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The textbook neoclassical growth model predicts that countries with faster productivity growth should invest more and attract more foreign capital. We show that the allocation of capital flows across developing countries is the opposite of this prediction: capital does not flow more to countries that invest and grow more. We call this puzzle the \"allocation puzzle\". Using a wedge analysis, we find that the pattern of capital flows is driven by national saving: the allocation puzzle is a saving puzzle. Further disaggregation of capital flows reveals that the allocation puzzle is also related to the pattern of accumulation of international reserves. The solution to the \"allocation puzzle\", thus, lies at the nexus between growth, saving, and international reserve accumulation. We conclude with a discussion of some possible avenues for research.

Capital flow and commodity cycles have long been connected with economic crises. Sparse historical data, however, has made it difficult to connect their timing. We date turning points in global capital flows and commodity prices across two centuries and provide estimates from alternative data sources. We then document a strong overlap between the ebb and flow of financial capital, the commodity price super-cycle, and sovereign defaults since 1815. The results have implications for today, as many emerging markets are facing a double bust in capital inflows and commodity prices, making them vulnerable to crises.

Official international economic statistics are generally considered accurate and meaningful gauges of cross-border flows of trade and capital. Most data users also assume that the quality of the underlying data keeps improving over time. Through an extensive review of the national accounting literature, archival research, two dozen interviews with high-level statisticians, and a series of data quality tests, we evaluate this common view for the primary source of data on trade and capital flows: the International Monetary Fund's Balance of Payments (BOP) Statistics. Our assessment paints a less rosy picture: reported figures are far less accurate than they are typically imagined to be and often do not correspond to the theoretical concepts with which users associate them. At the same time, measurement quality deteriorates over time as the transnationalization of economic production gradually undermines the validity of BOP statistics. Our findings raise serious questions about the widespread use of these numbers, with their deceptive pretense to accuracy, in scholarly research and public debate about the international political economy.

In this paper, we first compare house price cycles in advanced and emerging economies using a new quarterly house price data set covering the period 1990–2012. We find that house prices in emerging economies grow faster, are more volatile, less persistent, and less synchronized across countries than in advanced economies (AEs). We also find that they correlate with capital flows more closely than in AEs. We then condition the analysis on an exogenous change to a particular component of capital flows: global liquidity, broadly understood as a proxy for the international supply of credit. We identify this shock by aggregating bank-to-bank cross-border credit and by using the external instrumental variable approach introduced by Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013). We find that in emerging markets (EMs) a global liquidity shock has amuch stronger impact on house prices and consumption than in AEs. We finally show that holding house prices constant in response to this shock tends to dampen its effects on consumption in both AEs and EMs, but possibly through different channels: in AEs by boosting the value of housing collateral and hence supporting domestic borrowing; in EMs, by appreciating the exchange rate and hence supporting the international borrowing capacity of the economy.

This paper presents a welfare case for prudential controls on capital flows to emerging markets as a form of Pigouvian taxation that aims to reduce the externalities associated with the deleveraging cycle. We argue that restricting capital inflows during boom times reduces the potential outflows during busts. This mitigates the feedback cycle during such deleveraging episodes, when tightening financial constraints on borrowers and collapsing prices of collateral assets mutually reinforce each other. As a result, macroeconomic volatility is smoothed and welfare is unambiguously increased. This paper presents a simple model of collateralized international borrowing, in which the value of collateral assets endogenously depends on the state of the economy. When financial constraints are binding in such a setup, financial amplification effects (sudden stops) arise as declining collateral values, tightening financial constraints and falling consumption mutually reinforce each other. Such amplification effects are not internalized by individual borrowers and constitute a negative externality that provides a natural rational for the Pigouvian taxation of international borrowing.

Policymakers have relied on a wide range of policy tools to cope with capital flow shocks. And yet, the effects and interaction of these policies remain under debate, as does the motivation for using them. In this paper, quantile local projections are used to estimate the entire distribution of future policy responses to portfolio flow shocks for 20 emerging markets and understand the variety of policy choices across the sample. To assuage endogeneity concerns, estimates rely on the fact that global capital flows are exogenous from the viewpoint of any one of these countries. The paper finds that: (i) policy responses to capital flow shocks are heterogeneous across countries, fat-tailed—“extreme” responses tend to be more elastic than “typical” responses—and asymmetric—“extreme” responses tend to be more elastic with respect to outflows than to inflows; (ii) country characteristics are linked to policy choices—with cross-country differences in forex intervention relating to the size of balance sheet vulnerabilities and the depth of the forex market; (iii) the use of targeted macroprudential policy and capital flows management measures can help “free the hands” of monetary policy by allowing it to focus more squarely on domestic cyclical developments.

In this paper, we present a model of the financial resource curse (i.e., episodes of abundant access to foreign capital coupled with weak productivity growth). We study a two-sector (i.e., tradable and non-tradable) small open economy. The tradable sector is the engine of growth, and productivity growth is increasing with the amount of labor employed by firms in the tradable sector. A period of large capital inflows, triggered by a fall in the interest rate, is associated with a consumption boom. While the increase in tradable consumption is financed through foreign borrowing, the increase in non-tradable consumption requires a shift of productive resources toward the non-tradable sector at the expenses of the tradable sector. The result is stagnant productivity growth. We show that capital controls can be welfare-enhancing and can be used as a second-best policy tool to mitigate the misallocation of resources during an episode of financial resource curse.

International capital flows from rich to poor countries can be regarded as either too low (the Lucas paradox in a one-sector model) or too high (when compared with the logic of factor price equalization in a two-sector model). To resolve the paradoxes, we introduce a non-neoclassical model which features financial contracts and firm heterogeneity. In our model, free patterns of gross capital flow emerge as a function of the quality of the financial system and the level of protection for property rights(i.e., the risk of expropriation. A poor country with an inefficient financial system but a low expropriation risk may simultaneously experience an outflow of financial capital but an inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), resulting in a small net flow.

How effective are capital account restrictions? We provide new answers based on a novel panel data set of capital controls, disaggregated by asset class and by inflows/outflows, covering 74 countries during 1995-2005. We find the estimated effects of capital controls to vary markedly across the types of capital controls, both by asset categories, by the direction of flows, and across countries' income levels. In particular, both debt and equity controls can substantially reduce outflows, with little effect on capital inflows, but only high-income countries appear able to effectively impose debt (outflow) controls. The results imply that capital controls can affect both the volume and the composition of capital flows.