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The first international history of the emergence of economic sanctions during the interwar period and the legacy of this development Economic sanctions dominate the landscape of world politics today. First developed in the early twentieth century as a way of exploiting the flows of globalization to defend liberal internationalism, their appeal is that they function as an alternative to war. This view, however, ignores the dark paradox at their core: designed to prevent war, economic sanctions are modeled on devastating techniques of warfare. Tracing the use of economic sanctions from the blockades of World War I to the policing of colonial empires and the interwar confrontation with fascism, Nicholas Mulder uses extensive archival research in a political, economic, legal, and military history that reveals how a coercive wartime tool was adopted as an instrument of peacekeeping by the League of Nations. This timely study casts an overdue light on why sanctions are widely considered a form of war, and why their unintended consequences are so tremendous.

Von März 1918 bis Januar 1920 blockierte die Entente das bolschewistische Russland, um die Revolution zu bekämpfen und die Mittelmächte vom Zugriff auf Russlands Ressourcen abzuschneiden. Die Entente-Mächte scheuten eine großangelegte Invasion. Die schwindende Aussicht auf einen Sieg der „Weißen“ im Bürgerkrieg, die Angst vor deutscher Dominanz und das Marktpotenzial in Russland zwangen die Entente, Ende 1919 die Blockade aufzuheben. Das Britisch-Sowjetische Handelsabkommen 1921 legte die Grundlage für die Wiedereingliederung Sowjet-Russlands in die Weltwirtschaft. In den Autarkiebestrebungen und der Festungsmentalität der Sowjetunion hatte die Blockade eine Nachwirkung. Zur Bestrafung von Aggressoren in Friedenszeiten wurden die Mechanismen der Blockade von 1919 Teil des Völkerrechts. Sie sind der Beginn moderner Wirtschaftssanktionen. From March 1918 to January 1920, the Entente blockaded Bolshevik Russia, in order to fight the revolution and to cut off the Central Powers’ access to Russia’s resources. The powers of the Entente shied away from a full-scale invasion. The dwindling prospects for a “White” victory in the civil war, fear of German dominance, and Russia’s market potential forced the Entente to lift the blockade in late 1919. The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of 1921 laid the groundwork for Soviet Russia’s reintegration into the world economy. The blockade had an after-effect in the Soviet Union’s efforts to achieve autarky and its fortress mentality. The mechanisms of the 1919 blockade became a part of international law as a means for punishing aggressors in peacetime. They are the beginning of modern economic sanctions.

Von März 1918 bis Januar 1920 blockierte die Entente das bolschewistische Russland, um die Revolution zu bekämpfen und die Mittelmächte vom Zugriff auf Russlands Ressourcen abzuschneiden. Die Entente-Mächte scheuten eine großangelegte Invasion. Die schwindende Aussicht auf einen Sieg der „Weißen“ im Bürgerkrieg, die Angst vor deutscher Dominanz und das Marktpotenzial in Russland zwangen die Entente, Ende 1919 die Blockade aufzuheben. Das Britisch-Sowjetische Handelsabkommen 1921 legte die Grundlage für die Wiedereingliederung Sowjet-Russlands in die Weltwirtschaft. In den Autarkiebestrebungen und der Festungsmentalität der Sowjetunion hatte die Blockade eine Nachwirkung. Zur Bestrafung von Aggressoren in Friedenszeiten wurden die Mechanismen der Blockade von 1919 Teil des Völkerrechts. Sie sind der Beginn moderner Wirtschaftssanktionen. From March 1918 to January 1920, the Entente blockaded Bolshevik Russia, in order to fight the revolution and to cut off the Central Powers’ access to Russia’s resources. The powers of the Entente shied away from a full-scale invasion. The dwindling prospects for a “White” victory in the civil war, fear of German dominance, and Russia’s market potential forced the Entente to lift the blockade in late 1919. The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of 1921 laid the groundwork for Soviet Russia’s reintegration into the world economy. The blockade had an after-effect in the Soviet Union’s efforts to achieve autarky and its fortress mentality. The mechanisms of the 1919 blockade became a part of international law as a means for punishing aggressors in peacetime. They are the beginning of modern economic sanctions.

Sanctions as War is the first critical analysis of economic sanctions from a global perspective. Featuring case studies from 11 sanctioned countries and theoretical essays, it will be of immediate interest to those interested in understanding how sanctions became the common sense of American foreign policy.

Economic sanctions: panacea, symbolic but ineffectual, or useless and counterproductive? While these questions have framed much the existing debate, Drury digs deeper to why foreign policy leaders, and especially the president, choose sanctions, of which type, whether to sustain them, and when to terminate them. Skilfully integrating domestic and international factors, and placing the analysis of sanctions directly into the mainstream of strategic studies and decision theory, this book breaks new ground with its innovative argument and thorough testing using a variety of databases.

Sanctions are back with a vengeance, with new objectives, measures, challenges, and opportunities. Shaping the thinking of generations of scholars, Canadian Margaret Doxey anticipated and analyzed these issues. Multilateral Sanctions Revisited applies her lessons to the many multilateral sanctions that define our geopolitically contested world.

1. A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft 16. - 2. American Economic Incentives to Jordan, 1993-94 37. - 3. International Incentives to Hungary and Romania after the Cold War 50. - 4. Japanese Economic Incentives and the Northern Territories Dispute, 1985-1999 65. - 5. Threatened Arab League Sanctions against Canada in 1979 87. - 6. Indian Sanctions against Nepal, 1988-1990 99. - 7. Economic Sanctions against South Africa, 1978-1994 113. - 8. Economic Statecraft and Target State Calculations: Conclusions and Implications 135

As trade flows expanded and trade agreements proliferated after World War II, governments-most notably the United States-came increasingly to use their power over imports and exports to influence the behavior of other countries. But trade is not the only way in which nations interact economically. Over the past two decades, another form of economic exchange has risen to a level of vastly greater significance and political concern: the purchase and sale of financial assets across borders. Nearly $2 trillion worth of currency now moves cross-border every day, roughly 90 percent of which is accounted for by financial flows unrelated to trade in goods and services-a stunning inversion of the figures in 1970. The time is ripe to ask fundamental questions about what Benn Steil and Robert Litan have coined as \"financial statecraft,\" or those aspects of economic statecraft directed at influencing international capital flows. How precisely has the American government practiced financial statecraft? How effective have these efforts been? And how can they be made more effective? The authors provide penetrating and incisive answers in this timely and stimulating book.

Powerful countries like the United States regularly employ economic sanctions as a tool for promoting their foreign policy interests. Yet this foreign policy tool has an uninspiring track record of success, with economic sanctions achieving their goals less than a third of the time they are imposed. The costs of these failed sanctions policies can be significant for the states that impose them, their targets, and the other countries they affect. Explaining economic sanctions' high failure rate therefore constitutes a vital endeavor for academics and policy-makers alike. Busted Sanctions seeks to provide this explanation, and reveals that the primary cause of this failure is third-party spoilers, or sanctions busters, who undercut sanctioning efforts by providing their targets with extensive foreign aid or sanctions-busting trade. In quantitatively and qualitatively analyzing over 60 years of U.S. economic sanctions, Bryan Early reveals that both types of third-party sanctions busters have played a major role in undermining U.S. economic sanctions. Surprisingly, his analysis also reveals that the United States' closest allies are often its sanctions' worst enemies. The book offers the first comprehensive explanation for why different types of sanctions busting occur and reveals the devastating effects it has on economic sanctions' chances of success.