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"World War, 1939-1945 -- Deception -- United States"
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Deceit on the Road to War
In Deceit on the Road to War , John M. Schuessler
examines how U.S. presidents have deceived the American public
about fundamental decisions of war and peace. Deception has been
deliberate, he suggests, as presidents have sought to shift blame
for war onto others in some cases and oversell its benefits in
others. Such deceit is a natural outgrowth of the democratic
process, in Schuessler's view, because elected leaders have
powerful incentives to maximize domestic support for war and retain
considerable ability to manipulate domestic audiences. They can
exploit information and propaganda advantages to frame issues in
misleading ways, cherry-pick supporting evidence, suppress damaging
revelations, and otherwise skew the public debate to their benefit.
These tactics are particularly effective before the outbreak of
war, when the information gap between leaders and the public is
greatest.
When resorting to deception, leaders take a calculated risk that
the outcome of war will be favorable, expecting the public to adopt
a forgiving attitude after victory is secured. The three cases
featured in the book-Franklin Roosevelt and World War II, Lyndon
Johnson and the Vietnam War, and George W. Bush and the Iraq
War-test these claims. Schuessler concludes that democracies are
not as constrained in their ability to go to war as we might
believe and that deception cannot be ruled out in all cases as
contrary to the national interest.
In Deceit on the Road to War , John M. Schuessler
examines how U.S. presidents have deceived the American public
about fundamental decisions of war and peace. Deception has been
deliberate, he suggests, as presidents have sought to shift blame
for war onto others in some cases and oversell its benefits in
others. Such deceit is a natural outgrowth of the democratic
process, in Schuessler's view, because elected leaders have
powerful incentives to maximize domestic support for war and retain
considerable ability to manipulate domestic audiences. They can
exploit information and propaganda advantages to frame issues in
misleading ways, cherry-pick supporting evidence, suppress damaging
revelations, and otherwise skew the public debate to their benefit.
These tactics are particularly effective before the outbreak of
war, when the information gap between leaders and the public is
greatest.When resorting to deception, leaders take a calculated
risk that the outcome of war will be favorable, expecting the
public to adopt a forgiving attitude after victory is secured. The
three cases featured in the book-Franklin Roosevelt and World War
II, Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War, and George W. Bush and the
Iraq War-test these claims. Schuessler concludes that democracies
are not as constrained in their ability to go to war as we might
believe and that deception cannot be ruled out in all cases as
contrary to the national interest.
eBook
Selling Schweinfurt
A common theme of airpower histories is that the Combined Bomber Offensive was the proving ground for a post-war independent air force. Whether or not the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) could perform to the hype of its interwar doctrine, Allied commanders based their rival approaches to victory in Europe on their differing views of independent airpower. However, there is an essential, yet overlooked facet to this story: commanders' convictions alone could not hold sway within the War Department, much less at the politically and bureaucratically charged meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The air commanders pressed their staffs for decision-quality assessments and photographic evidence to sell their arguments and project their progress. They needed informed targeting plans and objective post-raid reports as well as an air-intelligence enterprise to mature all-too-quickly out of interwar neglect. What they received-and Brian Vlaun explains-was a collision of organizational interests and leadership personalities that shaped Ira Eaker's command of the Eighth Air Force in 1943, the tumultuous air campaign over Germany, and the path of the post-war U.S. Air Force. As a result of the author's research through thousands of declassified files, Selling Schweinfurt examines the relationships between air-intelligence organizations and key decision-makers. His analysis spans from pre-war planning and doctrine development, through the Eighth Air Force's independent air campaign, and culminates with the formation of the United States Strategic Air Forces and its 1944 pre-invasion preparations. This book concludes that military organizations, if left unchecked, may adopt symbols and exaggerate claims to justify their own preferences and market their ideas in ways that mask their optimistic assumptions. In the case of the air campaign against Germany, both the four-engine bomber and specialized targets-like Schweinfurt's ball bearings-served as symbols and powerful marketing tools for the AAF and air intelligence, respectively.
eBook
Secret agents! Sharks! Ghost armies! : secrets of American history : World War II
\"Discover the secret tactics Americans used to win World War II in this [reader]\"--Amazon.com.
Book
Untold. The Ghost Army
The WWII 23rd Headquarters Special Troops – otherwise known as the Ghost Army – was a top secret tactical deception unit deployed by the US Army during the Second World War to fool the enemy by any means necessary.
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