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Contemporary scholars share a common vision of the phenomenon of autocephaly as a virtue empowering a local Orthodox church independently to elect its supreme hierarch and run its domestic affairs without the endorsement of another church leader. While the academic discussion on this subject is concentrated on the canonical and theological aspects of autocephaly, the presented study shifts the focus to the involvement of civil authorities in the promotion and abolishment of this ecclesiastical status. It challenges the conventional perception of such interventions as something incidental or a feature of particular political formations. It aims to reveal that civil authorities have been a constant factor in the establishment of new autocephalies since the recognition of Christianity as an official religion in the Roman Empire. For this purpose, the focus falls on the Chalcedonian Eastern Orthodox churches which have centuries-old traditions in autocephaly-related practices from the Edict of Milan (313) to the end of the Cold War. It also takes into account the different legal frameworks within which civil authorities used to validate new autocephalies. On the grounds of this analysis, the concluding remarks reflect on the impact of this experience on the autocephaly-building process in post-atheist areas.

The relevance of this study is explained by the necessity of reviewing the historical framework of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as an important component of the socio-cultural life of Ukraine, as well as by considering further prospects of its development on the way to full canonical reunification of all existing Orthodox churches of Ukraine, namely the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The purpose of this study is to study the prospects of further development of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the context of homogenization of its cultural and spiritual space. This article presents the main historical moments of the development and strengthening of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the socio-cultural space. The importance of the existence of the autocephalous cathedral of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as a guarantee of the preservation of the state and awakening of the national consciousness of Ukrainians, as well as the elimination of Russian political narratives, which are broadcast through the UOC-MP, is outlined.

Drawing upon social, political, and ethical theory, as well as church history and ecclesiology, this essay begins with a brief discussion of the origins of phyletism within the history of the Church, implicating a failure to adequately recognize the importance culture plays in communal identity as holding responsibility for the emergence of phyletism. I will highlight the influence of geopolitical circumstances on the origins and development of the jurisdictional structure of the episcopate, and then examine the principle of territoriality as it relates to the ecclesial status of autocephaly within the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church, arguing that despite its canonicity, this principle ought to be understood as pragmatic rather than dogmatic. Subsequently, I will place Orthodoxy in dialogue with insights from contemporary analyses of globalization and multiculturalism as a means of better enabling Orthodox Christianity to come to terms with its own internal cultural diversity and position within global society. Finally, I will suggest ways in which the Church may begin to formulate and enact a form of Orthodox Christian multiculturalism.

The paper examines the role of religious narratives in the on-going Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The literature on religious nationalism offers several ways in which religion plays a role in national identity narratives. The strong connection between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Russian state have been well-known. The narrative of the “chosen” nation and “third Rome” have fueled Russian neo-imperial national discourse of Russkii Mir (Russian World) which shapes Russian Foreign Policy in the “near abroad”. The Church is used as tool to shape and disseminate these narratives, as a means for justification of Russian aggression in Ukraine. This paper seeks to analyze the role of the religious narratives of Russia neo-colonial and post-colonial nationalism in Ukraine. It argues that Ukrainian religious nationalism, should it develop, will do so in response to the Russian actions driven by the ideological religious narrative. President Poroshenko’s decision to support the recognition of an autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) in 2018 was a valiant effort to aid in the construction of Ukraine’s anti-colonial religious national narrative. Prior to the Russian invasion, there seemed to be relatively weak public support for the religious nationalist narrative in Ukraine. The evidence shows that commitment to religious pluralism continues to be prevalent in Ukrainian society.

In this paper, the author makes a strong case against the de-separation of state and Orthodox Church in Romania, especially in the political discourse. The religious discourse has been used by politicians to attack non-orthodox political enemies, while the church increased its influence in key political institutions, demanding more and more privileges, in the name of the symphony between church and state and of the autocephaly of the Romanian Orthodox Church. This paper deconstructs the concept of symphony and autocephaly and argues that their use in the political discourse goes far beyond their original meaning. The church uses these and similar concepts to engage a modern communicative interaction with the political and the public sphere using classical lobby but also new social media, besieging the public discourse, with the benefit of a large acceptance of theologically and democratically problematic ideas.

The attainment of autocephaly by the Orthodox Church of Ukraine intensified the religious transitions of parishes that were preceded by individual parishioners’ switches. The highest dynamics of such transitions occurred in the Volyn Region in the north-western part of Ukraine. These transitions refer exclusively to a switch from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine without affecting other religious communities. Most of the population supported the autocephalous status of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, for they consider granting autocephaly as a major historical event for the Ukrainian nation. The process of active religious transitions was primarily determined by the aptness of each parish community and political climate on a national level. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine was able to maintain its high regard, but with the change of political power in Ukraine in 2019, it lost political support. The process of religious transitions dwindled.

