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This study assesses the dynamic relationship between macroeconomic factors and bank asset quality based on changes in the condition of stock market returns. A dynamic panel two-step system, the Generalized Method of Moments (system GMM) model, is employed using panel data from 18 universal banks spanning the period of 2007 to 2021. The analysis revealed that the real GDP growth rate, the average lending rate, and the real exchange rate represent a set of macroeconomic factors with a marked influence on banks’ asset quality, where a unit increase in these variables drive 0.02 percent, 0.98 percent, and 0.27 percent improvement in asset quality, respectively. In addition, a high-inflation rate was found to exert an adverse effect of −0.32 percent on asset quality, as it affects borrowers’ financial ability to meet loan repayment obligations. Furthermore, the study verified the existence of a positive relationship between market condition and asset quality, where a rise in the market return drives a 0.07 percent improvement in bank asset quality. This implies that bank performance adapts to changes in market conditions as posited under the Adaptive Market Hypothesis (AMH). Bank managers should consolidate banks’ asset bases during conditions of market stability to withstand periodic market fluctuations to boost trading momentum. Policy recommendations are suggested to foster a conducive business environment for bank stability.

Is there any need to clean up a banking system by closing some banks and forcing others to sell assets if the risk of a crisis becomes high? Impaired banks that may be forced to sell illiquid assets in the future have private incentives to hold, rather than sell, those assets Anticipating a potential fire sale, liquid buyers expect high returns, reducing their incentive to lend. Privately optimal trading decisions therefore lead to a worse fire sale and a larger drop in lending than is necessary. We discuss alternative ways of cleaning up the system and the associated costs and benefits.

We analyze lender of last resort (LOLR) lending during the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a novel data set on all central bank lending and collateral, we show that weakly capitalized banks took out more LOLR loans and used riskier collateral than strongly capitalized banks. We also find that weakly capitalized banks used LOLR loans to buy risky assets such as distressed sovereign debt. This resulted in a reallocation of risky assets from strongly to weakly capitalized banks. Our findings cannot be explained by classical LOLR theory. Rather, they point to risk taking by banks, both independently and with the encouragement of governments, and highlight the benefit of unifying LOLR lending and bank supervision.

This paper analyses the concentration of the banking system in Croatia and the impact of concentration on stability of the economic system as a whole over the period since 2002 to 2017. The level of concentration is usually related to the competitiveness of a particular sector, in this case the banking system, which affects the development and health of the country's entire economic system. The banking system, as the basis for the development of all other sectors of the economy, has been analysed here in the context of the concentration trend and efficiency in the selected time period using selected concentration indices: Concentration Ratio, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the Gini coefficient and the entropy measure using the variables of total assets of banks, loans granted, and received deposits. This research concludes that in the considered period of nearly 20 years, Croatia was among the EU countries with increased concentration level of the banking system.

Banks produce short-term debt for transactions and storing value. The value of this debt must not vary over time so agents can easily trade it at par like money. To produce money-like safe liquidity, banks keep detailed information about their loans secret, reducing liquidity if needed to prevent agents from producing costly private information about the banks' loans. Capital markets involve information revelation, so they produce risky liquidity. The trade-off between less safe liquidity and more risky liquidity determines which firms choose to fund projects through banks and which ones through capital markets.

We model a loop between sovereign and bank credit risk. A distressed financial sector induces government bailouts, whose cost increases sovereign credit risk. Increased sovereign credit risk in turn weakens the financial sector by eroding the value of its government guarantees and bond holdings. Using credit default swap (CDS) rates on European sovereigns and banks, we show that bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk in 2008. We document that post-bailout changes in sovereign CDS explain changes in bank CDS even after controlling for aggregate and bank-level determinants of credit spreads, confirming the sovereign-bank loop.

We develop an infinite horizon macroeconomic model of banking that allows for liquidity mismatch and bank runs. Whether a bank run equilibrium exists depends on bank balance sheets and an endogenous liquidation price for bank assets. While in normal times a bank run equilibrium may not exist, the possibility can arise in recessions. A run leads to a significant contraction in intermediation and aggregate economic activity. Anticipations of a run have harmful effects on the economy even if the run does not occur. We illustrate how the model can shed light on some key aspects of the recent financial crisis.

We analyze the impact of monetary policy on the supply of bank credit. Monetary policy affects both loan supply and demand, thus making identification a steep challenge. We therefore analyze a novel, supervisory dataset with loan applications from Spain. Accounting for time-varying firm heterogeneity in loan demand, we find that tighter monetary and worse economic conditions substantially reduce loan granting, especially from banks with lower capital or liquidity ratios; responding to applications for the same loan, weak banks are less likely to grant the loan. Finally, firms cannot offset the resultant credit restriction by applying to other banks.