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Over the past decade a new form of philanthropy has emerged, termed 'philanthrocapitalism'. Champions of philanthrocapitalism suggest that private giving can fill the void left by diminished government spending on social and development programmes. Critics suggest that philanthropy is no substitute for strong governmental support for social welfare. Both arguments perpetuate a dichotomy between the public and the private, implying that philanthrocapitalism operates in a vacuum largely divorced from governmental interventions. In this article I challenge that assumption, exploring how new philanthropic initiatives have compelled increased financial support from governments toward the private sector. Drawing on three cases - advanced market commitments (amcs) in drug development; impact investing; and direct philanthropic and governmental grants to corporate entities - I illustrate the ways that governments remain one of the most powerful - if not the most powerful - philanthropic actors in the philanthrocapitalist turn.

The costs of developing and producing new-generation vaccines have increased compared to many of the older, “traditional” vaccines because of new technologies and regulatory requirements. While the public sector often supports basic research costs, private manufacturers are usually responsible for the investments in product development and production scale-up. When considering investments, firms evaluate the probability of a market. Unfortunately, the developing country vaccine market is small (in revenue terms) and often unpredictable, particularly given inaccurate forecasting in the past. Low-income developing countries expect low prices. Demand (actual decisions to pay for and introduce the vaccine) is almost always lower than need (estimates of requirements to achieve optimal public health outcomes), a distinction that may be even more significant for HPV vaccines given the number of new vaccines against priority diseases that will become available over the coming 5 years. One new mechanism under consideration to address some of these challenges is Advanced Market Commitments (AMCs). By providing an assured price subsidy for developing country purchase of a future vaccine meeting predefined standards, an AMC would provide industry with greater assurances of earning a reasonable return on their investment to serve the poorest developing countries. The AMC mechanism could provide critical motivation for increased industry (private) investment that would otherwise not occur. HPV vaccines are one of six vaccines being considered for a possible AMC pilot.

One out of every three dollars invested abroad in 2012 was originated in multinationals from developing countries. This study sheds light on the characteristics, motivations, strategies, and needs of emerging market investors. By including information on investors, potential investors, and non-investors, the study identifies differentiating factors among them that are associated with investment decisions. Results show that emerging market investors are active players in international trade markets; they operate predominantly in manufacturing, and are publicly listed and larger than non-investors. They exhibit a strong regional bias: they invest more heavily in neighbors and in other countries in their own regions. Outward FDI from emerging markets is primarily market-seeking. Expanding regional and host markets emerged as the most important factor influencing the location of investments. However, emerging markets' firms face binding costs of investing in distant, culturally dissimilar markets, resulting, in practice in a trade-off between market size and market familiarity. Transaction costs associated with geographical and cultural differences have a greater impact on services sector firms that exhibit a stronger regional bias. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) partly offset these costs associated with investing in faraway and/or unfamiliar markets. In addition, international trade agreements increase the perceived attractiveness of a host country to potential investors. Political factors constitute binding constraints that deter emerging markets' firms from investing in developing markets. Yet, investors value political stability and transparency more than corruption control, fair and regular elections, and risk of expropriation in the host country. IPAs play only a marginal role in raising awareness of investment opportunities in developing countries, and may be particularly ineffective in many African countries. Nevertheless, IPAs appear to be a widely used and useful resource for investors once they have made the decision to enter a specific market. IPA services tend to be more valuable for smaller and less productive firms. Overall, the new TNCs from emerging economies do not appear to differ dramatically from their predecessors from developed and developing countries in previous waves of OFDI. Results suggest that to attract FDI from emerging economies, countries need to maintain market-friendly, liberal trade and investment policies. In addition, joining international trade and investment agreements can be benefitial to reduce transaction costs associated with cross border investment. Countries also need to provide a stable and predictable political and institutional environment. Last and not least, it is important to revamp IPAs and increase their effectiveness in raising awareness of investment opportunities and meeting investors' needs.

The global economic crisis that began in 2008 threatened to erase years of progress in developing countries. In response, the World Bank Group increased lending to unprecedented levels. The World Bank posted a large increase in middle income countries (MICs), and a much smaller one in low income countries (LICs). The International Finance Corporation (IFC) focused on trade finance, mainly in LICs. Its new business initially fell in MICs, rebounding only in late fiscal 2010. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) concentrated on guarantees in Eastern Europe. Analytic and advisory work helped inform government and private sector responses to the crisis. This report presents an initial real-time evaluation of the readiness, relevance, quality-at-entry, short-term results, and likely sustainability of the Bank Group response from the start of the crisis through fiscal 2010. This evaluation builds on a 2008 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) assessment of Bank Group interventions during past crises and draws extensively on 11 country case studies and field visits. Given the short time since the crisis response started, the evaluation is geared more to raising flags than to presenting definitive conclusions.