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This solicitous attitude on behalf of Russia's main boss towards the Internal Troops was already in no doubt earlier: The Russian authorities regard the \"internal enemy\" as much more dangerous than the \"external enemy\" and prepare purposefully to wage war on their own people. But now the appointment of [Viktor Zolotov] to the post of chief organizer and, in the future, commander of the Presidential Guard introduces new aspects to this story. Whilst having a large number of general's stars, he has always been involved in only one thing: the protection or \"bodyguarding\" of a specific individual, be it Boris Yeltsin, Anatoliy Sobchak, or for the past 15 years or so, Vladimir Putin. And now full mechanized units and formations of the MVD Internal Troops are to come under Viktor Zolotov's command. In the USSR, they emerged in the mid-1960s as a belated reaction to the events in Novocherkassk [the 1962 food riots]. Although it is officially stated that their main task is to \"maintain public order\" first and foremost at mass events, in practice they exist to suppress unrest, if, God forbid, it should break out. These formations are stationed in 46 cities in 44 components of the Russian Federation, including nine cities with a population of over a million.

The only \"civilian\" reshuffle was the change in the governor of Krasnoyarsk Kray. Lev Kuznetsov, who has long been tipped for retirement, but who nevertheless has not yet left service and heads the new North Caucasus Development Ministry, was replaced by Viktor Tolokonskiy. Lately his position as presidential plenipotentiary representative in the Siberian Federal District had been seen shaky. This was in connection with his active involvement in public disputes within the elites in Novosibirsk Oblast, which the Kremlin is putting a firm stop to in the current tense political climate. In the end Tolokonskiy's serious standoff with Vasiliy Yurchenko, who replaced Tolokonskiy as Novosibirsk governor in 2010, led to Yurchenko's dismissal due to \"loss of confidence\" in him, but contributed to the defeat of the United Russia candidate and the victory of communist Anatoliy Lokot in April's Novosibirsk mayoral elections. It seems that for the Kremlin this was the deciding argument in favour of Tolokonskiy's removal from the post of plenipotentiary representative, and just at that point a vacancy had opened up for the head of Krasnoyarsk region. Finally, the post of head of the Interior Ministry's Chief Directorate for Economic Security and Countering Corruption (GUEBiPK) has gone to Dmitriy Mironov, who was simultaneously awarded the rank of police major-general. Public attention has been focused on the GUEBiPK in recent months because of a high-profile scandal, which saw the dismissal and subsequent arrest a few days later of the former directorate head Denis Sugrobov (and before this his deputy General Boris Kolesnikov, and a number of his other subordinates). The directorate's former leadership are accused of organizing a criminal conspiracy, encouraging the offering of bribes, and abuse of office. Observers link this scandal to the institutional conflict between the Interior Ministry and the FSB [Federal Security Service]. New GUEBiPK head Dmitriy Mironov had not served in the Interior Ministry system until recently, and worked for the FSO. On 18 February, the day following Sugrobov's dismissal, by presidential decree he was appointed first deputy head of the Interior Ministry's Chief Criminal Investigation Directorate, and now head of the Chief Directorate for Economic Security and Countering Corruption. Clearly President [Vladimir Putin] decided that only a former employee of the security agency that is the most reliable and the closest to himself could enable the \"recovery\" of the situation inside the GUEBiPK.

The challenge stirred scorn and ridicule, until the presidential spokesman welcomed the suggestion and Parliament moved to legalize dueling.

[Putin] announced that he had agreed to be number one on One Russia's federal electoral list. \"What is really important is that he is on his own, without numbers two and three,\" [Yevgeniy Kiselev] said. \"This means that voting at the parliamentary election will turn into a referendum of confidence in the incumbent president. In other words, it will be Putin's covert election for a third term.\" His studio guest, [Stanislav Belkovskiy], said, on the other hand, that he did not believe that Putin would become prime minister. \"There are no indications for this,\" he said. He added that the main argument against this scenario was the fact that \"over recent months Putin has been reducing the government's powers; many of the government's functions have been moved to state corporations\". Asked who was in this network, Belkovskiy replied: \"Above all, his business partners and their joint financial interests.\" Among Putin's \"business partners\" Belkovskiy named deputy head of the presidential administration Igor Sechin, businessman Gennadiy Timchenko, nicknamed \"the Kremlin's cashier\", and oligarch Roman Abramovich, as well as \"many other people with whom the president has been linked by years of joint businesses and billions of dollars\".