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result(s) for
"World Trade Organization Membership"
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China 2002
by
Garnaut, Ross
in
Economics
,
Economics, Finance, Business and Management
,
International economics
2012
In 2002 China enters the WTO. Long awaited by the world's trading economies, it now comes in a year of global recession. What effect will China's entry into the WTO have at a difficult time? The rapid expansion of China's trade has required large adjustment in its trading partners, and the expansion and adjustment will accelerate with WTO entry. The internal adjustment pressures in China from WTO entry are also immense. Recently dubbed Australia's Ambassador to the region by Rowan Callick of the Financial Review, Ross Garnaut was Australia's ambassador to China through an earlier exciting period when China took its first major steps towards opening to international trade and investment. He was instrumental in the development of China's thinking about the WTO. Ross Garnaut is Chairman of the China Economy and Business Program at The Australian National University. Australian members of the Program and their associates gather each year for the China Update. Ligang Song is leading authority on the internationalisation of the Chinese economy and on the development of the private sector in China. He has worked at Peking University and People's University in Beijing and at the International University in Tokyo.
China 2002
2012
In 2002 China enters the WTO. Long awaited by the world's trading economies, it now comes in a year of global recession. What effect will China's entry into the WTO have at a difficult time? The rapid expansion of China's trade has required large adjustment in its trading partners, and the expansion and adjustment will accelerate with WTO entry. The internal adjustment pressures in China from WTO entry are also immense. Recently dubbed Australia's Ambassador to the region by Rowan Callick of the Financial Review, Ross Garnaut was Australia's ambassador to China through an earlier exciting period when China took its first major steps towards opening to international trade and investment. He was instrumental in the development of China's thinking about the WTO. Ross Garnaut is Chairman of the China Economy and Business Program at The Australian National University. Australian members of the Program and their associates gather each year for the China Update. Ligang Song is leading authority on the internationalisation of the Chinese economy and on the development of the private sector in China. He has worked at Peking University and People's University in Beijing and at the International University in Tokyo.
China and the World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond
2008,2007
The process of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is an object lesson in China’s relationship to international society. Accession can be viewed through different lenses. One lens looks at China’s specific performance in which accession is viewed as a contract and therefore is evaluated on evidence of specific compliance or derogations. Another lens views WTO accession as part of China’s integration process into global regimes and assesses how China’s accession redirects its domestic policies toward the norms and constraints embedded in the WTO regime. The first approach sees the WTO regime as a pattern and matches the regime against the outlines of China’s current policy and law. 4 The second approach sees WTO accession as riding a trajectory of conformity with international regimes and compares the commitments under the accession agreements with China’s past governance practices.5 The latter does not ask “to what extent does China comply?” but “what has changed?” and “how do the changes mandated by the WTO reorient Chinese governance on a sustainable course of market opening and adherence to international norms?”
Book Chapter
Hello, goodbye: When do states withdraw from international organizations?
2019
Under what conditions do states withdraw from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)? Recent events such as Brexit, the US withdrawal from UNESCO, and US threats to withdraw from NAFTA, NATO, and the World Trade Organization have triggered widespread concern because they appear to signify a backlash against international organizations. Some observers attribute this recent surge to increasing nationalism. But does this explanation hold up as a more general explanation for IGO withdrawals across time and space? Despite many studies of why states join IGOs, we know surprisingly little about when and why states exit IGOs. We use research on IGO accession to derive potential explanations for IGO withdrawal related to domestic politics, IGO characteristics, and geo-politics. We quantitatively test these potential explanations for withdrawal using an original dataset of 493 IGOs since 1945, documenting about 200 cases of withdrawal. We find that nationalism is not the key driver of IGO withdrawals in the past. Instead, we show that geo-political factors – such as preference divergence and contagion – are the main factors linked to IGO withdrawals, followed by democracy levels in the country and organization. These findings have important implications for research on the vitality of international organizations, compliance, and the liberal world order.
Journal Article
International Institutions and the Volatility of International Trade
2008
During the past half-century, states have established a large number of international trade institutions, both multilateral and regional in scope. The existing literature on this topic emphasizes that these agreements are chiefly designed to liberalize and increase the flow of overseas commerce. Yet such institutions have another function that has been largely ignored by researchers, namely, reducing volatility in trade policy and trade flows. Exposure to global markets increases the vulnerability of a country's output to terms of trade shocks. Governments seek to insulate their economies from such instability through membership in international trade institutions, particularly the World Trade Organization (WTO) and preferential trading arrangements (PTAs). We hypothesize that these institutions reduce the volatility of overseas commerce. We further hypothesize that, because market actors prefer price stability, trade institutions increase the volume of foreign commerce by reducing trade variability. This article conducts the first large-scale, multivariate statistical tests of these two hypotheses, using annual data on exports for all pairs of countries from 1951 through 2001. The tests provide strong support for our arguments. PTAs and the WTO regime significantly reduce export volatility. In so doing, these institutions also increase export levels.
Journal Article
Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade
2007
Preferential trade agreements offer members an alternative to dispute settlement at the World Trade Organization. This gives rise to forum shopping, in that complainants can file regionally, multilaterally, or not at all. What explains this choice of forum? I argue that complainants strategically discriminate among overlapping memberships: on a given measure(s), some prefer to set a precedent that bears only on a subset of their trade relations, others a precedent that bears on all their trade relations, while still others prefer not to set a precedent. Thus, the key to forum shopping is not simply which institution is likely to come closest to the complainant's ideal ruling against the defendant, but where the resulting precedent will be more useful in the future, enabling the complainant to bring litigation against other members, rather than helping other members bring litigation against the complainant. I consider disputes over Mexican brooms and Canadian periodicals.For comments, I thank Vinod Aggarwal, Raj Bhala, Jane Bradley, Bill Davey, Rob Howse, Miles Kahler, Simon Lester, Rod Ludema, Ed Mansfield, Lisa Martin, Petros C. Mavroidis, John Odell, Joost Pauwelyn, Amy Porges, Eric Reinhardt, Peter Rosendorff, Ken Scheve, Ed Schwartz, Christina Sevilla, Michael Simon, Jay Smith, Debra Steger, Joel Trachtman, Todd Weiler, seminar participants in the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security (PIPES) at the University of Chicago, and two anonymous referees. All shortcomings are, of course, my own. For research support, I thank the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. For research assistance, I thank Alex Muggah, Krzysztof Pelc, and Scott Winter.
Journal Article