the relation of FWB, as measured using the Free Will Inventory, to determinism, dualism and related concepts like libertarianism and compatibilism. We find that libertarian, compatibilist, and dualist, intuitions were related to FWB, but that these intuitions were often logically inconsistent. Importantly, direct comparisons suggest that dualism was more predictive of FWB than other intuitions. Thus, believing in free will goes hand-in-hand with a belief in a non-physical mind. Highlighting the importance of dualism for FWB impacts academic debates on free will, which currently largely focus on its relation to determinism. Our findings also shed light on how recent (neuro)scientific findings might impact FWB. Demonstrating physical determinism in the brain need not have a strong impact on FWB, due to a wide-spread belief in dualism.

Unconscious neural activity has been repeatedly shown to precede and potentially even influence subsequent free decisions. However, to date, such findings have been mostly restricted to simple motor choices, and despite considerable debate, there is no evidence that the outcome of more complex free decisions can be predicted from prior brain signals. Here, we show that the outcome of a free decision to either add or subtract numbers can already be decoded from neural activity in medial prefrontal and parietal cortex 4 s before the participant reports they are consciously making their choice. These choice-predictive signals co-occurred with the so-called default mode brain activity pattern that was still dominant at the time when the choice-predictive signals occurred. Our results suggest that unconscious preparation of free choices is not restricted to motor preparation. Instead, decisions at multiple scales of abstraction evolve from the dynamics of preceding brain activity.

Research in social psychology and experimental philosophy has investigated lay people’s free will beliefs (FWB). Using different approaches (i.e. experimental manipulations and vignette studies), they investigated how FWB relate to other concepts, and whether changing FWB has an impact on downstream processes such as social behavior. However, both approaches have shortcomings. While experimental manipulations used in social psychology suffer from demand effects, vignettes used in experimental philosophy are often highly abstract. Across two pre-registered studies, we developed a new approach by merging them in an online video game setting. Using this novel, experience-based FWB manipulation, we found that decreasing FWB impacted variables such as perceived control and responsibility in both studies. While the experience-based manipulation influenced participants’ beliefs in free will within the context of the experience (“Within the context of the scenario, would the agent believe in free will?”) in the first study, this manipulation effect did not transfer to participants’ general FWB (“Do you believe in free will?”) in the second study. Overall, our findings suggest a way forward in studying laypeople’s beliefs in free will.

Disadvantageous decision-making and impaired volitional control over actions, thoughts, and emotions are characteristics of a wide range of mental disorders such as addiction, eating disorders, depression, and anxiety disorders and may reflect transdiagnostic core mechanisms and possibly vulnerability factors. Elucidating the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms is a precondition for moving from symptom-based to mechanism-based disorder classifications and ultimately mechanism-targeted interventions. However, despite substantial advances in basic research on decision-making and cognitive control, there are still profound gaps in our current understanding of dysfunctions of these processes in mental disorders. Central unresolved questions are: (i) to which degree such dysfunctions reflect transdiagnostic mechanisms or disorder-specific patterns of impairment; (ii) how phenotypical features of mental disorders relate to dysfunctional control parameter settings and aberrant interactions between large-scale brain systems involved in habit and reward-based learning, performance monitoring, emotion regulation, and cognitive control; (iii) whether cognitive control impairments are consequences or antecedent vulnerability factors of mental disorders; (iv) whether they reflect generalized competence impairments or context-specific performance failures; (v) whether not only impaired but also chronic over-control contributes to mental disorders. In the light of these gaps, needs for future research are: (i) an increased focus on basic cognitive-affective mechanisms underlying decision and control dysfunctions across disorders; (ii) longitudinal-prospective studies systematically incorporating theory-driven behavioural tasks and neuroimaging protocols to assess decision-making and control dysfunctions and aberrant interactions between underlying large-scale brain systems; (iii) use of latent-variable models of cognitive control rather than single tasks; (iv) increased focus on the interplay of implicit and explicit cognitive-affective processes; (v) stronger focus on computational models specifying neurocognitive mechanisms underlying phenotypical expressions of mental disorders. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.