This article analyses the establishment of the autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine. It explains the main steps that were taken in Ukraine towards obtaining autocephaly for the Orthodox Church, namely for two non-canonical groups - 'Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church' and 'Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kiev Patriarchate', which formally merged in December 2018. A special attention is devoted to the analysis of the events in 2018, starting from the April 2018 request of the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, addressed to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomeos. I argue that the move towards autocephaly was dictated primarily by politico-ideological reasons and was accompanied by the rise of confrontation and a lack of cooperation. The majority of Orthodox, belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), opposed this process, which made them the subject of intimidation campaigns. It appears that in Ukraine there is an ongoing process of constructing a \"radical other\", and much effort is being devoted to making the Ukrainian Orthodox Church this \"radical other\", since the actions of this Church have been often interpreted in the most negative ways. Overall, the move towards autocephaly, instead of uniting Ukrainians, has brought about new dividing lines in Ukraine and has contributed to the split in global Orthodoxy.

The Orthodox concept of autocephaly, a formerly organizational and administrative measure, has been a powerful nation-building tool since the 19th century. While autocephaly could be granted—from the perspective of the Orthodox canon law—in an orderly fashion, it was often the case that a unilateral, non-canonical way towards autocephaly was sought. This usually took place when the state actors, often non-Orthodox, intervened during the nation-building process. We investigated the effects of unilateral declarations of autocephaly (through a schism) by comparing Bulgarian, Northern Macedonian, and Montenegrin examples. We contend that the best success chances are to be expected by the ecclesiastic body that is less willing to make major transgressions of the canon law, than to radicalize the situation after the initial move. This is mostly because autocephaly’s recognition requires a global acceptance within the circle of the already autocephalous churches. We also suggest that the strong political backing of the autocephaly movement can paradoxically have a negative impact on its ultimate success, as it can prolong the initial separation phase of the schism and prevent or postpone the healing phase, and with it, the fully fledged autocephaly.

Die Russische Orthodoxe Kirche hat im Jahr 2019 einen bedeutenden Kurswechsel in ihrer Weltpolitik vollzogen. Nachdem das Ökumenische Patriarchat von Konstantinopel der neugegründeten Orthodoxen Kirche der Ukraine gegen den Willen des Moskauer Patriarchats die Autokephalie verliehen hat, ist Moskau auf Konfrontationskurs gegangen. Die mit Abstand größte der 14 unabhängigen orthodoxen Kirchen sieht sich nun als globale Kirche in Konkurrenz zu dem griechisch geprägten Konstantinopler Patriarchat. In diesem Wettbewerb verzichtet die ROK nicht nur auf das Konzept der Russischen Welt, sondern sagt sich faktisch sogar von den griechischen Wurzeln los. 2019 marked a significant change of tack for the Russian Orthodox Church with regard to its global policy. After the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople granted autocephalous status to the newly founded Orthodox Church of Ukraine, against the will of the Moscow Patriarchate, Moscow adopted a confrontational stance. By far the largest of the 14 independent orthodox churches now regards itself as a global church in competition with the Greek-dominated Constantinople Patriarchate. In this competition, the Russian Orthodox Church is not only abandoning its “Russian world” ideology, but is also in effect breaking away from its Greek roots.

In der Ukraine wurde Anfang des Jahres 2019 eine orthodoxe Nationalkirche gegründet. Faktisch handelt es sich jedoch um kaum mehr als eine staatliche Kirchenorganisation. Der Versuch, die Ukraine mit der Gründung einer neuen Kirche zu einen, ist gescheitert. Die religiös-nationalistische Politik, die Präsident Porošenko ab Herbst 2018 betrieb, hat im Gegenteil zu neuen Konflikten und einer Spaltung des Landes geführt. Obwohl der Staat die Ukrainische Orthodoxe Kirche (Moskauer Patriarchat) als moskauhörig diffamierte und Druck auf sie ausübte, sind nur sehr wenige Gemeinden zu der neuen Kirche übergetreten. Berichte über angebliche Übertritte und vor allem Meinungsumfragen wurden instrumentell eingesetzt. Erst nach der Wahl von Volodymyr Zelens’kyj hat sich die Lage etwas entspannt. Zahlreiche Konflikte sind jedoch geblieben, etwa um Kirchengebäude, die mit Gewalt übernommen oder von örtlichen Verwaltungen ohne Rechtsgrundlage konfisziert worden sind. At the start of 2019, an orthodox national church was founded in Ukraine. However, this is no more than a state church organisation. The attempt to unify Ukraine by founding a new church has failed. The religious-nationalist policies pursued by President Poroshenko from the autumn of 2018 onwards have in fact led to new conflicts and a division of the country. Although the state discredited the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) as being loyal to Moscow and exerted pressure on it, only a small number of parishes joined the new church. Reports on alleged conversions, and opinion polls in particular, were instrumentalised for political purposes. It was only after Volodymyr Zelensky was elected that tensions were reduced to a certain degree. However, numerous conflicts remain unresolved, including disputes over church buildings that were forcibly seized or confiscated by local authorities without any legal grounds.