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A well-known approach to modeling international relations treats them as a two-level game played by national governments and international organizations, in which they negotiate with one another while coping with internal constraints on their action posed by domestic politics or organizational governance. Officials in these organizations can play a different two-level game, arising from their simultaneous negotiations within their personal transnational networks and their official duties in their host organizations. In each domain, they can act in ways that improves their outcomes in the other one - informal understandings facilitate subsequent formal agreement, while actions taken within their organizations implement and cement what had been negotiated informally. Multi-organizational innovation can thus be coordinated even in the absence of formal action to do so. This process is illustrated through an examination of the role of an informal transnational network in the shifting of the policies of the government of India and major aid donors in the 1960s.

Different theories about the impact of aid make distinct predictions about citizens’ attitudes toward foreign aid in recipient countries. We investigate their preferences toward aid and government projects in order to examine these different theories. Are citizens indifferent between development projects funded by their own government versus those funded by foreign aid donors, as aid capture theory suggests? To address this, in an experiment on a large, representative sample of Ugandan citizens, we randomly assigned the names of funding groups for actual forthcoming development projects and invited citizens to express support attitudinally and behaviorally. We find that citizens are significantly more willing to show behavioral support in favor of foreign aid projects compared to government programs, especially if they already perceive the government as corrupt or clientelist or if they are not supporters of the ruling party. They also trust donors more, think they are more effective, and do not consistently oppose aid conditionality. This experimental evidence is consistent with a theory that we call donor control which sees donors asbeing able to target and condition aid so that it is not fungible with government revenues and thus to be able to better direct it to meet citizens’ needs.

Purpose This study aims to examine how aid for trade policy and regulations (AfTPR) contribute to achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target 8.1 (sustain per capita economic growth) and whether the effectiveness of AfTPR is conditional to the stable political environment. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses a widely accepted endogenous growth framework and applies panel data fixed effects and two-step difference and system generalized method of moments estimation strategies on panel data of 50 developing countries over 2005–2017. Findings The findings of the study confirm that aid to trade policy promotes sustainable economic growth in developing countries, but this category of development assistance is only effective and significant for low and lower middle-income (LLMI) economies. The positive and significant effect of AfTPR in upper middle-income countries is conditional to their level of political stability. Under a stable political situation, the positive effect of AfTPR on sustainable growth remains almost same for the LLMI countries, whereas for the upper middle-income countries this growth effect reached almost double. Research limitations/implications International trade is considered as a driver for inclusive and sustainable economic growth, whereas aid for trade is acknowledged for its prospective contribution toward achieving these goals. The findings have dominant policy implications for the international development organizations and donors, which recommend that it is more desirable to transmit aid toward developing and implementing trade policy and regulations as per capita economic growth improves in the aid recipient countries. Originality/value According to the authors’ knowledge, no prior study empirically analyzes the effect of AfTPRs on SDG target 8.1.

The stakes are high for tropical forestlands in multi-actor power relations because of their interdependence (climate change mitigation), their above- and below-ground resources (wood, mines) and their arable lands. In tropical countries, where the State owns most of the forestlands, many governments feel that any external initiative to change their forestland use policies infringes on their sovereignty. The governments' reactions to pressure for forestland governance reforms advocated by the international community may reflect the level of their national strength, international credibility and the attractiveness of offsets for forestland use conversion. Governments either use a tactic based on strength or on cunning, in the Machiavellian sense of the term, to impose their domestic agenda. Referring to the two last decades of forestland use policy reforms in Cameroon, this article seeks to understand why and how some governments of developing countries like Cameroon use cunning strategies to circumvent the implementation of undesired forest policy reforms while avoiding blame from the international community.

As a way of deepening democracy, the European Union (EU) has dedicated substantial financial and technical assistance to Cameroon's civil society and election process. More than two decades after the adoption of multipartism, there is, however, the lack of a credible institutional framework for democratization in the country. This analysis of mainly primary sources draws on donor-recipient relations theory to provide a critical assessment of the EU's aid to the democratization process in Cameroon. The article argues that the overemphasis on elections as a catalyst for orchestrating broader changes has instead given the Yaounde regime room to maneuver by failing to genuinely embrace democratization. Besides the worrying lack of institutional reforms, weaknesses embedded in the EU's aid architecture and its member state's self-interests have significantly compromised the effectiveness of its development assistance program in Cameroon and most of the Third World. The study suggests that the EU should recognize elections as a multifaceted process involving a complex cycle of myriad events and legal, technical, and organizational processes.

Nowhere is China’s aid program both more important and yet less understood than with North Korea. This article examines two puzzles: China’s aid to North Korea coexists with a discriminatory trading relationship, and China continues to provide aid even as it tightens economic sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear program.

Martha Nussbaum raised profound concerns about aid as being conceived out of the self-directed charity of donors and not the expressed concerns of those being aided. Even when the recipients of aid seek to express their concerns, their capabilities may not recognise their own conditions and desirable remedies. This paper agrees that Nussbaum's questions are profound, but argues that even they do not go far enough.

Does aid conditionality—the setting of policy goals in exchange for access to aid—promote reform? Many studies on the impact of aid and reform suggest not. However, few explicitly examine whether the impact of aid on reform is mediated by recipient regime type. I argue that conditional aid is effective but its efficacy depends on recipient countries’ level of democracy because the value of aid to governments depends on the degree to which it helps them maintain power, and recent work shows that the marginal impact of aid on political survival increases with level of democracy. I test this argument on data from 68 countries over the period from 1980 to 1999. I focus on the impact of IMF and World Bank aid on fiscal reform, one of the most commonly stipulated conditions in aid-for-policy arrangements. I find that aid from the Bretton Woods institutions promotes fiscal reform, but only in more democratic countries.

In development practice, how does 'mutual benefit' accrue, and to whom? China criticises America for perpetuating capitalist power relations and claims it can seek a new geopolitical order based on South-South cooperation. Meanwhile, there has been an extraordinary shift of emphasis towards the private sector as a driver of development, but this shift is attracting increasing criticism. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) - the only development agency to grow in influence under the Trump administration - is evaluated in the light of these two key themes. Neither China nor the private sector is successful in achieving 'mutual benefit' for ordinary citizens - both replicate existing power inequalities. As with the rise of both China and the private sector, the MCC also enmeshes developing countries further into the existing neoliberal capitalist structures. However, the advantages of the agency should not be dismissed outright, as its Ruling Justly and Investing in People indicators can enhance the capacity of citizens to challenge these power structures themselves.

Anarchy and war reigning throughout Africa threaten to bring about a \"failed\" continent. This article, on the contrary, argues that to understand the evolution of African state systems, political order should be defined as a conflict mediation institution and process. Through a quantitative analysis, this paper challenges Charles Tilly's notion that interstate war helps build states and challenges the idea that foreign support retards state building. Democracy, and a complex three-dimensional relationship between intrastate war, political order, and foreign support, on the other hand, can have a positive impact on state strength.